



PHD

Structure, environment and behaviour within development organisations: Using a contingency approach to study environmental influences on structure and behaviour in organisations in a number of Middle Eastern countries.

Atiyyah, Hamid

Award date:
1978

Awarding institution:
University of Bath

[Link to publication](#)

Alternative formats

If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk

Copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Access is subject to the above licence, if given. If no licence is specified above, original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms.

Take down policy

If you consider content within Bath's Research Portal to be in breach of UK law, please contact: openaccess@bath.ac.uk with the details. Your claim will be investigated and, where appropriate, the item will be removed from public view as soon as possible.

STRUCTURE, ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOUR WITHIN DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATIONS: USING A CONTINGENCY APPROACH TO STUDY
ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOUR IN
ORGANIZATIONS IN A NUMBER OF MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES.

submitted by Hamid Atiyyah
for the degree of Ph. D. of
the University of Bath
1978.

"Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright
of this thesis rests with its author. This
copy of the thesis has been supplied on
condition that anyone who consults it is under-
stood to recognise that its copyright rests with
its author and that no quotation from the thesis
and no information derived from it may be
published without the prior written consent of
the author".

"This thesis may not be consulted, photocopied
or lent to other libraries without the
permission of the author for 10 years from the
date of acceptance of the thesis".

[Signature] 8

UNI	BATH
SI	- 2 NOV 1978
Ph.D	

TELEPEN

60 7809008 9



ProQuest Number: U641699

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest U641699

Published by ProQuest LLC(2015). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

A SUMMARY

The theme of this dissertation is to demonstrate the usefulness of adopting a contingency approach for understanding organizational designs, structure and behaviour. It is made in two parts.

In the first part, a search is undertaken to identify the contingencies in the environment of the organization, the significant actors and processes in the organization, the patterns of exchange and interaction between the endogenous and the exogenous elements and the implications of this for structure and behaviour in the organization. The initial choice of planning organizations in a number of Middle Eastern countries made this search difficult because of the scarcity of information and studies on this area, its people and institutions. In the research model, it was argued that the political-ideological component of the environment of the organization constituted the major contingency facing the organization and its members. The implications of this contingency for structure and behaviour were to be studied at two levels of organizational analysis, the management and the individual employee. The hypotheses proposed at the end of the first part represented the significant dimensions of the contingency relationship and their impact on internal organizational features.

The second part of the dissertation begins with a short report on the difficulties encountered in preparing and administering the research measurement. These difficulties made it necessary to adjust the initial research plan and to enlarge the research sample. The final sample included planning and research organizations from

five countries in the area. The basic materials for this study consist of responses obtained on two questionnaires, one answered by the manager and the other by his subordinates. Additional materials were acquired in interviews with managers and/or senior employees and from written sources and documents.

The research findings show that there are significant interdependencies between these organizations and their respective environments. It was not possible, however, to test in any serious fashion whether or not there exists a relationship between the manager perception of the environment and his design of structure for his organization. The findings lend support to the hypothesis that the adjustment and satisfaction of the employee is a function of the degree of insecurity feeling he exhibits and the degree of structure imposed on him by his superior. The relationship supported by the data is not, however, congruent with the hypothesized one. In the concluding chapter, the organization is described as being made of personal informal elements and impersonal formal elements. To minimize these dysfunctional informal elements, a number of conditions, incorporating a contingency approach, for organizational designs are proposed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It would not have been possible to do this research without the help of many. I am most grateful to those who answered the questionnaires and were helpful in providing me with information and publications. My debt to my friends, Mohammed Kubba, Marwan Salama and Amin Helou, is great. Their help and that of other fellow alumni of the American University of Beirut was instrumental in doing the research. I gratefully acknowledge the help and diligent supervision of Professor Ian Mangham. Thanks are also due to the Iraqi Government for their partial financial help. Not enough words can be recited here to express my gratitude to my family who gave me all their financial and moral support. The help, encouragement and patience of my wife deserve a special mention. Finally, it must be made clear that responsibility for the ideas and opinions written or implied in this dissertation is mine alone.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter I ORGANIZATION THEORY: OPEN SYSTEMS AND THE INTERDEPENDENCIES WITH THE ENVIRONMENT	2
The Organization as an Open System	
The Environment of the Organization	
The Organization Response to Environmental Demands and Pressures	
The Emerging Contingency Approach and its Usefulness for Organization Research	
Chapter II PLANNING: THE CORE TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS	35
An Overview of Economic Planning	
A Model of Perfect Planning	
Imperfect Planning	
The Human Element in the Planning System	
Chapter III THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONNECTIONS	60
Politics, Ideology and the New Order	
The Immediate Impact	
Overcoming a Methodological Difficulty	
The Planning Function	
The Management Task	
The Manager Perception of the Environment	
The Implications of the Manager Perception	
Further Implications?	
The Search for other Indicators	
The Individual and his Environment	
Satisfying his Security Needs	
The Individual in the Organization	
The Management-Subordinate Mix	
Working Hypotheses	
Testing the Hypotheses	

PART TWO: THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION.....	99
Chapter IV MANAGER PERCEPTION OF THE ORGANIZATION ENVIRONMENT	110
The Environment Scale and the Manager Perception of the Environment Impressions about the Organization Expectations and Demands Inputs Nature of Work Relationship with other Organizations Appraisal of the Organization Products Research Findings on the Environment Continuum	
Chapter V MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTINGENCY	169
Changing the Environment Adapting to the Environment Two Research Establishments: A Comparative View Research Findings on the Manager Conformity Scale Research Findings on the Manager Distribution of his Time and Energy	
Chapter VI THE ORGANIZATION HUMAN ELEMENT	218
General Traits of the Individual The Employee Questionnaire Findings on the Insecurity Feeling Scale	
Chapter VII THE ORGANIZATION CLIMATE, CONFORMITY, AND EMPLOYEE ADJUSTMENT	258
The Physical Climate The Operation-Production Climate The Social Climate The Employee's Rights, Pay, Incentives and Promotion The Research Findings The Employee Conformity Scale The Adjustment-Satisfaction Scale Testing the Hypotheses The First Sample The Second Sample	

	Page
CONCLUSIONS	302
BIBLIOGRAPHY	318
APPENDIX I	338
APPENDIX II	370

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER V

Page

Table

1.	Ministerial Planning Managers' Scores on the Conformity Scale Listed in Order of their Scores on the Environment Scale.....	203
2.	Company Planning Managers' Scores on the Conformity Scale Listed in Order of their Scores on the Environment Scale.....	204
3.	Research Managers' Scores on the Conformity Scale Listed in Order of their Scores on the Environment Scale.....	204
4.	Type of Structure in Ministerial Planning Organizations Listed in Order of the Managers' Scores on the Environment Scale.....	211
5.	Type of Structure in Company Planning Organization Listed in Order of the Managers' Scores on the Environment Scale.....	212

Table		Page
6.	Type of Structure in Research Organizations Listed in Order of the Managers' Scores on the Environment Scale.....	212

CHAPTER VI

Table		
1.	Items Included in the First Insecurity Feeling Scale.....	244 - 246
2.	Frequency Distribution of Scores on the First Insecurity Feeling Scale.....	248
3.	Discriminative Powers (DP) of the Items Included in the Second Insecurity Feeling Scale.....	252
4.	Frequency Distribution of Scores Obtained on the Second Insecurity Feeling Scale.....	253
5.	Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on First and Second Scale by Educational Achievement....	255

CHAPTER VII

Table	Page
1. Adjustment and Satisfaction by Degree of Enforced Conformity and Insecurity Feeling.....	291
2. Adjustment and Satisfaction by Degree of Enforced Conformity and Insecurity Feeling.....	294

PART ONE:

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are being described as developing. This means that their governments are seeking to modernize their traditional technologies and to successfully transfer advanced technologies from developed countries into their economies. The development process can also be viewed as a concern for the application of rationality, which can be increased at an incremental rate over time, to the government operations in these countries. New concepts and functions are being introduced to realize these desirable states. One of these is the planning function as performed by central planning organizations and applied to the government domain of activities. The continuity and success of this organization is thought to be necessary to the success of the developmental process. Accordingly it seems justified to spend an effort on observing and studying the prospect of the planning organization in the changing environment of a number of developing countries in the Middle East.

This study belongs to the field of management-organization studies. In Part One of the dissertation, a search will be conducted for a useful interpretation of the organization-environment interface, making use of the current contingency approach in the study of organizations. The merits of this approach and its historical foundations are discussed in Chapter I. In Chapter II, the focus of the search is moved to the planning technology with the aim in mind of trying to identify the nature of the contingencies encountered by the organization. It is hoped that a research model incorporating these contingencies and the organization response will emerge in Chapter III.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION THEORY: OPEN SYSTEMS AND THE
INTERDEPENDENCIES WITH THE ENVIRONMENT

Current researches on organizations underline the usefulness of viewing organizations as open systems interdependent with other systems in their environment. In essence, this amounts to a major 'break-out' from the limited scopes of the Classical and Human Relations schools. On the other hand, the task of theory-making has been made even more difficult because of the complexity that results from introducing the environment into the realm of organization studies. Moreover, this approach demands the cultivation of new techniques and new abilities on the part of the researcher. In contrast, the closed system approach allows more freedom in formulating general models by excluding external factors and thus puts lesser demands on the abilities of the researcher. However, although using the open system approach may result in difficulties and delays for theory-making, it can better serve the long-term objective of a comprehensive and useful organization theory.

The origin of this trend in organization research can be traced to notions found in earlier studies. The relevancy of external factors for the study and understanding of internal organizational processes has been observed and examined by Barnard (1938), Selznick (1948, 1949), and Clark (1956). Their studies have suggested that,

among other things, the policies of managers and the internal 'politics' are conditioned by situational factors. Another contribution to the current approach came from attempts to explain the behaviour of individuals in the organization. Simon (1952) observes that cultural forces enter the organization with the organization members.

Selznick's (1948) theoretical framework deserves a closer look because it introduces the environment as a major factor in the shaping of organizational features. He observes first that environmental pressures result in problems for the organization. Selznick argues further that organizations in search for solutions to these problems should maintain adaptive and flexible structures. Accommodating the environmental pressures without undermining the purposes of the organization becomes the condition for survival and effective operation.

According to Selznick (1948): "Organizations may be viewed from two standpoints which are analytically distinct but which are empirically united in a context of reciprocal consequences. On the one hand, any concrete organizational system is an economy; at the same time it is an adaptive social structure". Selznick adds that the totality of the organization can be approximated if viewed as a cooperative system. What emerges from this is the 'organic' organization (Selznick's terminology), a reified animated system which decides, behaves and adjusts. In the tradition of

the structural-functional approach Selznick ascribes to the organization certain needs of which the fundamental one is the need for survival and continuity. An organization will attempt the satisfaction of these needs by interacting with the external environment. For example, "The organization will seek stable roots (or firm statutory authority or popular mandate) so that a sense of permanency and legitimacy of its acts will be achieved". These needs and the organization's designs to satisfy them are what students of organization must attend to, Selznick asserts. Selznick urges researchers to observe the different states of the organization system and their implications for various features of the organization such as goals, size, efficiency and effectiveness, leadership, and doctrine. These efforts would lead, Selznick is confident, to the formulation of a "theory of transformation in organization".

The Organization as an Open System

Selznick builds his theoretical framework on a system approach foundation. The works of Parsons, Gouldner, and Katz and Kahn also bear witness to the significant contributions derived from this approach. To understand these works, it might be necessary to review the basic concepts which characterize a system approach.

The system approach endows systems with specific features of which the interdependency of parts is the basic one. This is clearly identified in Ackoff's (1960) definition of a system as "an entity, conceptual or physical, which consists of interdependent parts". Another characteristic of living systems recognized by von Bertalanffy (1974)

is their openness to the environment. He observes that living systems can survive and adapt to the environment by maintaining exchanges with the environment and by continuously remodelling and adjusting their components. The steady state equilibrium which systems must attain differ from the chemical equilibrium of closed systems in its allowance for the performance of work by the system. Another quality of open systems, identified by von Bertalanffy, is equifinality. It means that open systems can move toward their final states via different routes and from different starting conditions.

Like Selznick, Talcott Parsons (1956) makes use of the system approach and its basic principles in his sociological model of organization. His model exhibits the two main features of open systems, namely the interdependency of parts and the openness to the environment.

Parsons' analytical tools for approaching the organization are the concepts of the goal and the value system. What distinguishes the organization from other social systems and defines its character, according to him, is the "primacy of orientation to the attainment of a specified goal". The significance of the goal and its attainment to the organization can be better understood if it is viewed as an output which the organization exchanges for scarce resources (inputs). Parsons (1956) argued: "It seemed appropriate to define an organization as a social system which is organized for the attainment of a particular type of goal; the attainment of that goal is at the same time the performance of a type of function on behalf of a more inclusive system, the society".

Parsons uses the concept of the value system to relate the organization to its environment, i.e. the total social system, and to explain the primacy of organizational goal. The organization is a sub-system of society and similarly its value system is derived from the social value system. The value system also provides the legitimation of the goal by affirming its utility for society and by establishing its primacy over group and individual goals, it serves to integrate the organization.

Parsons distinguishes four components in the structure of organization. The value system is one component. The second component (the procurement mechanisms) performs the vital function of acquiring the resources necessary for operating the organization. The third component prepares an operational plan for the organization. The task of linking the organization with society is the speciality of the fourth component, what Parsons calls the institutional patterns.

Goal attainment is not the only concern of organization; equally important is the organization's need for stability. The emphasis on the organization's need for stability implies that certain factors tend to make the system unstable and hence diverts the organization from its focal concern. While he admits that change may be effected by endogenous factors, Parsons views the exogenous pressures as the ultimate causes of change in the organization.

Alvin Gouldner (1959) begins his "Organizational Analysis" by identifying two approaches to the study of organization in the literature. We are indebted to him for clear and comprehensive definitions of these two approaches which are included below. The rational model or approach is represented by the Weberian bureaucracy and the natural model is the conception of organization found in the works of Selznick and Parsons. Gouldner finds in both models points of strength and weakness and calls for the synthesis of a "new and more powerful model".

Gouldner draws our attention to the rational model's overemphasis on the rationality of the organization in making the assumption that all decisions are rationally made and all actions are goal-oriented. In accordance with this, deviations from rationality are considered to be the products of ignorance or errors. He summed up his understanding of this model as follows: "Fundamentally, the rational model implies a 'mechanical' model, in that it views the organization as a structure of manipulable parts, each of which is separately modifiable with a view to enhancing the efficiency of the whole."

The natural system model, on the other hand, conceives of the organization as a whole 'organism' which interacts with other systems to satisfy certain needs. The distinguishing feature of this model is its interdependency with the social environment. It responds to environmental threats by adjusting its structure and the unplanned spontaneous nature of these responses is stressed. Gouldner makes the following statement on

this model: "The natural-system model is typically based upon an underlying 'organismic' model which stressed the interdependence of the component parts. Natural-system theorists tend to regard the organization, as a whole, as organically 'growing' with a 'natural history' of its own which is planfully modifiable only at great peril, if at all. Long-range organizational development is thus regarded as an evolution, conforming to 'natural laws' rather than to the planner's designs".

Although Gouldner clearly indicates his dissatisfaction with both models, he appears to be especially critical of the natural-system model. He finds the latter's neglect of the rational processes of organization unjustifiable and argues against the interdependency-of-parts principle by pointing out the presence of centrifugal forces within certain parts which make them more autonomous than others, i.e. less dependent on other parts of the organization. This methodological problem, however, cannot simply be solved by bringing together the two models since this does not assure us of comprehensiveness. Instead, there is a need, Gouldner asserts, for a dynamic synthesis of the two models which must represent the dynamic interaction of rational and unplanned aspects of organizational life.

Gouldner's argument for a more comprehensive approach provided the background and a point of departure for later studies on the organization

Emery and Trist (1960) came up with a more complex version of the open system which they called the socio-technical system. From results obtained in the field, Burns and Stalker (1961) deduced a typology distinguishing between the mechanistic and organic system of management. The works of Katz and Kahn (1966), James D. Thompson (1967), and David Silverman (1970) include significant attempts to refine Gouldner's basic propositions and to develop the needed synthetic model.

Emery and Trist observe that the survival and continuity of any enterprise depends on its exchanges with the environment. The main point which they emphasize is the complexity of the environment of the enterprise which necessitates an equally complex pattern of responses and adjustments on the part of the enterprise. Their version of an open system is constrained by the social environment, a technological component, and the resultant forces which emerge from the interactions of these two. It is also a rational force which can exercise influence over its environment and strives to enforce some order upon its fluctuations. Emery and Trist summarize their thesis as follows:

Considering enterprises as open socio-technical systems helps to provide a more realistic picture of how they are both influenced by and able to act back in their environment. It points in particular to the various ways in which enterprises are enabled by their structural and functional characteristics ('systems constants') to cope with the 'lacks' and 'gluts' in their available environment.

Burns and Stalker (1961) identify two systems of management in practice, the mechanistic and the organic systems. They indicate that "both types represent a 'rational' form of organization, in that they may both, in our experience, be explicitly and deliberately created and maintained to exploit the human resources of a concern in the most efficient manner feasible in the circumstances of the concern". From their study of twenty electronic firms they conclude that the mechanistic system of management or an approximation of it is suitable for organizations working under stable environmental conditions while a high degree of fluctuation and change in the environment, especially with reference to the stability or instability in market and of the technical know-how required by the product, calls for an 'organic' system of management.

The mechanistic system is ideally characterized by functional specialization, a clear-cut prescription of duties and responsibilities, vertical communication, and a high concentration of information at the top of the firm. In contrast, the organic system tends to be flexible in terms of specialization and job specificity for the purpose of accommodating the ever-changing environment. Instead of a hierarchy, the organic system exhibits a formula of stratification wherein authority belongs to the better informed and capable members. To compensate for the lack of formal channels for cooperation, a high degree of goal and value consensus (Parsons' value system?) is observed among members of the organization.

Katz and Khan (1966) find the Classical Organization Theory inadequate because it applies the closed-system approach. They are in favour of an open-system approach because it allows a comprehensive and dynamic examination of organization by focussing on the relationship between organizational structure and the environment. Their theoretical model for the understanding of organizations is "an energetic input-output system in which the energetic return from the output reactivates the system". Accordingly, they view social organization as "flagrantly open systems in that the input of energies and the conversion of output into further energetic input consist of transactions between the organization and its environment".

The open-system model, as outlined by Katz and Kahn, is a 'behavioural' model which conceives of structure in terms of human acts and responses. Lines of communication in this model run mainly upward, conveying the trends in the environment and the feedback. The functioning of an open system depends on the fulfilment of certain research activities. Operational research is concerned with improving the quality of product and the methods of production. Systemic research is intended to find out the organizational changes necessitated by changes in the technology. Katz and Kahn warn that decisions made in the organization are not entirely based on sound research activities for there is always the 'personality dimension' of the decision-maker which influences his decisions.

Katz and Kahn bring up an old controversial issue which has received ample attention in earlier studies. This issue centres round the question whether organizations tend to develop authoritarian or democratic structures. They propose that the degree of authoritarianism or democracy of the structure is a function of the particular environment and its degree of stability or instability. A hierarchical (authoritarian) structure is judged appropriate if environmental demands, being clear and having obvious implications, do not call for search and problem-solving activities. On the other hand, if the situation is such as that adequate time is available to the decision-maker within which he can arrive at the decisions involving the necessary adaptations, then a democratic structure is deemed feasible.

Following Gouldner, James D. Thompson (1967) finds the two models, the rational and the natural models, to be representative of two major trends in the literature. Observing the closed-system strategy in the rational model, he identifies its salient feature to be an assumption that "all action is appropriate action and its outcomes are predictable". Unlike the rational model, "the natural system model stresses homeostasis or self-stabilization, which spontaneously or naturally governs the necessary relationship among parts and activities and thereby keeps the system viable in the face of disturbances stemming from the environment". The homeostatic character of the natural model can be clearly seen in the elimination of a part which fails to render any significant contribution to the system.

Thompson also aspires to integrate the two models into a synthesis. He argues that while some understanding of the organization can be achieved by using either model, a comprehensive understanding would require a synthesis of the two models. To arrive at this synthesis, Thompson makes use of the notion of bounded rationality introduced by Simon (1957). Simon bases this notion on his observation that a decision-maker can become aware of only some of the information and alternative courses of action involved in his decision and, therefore, decisions tend to satisfice rather than maximise rationality. Accordingly, Thompson defines complex organizations "as open systems hence indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing determinateness and certainty".

The principal element in Thompson's synthetic or composite model is that organizations tend to circumscribe their technical cores (Parsons' operative mechanisms?) with defensive units while allowing free exchange with the environment at the institutional level for the purpose of legitimizing the goal and operations of the organization. In this way, the closed rational model and the open natural model are accommodated.

David Silverman (1970) begins his critical review of the theory by affirming that it should make clear the significant ways in which organizations are related to the society in which they are embedded.

He predicts that similarities will be detected between processes in organizations and in other social institutions. The tendency toward uniformity in values has already been observed by Parsons. This is, in essence, the sociological perspective that Silverman would like to see incorporated in the study of organization.

Silverman identifies three types of system; closed systems, partially-open systems, and open systems. He argues that studies based on the closed, or partially-open models are inadequate, and even misleading. The closed-system model results in a picture of the organization profoundly different from the real entity. On the other hand, the partially-open system model limits the scope of study by assuming the relevancy of a number of organizational variables and then attempting to relate them to external factors. He maintains that "to develop hypotheses solely in terms of internal variables then only to introduce external variables as a means of reducing inconsistencies in the data, prevents rather than assists an understanding of the processes through which the two are systematically related". The open-system model is preferred because it attempts a thorough investigation of the environmental demands. Identifying these demands before considering the organizational variables offers the researcher greater insight into the problems faced by the system and its attempts to solve them.

The viewpoint that has repeatedly surfaced in the preceding review is that organizations, their structure and processes are to an extent, conditioned by environmental factors.

Whether or not organizations survive and realize the goals depends on the feasibility of the organizational response to the environmental challenge, it is suggested. The different patterns of organizational response will be considered later but first we must attend to the ways in which organization students conceive of the relevant environment of the organization.

The Environment of the Organization.

A basic definition of the word environment, which can be found in a dictionary, refers to almost everything that environ or encircle an object, a person, an institution or a polity. In the different fields of inquiry, different sets of environmental conditions are considered depending on the subject matter of the particular field. A study of personality may refer to such environments as the home, the school and so on. A topic for investigation in the field of biological evolution is the relationship between the survival of a living thing and its physical environment. Among the themes which interest foreign-policy students is the effect that an environmental factor such as the state of detente between the two super powers has on a third country's foreign policy. What these few examples show is the strong relevancy of studying the envired phenomenon in terms of the environmental impacts on its constitution and behaviour.

If the environment is observed to have an appreciable impact, it is pertinent then to ask why this line of approach has only recently received consideration from organization specialists. Two reasons can be identified. The first of these is the weight of a substantial heritage in organization

studies which pay little, if any, attention to the environment of the organization. Also it is apparently easier to investigate the effect of such factors as size, informal groupings and other internal variables rather than that of culture, the stage of development, and technology.

Studies based on the openness to the environment principle need to make clear their underlying conceptions of the relevant environment, its internal dynamics, and its evolution. Among advocates of this approach, there is little agreement on how to represent the environment. Instead, they appear to conceive of different configurations of the environment in variance with differing situations.

The general tendency among researchers is to select an aspect of the environment which is then presented as the most relevant or as having the greatest impact. Sleznick and Parsons, for example, concentrate on the institutional or social environment of the organization. This refers to the sum total of individuals, groups, and institutions which surround the organization. In his study of the TVA, Selznick (1949) presents the case of an organization working under pressures from the community. The organization's concession which takes the form of admitting representatives of the community on its policy-making board is judged necessary to ensure the continuity of support and legitimation from the community. In the final analysis, an organization develops a close relationship with what he calls an 'administrative constituency' which is "a group, formally outside a given organization to which the latter (or an element within it) has a special commitment".

Parsons' social environment can be identified as people, other institutions, or simply society. The common conceptual thread in Parsons' general model is the social value system. It is this social value system, i.e. the general norms governing orientations to action in a society, which is the source of the exogenous factors.

Following a similar line of thought, Katz and Kahn (1966) define the social environment of the organization as "other people, their behaviour and the products of their activities". Another way of looking at the environment in their model is as being the reservoir of inputs necessary for operating the organization. They also recognize that particular forces in the environment, cultural or political, may effect a change in the organization's priority scale by de-emphasizing the profit motive and by stressing the community welfare orientations.

The importance of other organizations as factors in the environment is affirmed by Katz and Kahn (1966), Thompson and McEwen (1958), and Aiken and Hage (1972). Aiken and Hage consider a particular situation in which an organization in order to survive enters into joint programmes with other organizations. They explain that the joint programme is different from other forms of inter-organizations cooperation in that it is "often a relatively enduring relationship, thus indicating a high degree of organizational interdependence".

The fact that the organization is often seen as a system competing with other systems over a limited supply of resources suggests to Yuchtman and Seashone (1967) a distinction between rich and poor environments. They observe that while it may be easier for an organization to survive and operate in an environment of plenty, the available resources are still exhaustible in either the short or the long run.

William Dill's (1958) task environment includes all aspects of the environment which are 'relevant or potentially relevant to goal-setting and goal attainment'. In his study of two Norwegian business firms, he isolates the following factors as the ones having the 'greatest impact': customers, suppliers, competitors, and regulatory groups. Dill finds that members of the management team in either firm do not ascribe to a common conception of the relevant environment; each tends to emphasize that part of the environment most relevant to his line of work.

Another group of organization students, Joan Woodward (1958), Burns and Stalker (1961) and Edward Harvey (1958), are interested in the technological component of the environment. Technology is observed by Woodward to shape the organizational structure and in particular such aspects of structure as size, levels of authority, and the ratio of managers and supervisors to the total number of personnel. Burns and Stalker investigated in great detail the impact of technological and scientific advances on the organization and management of the industrial firm.

They found that an organization could survive and maintain its outlets to the market by responding to changes in the technology. Similar conclusions were arrived at in the study of forty-three industrial firms by Edward Harvey.

Instead of emphasizing either the social or technological component of the environment, Homans (1950), and Emery and Trist (1960) choose to consider their combined effect. Homans affirms that these two components (and a third physical component) enforce certain patterns of behaviour and activities on members of the system. The socio-technical model of Emery and Trist represents the complex ways in which both components interact and influence the operations of the organization. They dispute the tendency of many researchers to restrict the relevancy of the technological component to "the initial stage of building an enterprise".

Emery and Trist (1965) suggest a useful concept for approaching the environment. The 'causal texture of the environment' is introduced by them to describe the kind of relationships that develop among components of the environment. Four ideal types of causal texture are said to represent points on a continuum from low to high degree of inter-components relatedness. The first ideal type, the placid, randomized environment is that in which "goals and noxiants ('goods' and 'bads') are relatively unchanging in themselves and randomly distributed".

The second ideal type is more complex than the first type in that goals and noxiants acquire a clustered distribution. However, this type is still placid, hence, it is called the placid, clustered environment. A further increase in the degree of complexity of causal texture is represented by the third ideal type, the disturbed reactive environment. It is the environment in which the organization faces competition from other organizations. The fourth ideal type, the turbulent fields, is the highest point on the scale of environmental complexity suggested by Emery and Trist. In this, complexity is increased by the dynamic properties emanating from the field.

Shirley Terreberry (1968) interprets the increasing interest in the environment of the organization as evidence that the causal texture of the environment is undergoing evolution toward increasing complexity (the turbulent type of Emery and Trist). This complexity is characterized by "an increase in the ratio of externally induced change in a system's transactional interdependence".

Robert Duncan (1972) notes that previous studies have failed to produce a comprehensive conception of the organization environment. He sets out to do so by defining the environment as "the totality of physical and social factors that are taken directly into consideration in the decision-making behaviour of individuals in the organization".

From the works of Emery and Trist, Thompson, and Terreberry, he distills two dimensions of the environment, namely the simple-complex and the static-dynamic. He suggests that a changing environment generates more uncertainty for the organization than a complex static environment.

In the preceding review, the focus was maintained on a number of general approaches proposing novel perceptions of the organization and inviting an extension of the scope of organization study to cover the organization interactions with the environment. The nature of these interactions and their implications for structure and behaviour in the organization is the theme of the following section.

The Organization Response to Environmental Demands and Pressures

The environment of the organization has been identified as the source of uncertainty and threats to the organization. At the same time, it is also the reservoir from which the organization acquires its resources, support, and legitimacy. It is therefore only logical to expect the emergence of some pattern of exchange between the organization and its environment. How do the specialists conceive of this exchange relationship?

Parsons (1956), A. Rice (1963) and Katz and Kahn (1966) analyse this relationship in terms of an input-output model. Sleznick (1948) and Thompson (1967) are interested in the defensive mechanisms of the organization. Others choose to discuss the influence of the organizational environment on internal features of the organization such as goals, structure, and behaviour.

A. Rice and Katz and Kahn use an input-output model as a frame of reference. They argue that the organization needs an intake of various resources which must be imported from the environment. Inside the organization, these inputs are processed and transformed into outputs which are then exported to the environment. Rice and Katz and Kahn agree that information constitutes a major item on the imports quota of the organization. From this information, the organization, or specifically its adaptive component can foretell the shape of its future environment and accordingly plan its future policies. In much the same way that the organization depends on other systems

for inputs, other systems will need the outputs of the organization as inputs for their consumption or operations. Thus, an organization has the potential means to exercise influence over the dependent systems.

The capability of the system to forecast with increasing accuracy the shape of its environment is a function of the system's learning capacity, Deutsche (1952) proposes. This capability, the system's degree of openness, the efficiency of its parts, and its power are all factors recognised by Deutsche to have an influence on the system's ability to resist the externally-enforced changes.

Selznick (1948) and Thompson (1967) regard the self-defensive mechanisms of the organization as the principal means for coping with the environment. One such mechanism observed by Selznick is 'ideology'. This serves as the moral shield of the organization against environmental subversion. Another mechanism identified by Selznick is cooptation. He defines this as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership on policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence". Selznick distinguishes between formal cooptation in which representatives of the community are admitted and informal cooptation in which powerful individuals or representatives of pressure groups are coopted. In the latter case, the concession is not made public so as not to undermine the organization claim to represent the wider public. Selznick makes it clear that cooptation involves commitment and the introduction of a constraint on the choice exercised by the organization leadership.

According to Thompson, an organization can adjust to its environment by including within its structure specialized parts which are assigned the task of maintaining the necessary level of interaction with the environment. The primary task of organizations is to protect their 'core technologies' i.e. their internal operations, from environmental fluctuations. Input and output components absorb some of these fluctuations. An organization may also have to forecast the environmental changes and accordingly enhance its state of preparedness. It can also design and develop its structure to minimize contingencies. This may involve extending the boundaries of the organization to include tangential activities.

Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, 1969) suggest another interpretation of the organization-environment relationship in terms of two processes, namely differentiation and integration. They begin their analysis by asserting the relevancy of viewing organizations as natural systems made up of interdependent parts and which can be adjusted and modified, i.e. 'morphogenic'. They suggest that an organization deals with its environment by assigning to each of its subsystems the task of coping with a sub-environment. This leads them to hypothesize that each of the subsystems "would tend to develop particular attributes which would be predictably related to characteristics of its relevant external environment". This subsystems tendency is counterbalanced by the existence of an integrative subsystem which acts to bring together and co-ordinate the various subsystems within a common framework.

Analyzing the organizational set-up by way of its interdependencies with the environment has resulted in new conceptions of the organization, its goals, structure, and the common nomenclature used in organization studies.

Instead of viewing the organization as a closed entity which exists in order to achieve certain goals, the new emphasis is on its openness to the environment and on its basic needs for survival and adjustment. Classical conceptions of the organization lose much of their validity when elements of uncertainty and irrationality are observed to surround and influence the organization. The search for the timeless non-situational understanding of the organization is abandoned in favour of the new revelation that the organization character is evolving and situational. With the emergence of this orientation in research, several key organizational concepts have been given new meaning.

Goals have been customarily viewed as the desired end states to which all activities within the organization are directed. These goals are stipulated in the organization charter or can be gathered from the statements of owners or policy makers of the organization. One of the findings of the Human Relations school is that activities of members of the organization are not always directed towards the achievement of the formal goals. An individual joins the organization to realize his personal goals and as a member of a group in the organization he pursues the group goals. The displacement of the goal phenomenon, i.e. when an

organization changes its initial goal either because it has been fulfilled or for other reasons, has also been widely observed.

Instead of the official goals, Charles Perrow (1961) suggests a more useful concept, namely the operative goals. He finds official goals "vague and general and do not indicate two major factors which influence organizational behaviour: the host of decisions that must be made among alternative ways of achieving official goals and the priority of multiple goals and the many unofficial goals pursued by groups within the organization". On the other hand, operative goals are identified by Perrow as the "means to the official goals". Operative goals determine the following three tasks: the importation of inputs from the environment, the activation of resources and skills, and the coordination of activities. In a recent study, Perrow (1970) underlines the futility of the search for organizational goals and the difficulties encountered in trying to distinguish between goals and means and concludes that "strictly speaking, organizations do not have goals, only individuals do". Silverman (1971) reflects this dissatisfaction with the concept of organizational goals when he asserts that an organization cannot be described as having a goal unless all of its members perceive and acknowledge it to be the purpose of their participation. He proposes that organizations can be better described as having needs rather than goals.

In accordance with their model, Katz and Kahn (1966) view the output (goal) of the system as simply a catalyst which reactivates the cycle by allowing the system to import more inputs. The output must, therefore, be of value and utility to the society in which the organization is located. They understand organizational functions or goals "not as the conscious purposes of group leaders or group members but as the outcomes which are the energetic source for a maintenance of the system type of output".

Given these new outlooks on the organizational goals, one can expect corresponding changes on the conceptions of efficiency and effectiveness. In the closed model, effectiveness and efficiency are tangible calculable measures which are useful for evaluating the capability of the organization to realize its stated purposes and for rating this capability in terms of the costs incurred. The open system approach of Katz and Kahn proposes new applications for the two terms: efficiency becomes a measure of the organization's ability to survive and grow while effectiveness becomes a measure of the success of the organization in transforming inputs into socially useful outputs.

As in the case of goals, efficiency, and effectiveness, the concept of organizational structure received new interpretations. Under Weber's influence, early studies of organizations viewed the hierarchy as the backbone of the organization, an ideal recipe for the distribution of authorities and responsibilities so that each member of the organization would know his super-ordinates and his subordinates. This approach in organization studies produced the distinction between line (the authority structure) and staff (the consultancy unit),

the pyramidal structure, and the primacy of formal procedures, i.e. a prescribed manual for doing things in the organization. In essence, this is an ossified image of the organizational structure.

The open system advocates subscribe to a different view of the organizational structure. They judge the hierarchical structure suitable only for organizations working under stable conditions in their respective environments. However, as the environment becomes increasingly uncertain and unpredictable, the structure of the organization must become less hierarchical and less rigid if the organization is to adapt and survive. Rather than concentrating authority at the top, this calls for an increase in the prerogatives of subordinates. In this event, structure is reduced to the minimum of programmes and procedures which are not affected by the adaptive process.

Organizations are observed to respond to uncertainty by adjusting their structures in a number of ways. An organization may simply restructure its activities to minimize the effects of uncertainty or it may learn to operate at a lower level of rationality. A better strategy for dealing with uncertainty is by enhancing structurally the organization's ability to identify and respond to the fluctuations at the time of their occurrence. One way of doing this is by maintaining a flat structure which can attain greater congruence between the organizational components and the corresponding environmental sectors.

Another way envisaged by Perrow (1970) is by establishing formal points of contact with the environment. Thus, each organizational component or point of contact would then be concerned with the uncertainty posed by a particular sector of the environment.

A special type of organizational response to uncertainty is the decision to enter into alignment or special arrangement with other organizations. While this may help the organization to ensure a regular supply of resources or to neutralize the threat of a third party, it is observed to result in an extra burden for the organizational structure.

According to Aiken and Hage (1972), the maintenance of such arrangements which involve an amount of cooperation among the parties must be assigned to an organizational unit, either an already existing one or a new unit created for this purpose. Emery and Trist (1965) observe such relationships to arise when the environment is of the turbulent fields type:

Turbulent environments require some relationship between dissimilar organizations whose fate are, basically, positively correlated. This means relationships that will maximize co-operation and which recognize that no one organization can take over the role of 'the other' and become paramount. We are inclined to speak of this type of relationship as an organizational matrix.

The organizational structure has also been correlated with technology. Thus, the initial choice of a technology or subsequent changes in it are observed to have specific implications for structure. Joan Woodward (1958) found that the technology used by a firm is strongly associated with three characteristics of structure namely, the span of control, the number of managers and supervisors as a percentage of the total number of employees, and the number of responsibility levels in the hierarchy. Further investigations by Pugh, Hickson and Pheysey (1969) and Perrow (1967) confirm the significant influence of technology on structure and especially such aspects as the degree of formalization and the division of labour.

The Emerging Contingency Approach and its Usefulness for Organization Research.

The works reviewed in the preceding sections serve as evidence of the increasing significance of viewing the organization as inter-dependent with its environment. There is now less enthusiasm for exploring universal principles of organization and management. Instead, there is an emphasis on the contingent character of the organization. Some like Heller (1966) and Negandhi and Reiman (1972) even identify a contingency theory in the literature. To Heller, a contingency theory "means that findings are expected to vary according to the contingencies of different situations". Negandhi and Reiman understand the contingency theory as viewing the structure and processes of the organization to be dependent on its interaction with the environment. According to Hicks and Gillet (1975), the contingency

approach is a negation of the classical and behavioural 'one best way' because it advocates that "different environments require different organizational relationships for optimum effectiveness".

The contingency approach is characterized by an open-minded outlook, or to put it in other words, to expect anything. Otherwise, disappointments can result. It was perhaps the original disappointment of international administration experts who were employed to improve and modernize the administrative systems of developing countries that led to an appreciation of the environmental imperatives and that Western administration "principles" could not be implanted anywhere without due regard to the situational factors. This gave rise to the ecological approach in administration studies. The belief in the prepotency of the environmental impact also appears in studies in the field of international or comparative management. According to Hans Schollhammer (1969) the comparative management field acquired a distinct identity around 1960. He argues that since then the branches of this field have developed into a 'jungle'. His stocktaking article includes several references to books and articles in which focus is put on the environmental conditioning of the organization. There is undoubtedly some confusion regarding what aspects of the environment constitute the prepotent variable(s). Otto Nowotny (1964) found that the socio-cultural demand factor accounted for differences in management thoughts between American and European regions.

The finding that differences in management philosophy and practice can be explained by bringing in the cultural variable appears also in other studies, e.g. Oberg (1963), Gonzalez and McMillan, Jr. (1961), and Hall (1959). Nevertheless, this factors has been found by Negandhi and Reimann (1972) and Haire, Ghiselli, and Porter (1963) to have limited effectiveness. Moreover, a review of thirty-three comparative management studies led Ajiferuke and Boddewyn (1970) to conclude that "much of the claim about 'culture' being the most significant variable in management comparisons rest more on speculation than on facts". In their study of managerial attitudes in five geographical regions, Cummings, Harnett and Stevens (1971) report the finding that while cultural differences have an impact, it is the individual differences which explain most of the variations in the results. Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Meyers (1964) argue that management behaviour reflects the demands of the particular economic environment.

In view of this diversity of outlooks on the environment of the organization, it would be difficult at this stage to select the contingent element(s) for this study - unless it is done at random. This will have to wait then until some knowledge of the organization under study and its environment is gained. The progress of our search activities is reported in the following two chapters of Part One.

It suffices now to make clear the contingency approach as understood in this study. It is essentially Heller's (1966) following conception:

Different habits of thought or role behaviour would form part of a contingency theory, but most other expected differences have no relation to nationality. For instance, the experience of managers, their perceptions of what goes on at work, their role expectations and the organization structure within which they work are all put forward as contingencies. These different situations cut across psychological, sociological and technical variables and constitute an open system approach.

CHAPTER II

PLANNING: THE CORE TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS.

The preceding chapter was concluded with the emphasis being laid on viewing the organization as envired by constraints and faced with contingencies. It was also proposed that a rough idea of the organization set-up and the contingencies in its environment can be gathered from reviewing the basic functions performed in such an organization. The organizations chosen for this study are the economic planning organizations in a number of Middle Eastern countries. The search for the significant events in the planning process begins with a definition of the planning concept and an overview of the economic planning phenomenon. This is followed by an attempt to construct an ideal model of planning which is expected to be useful for identifying the planning events and their spatial and temporal relationships and then a number of hypothetical instances of imperfect planning will be drawn up by varying the inputs from the environment. This exercise is expected to make visible the environmental elements which can significantly influence the planning operations.

As its name suggests, planning organizations perform planning functions and are involved in the preparation of plans. The plans produced by these organization are intended to bring about social and economic advantages to the systems undertaking planning. Planning is generally understood as a human process designed to enhance the rationality of human decisions and action. It involves the making of plausible assumptions about the future which are ideally based on relevant knowledge of past and present trends. A maximisation of rationality is the central purpose of planning, however, this does not preclude the emergence of irrationality in the plans.

Planning is basically a human mental process which all, except the perfect fatalist, exercise. Hence, one way of introducing it is by considering few of its common applications. A person plans, consciously or unconsciously, when he decides the time, place and cost of his holiday. A planning of a higher order of importance is involved when a college freshman decides to read medicine from a wide choice of subjects. In this case, the planning is of a long-term nature, since the student does not only decide on a course of study extending over a number of years but also on a life-time profession. From these two examples, one can gather that planning is a decision-making activity concerning a period of time in the future.

And since the future is host to numerous unknowns regarding which one can only make conjectures based on past and present knowns, uncertainty in planning is inevitable.

Although planning appears far from being a smooth mental process, its appeal and importance cannot be belittled as this testimony from Hayek (1944), a scholar with deep-seated suspicions of planning, shows:

Planning owes its popularity largely to the fact that everybody desires, of course, that we should handle our common problems as rationally as possible, and that in so doing we should use as much foresight as we can command.

Hayek admits that the task of dealing with the problems generated by this complex technical era justifies the resort to planning. Also, planning is beneficial because it produces a coherent picture of the subject matter to which it is applied. Unlike Hayek, John Friedman (1959) is a firm believer in the value of planning. He finds it to be "inherent in the very conception of society" and "indispensable to its survival". He defines planning as "an activity by which man in society endeavours to gain mastery over himself and to shape his collective future consciously by power of his reason".

The basic instrument of planning is said to be reason. Accordingly, seven 'modes of thought' are recognized by Friedman to characterize planning: "It must be objective, analytical, integrative, projective, experimental, Utopian, and possessed of an aesthetic vision".

He is also aware that the planner's work is subject to a powerful element of uncertainty and he feels that this puts obvious limitations on the time span for which a plan can be prepared. In view of this uncertainty, if planning is to remain useful, it must be continuous and flexible.

On a less philosophical and less romantic level, the operational aspects of planning are stressed. This is found in Robert Dahl's (1959) definition of planning as "any deliberate effort to increase the proportion of goals attained by increasing awareness and understanding of the factors involved in making the choices that are a part of any decision". Similarly, planning is viewed by Tinbergen (1959) as "the technical elaboration of the means needed for the implementation of a policy which is considered as already given". This is not significantly different from Dror's (1969) definition except that he can conceive of the possibility that the given goals of planning may not be clearly specified and, hence, the first effort in planning will be spent on defining the otherwise ambiguous goals. Dror outlines some basic characteristics of planning such as its being a continuous process which involves the preparation of a number of interrelated decisions. Stripped of its emotional and ideological connotations,

planning is reduced to the core operation of searching for the most suitable means for realising the goals.

An Overview of Economic Planning

The type of planning which concerns us here is economic planning for development as performed by specialised planning agencies in the developing countries. One can justifiably argue that there are as many planning experiences as there are governments applying their own conceptions of planning. Nevertheless, these experiences are customarily classified into Western, Communist, and Third World types. All these can be traced to a common origin in Europe of the last century.

The adherents of socialism in the nineteenth century were the first to call for the institution of economic planning to redress the gross inequality in the distribution of wealth. Some, such as Saint Simon (1760-1825), saw it as the instrument for the salvation of mankind in that it would finally make possible the creation of a Utopian society. Early proponents of economic planning justify their sentiments by stressing the chaotic effect of market forces. However, many neither shared these sentiments nor appreciated their logical appeal.

The proponents of laissez-faire economy argued that economic planning should be opposed because of its negative implications for individual freedom and they maintained that competition was a superior instrument for the adjustment of economic activities in society. Hayek (1944) while acknowledging the appeal of economic planning to rational minds argued that planners could not acquaint themselves with all the relevant facts or satisfy the numerous and diverse conditions for human welfare and happiness.

Karl Mannheim (1940) observes no conflict between freedom and planning. On the contrary, he is confident of the general benefits of planning and, indeed, in its particular contribution to freedom. Mannheim's faith in planning can be better understood if it is viewed in the context of his general philosophical theory. The central hypothesis in this theory, as identified by Bachrach (1969) is that "the intellectual elite are committed to freedom, and capable, through the utilization of social techniques and planning, to lead a directionless mass society to the safety of an ordered constitutional democracy". But Karl Mannheim did not resolve the alleged conflict between freedom and planning, John Friedman (1959) points out. Friedman noticed that Mannheim "forgot that planning could become a tool in the hands of both dictator and democrat to be used or misused by either".

The viewpoint that economic planning is a tool which can be used to serve different ends is confirmed by the acceptance and application of planning in both 'communist' and 'capitalist' countries. However, while the partial reconciliation of capitalist democracies to one or the other form of economic planning did not occur until after the Second World War, the Soviet Union has undertaken large-scale central economic planning almost since the consolidation of Bolshevik rule. The Soviet Union's adherence to planning was advanced by practice rather than dogma. The concept of economic planning received little attention from Karl Marx beyond his identification of it as 'the road to industrialization'. Lenin, on the other hand, manifested a remarkable insight into the meanings and uses of planning. He wrote the following statement on the plan as a political symbol, quoted by Jewkes (1968):

a plan (not a technical but a political scheme)
which could be understood by the proletariat.
For example, in ten years (or 5?) we shall
build twenty (or 30 or 50?) power stations
covering the country with a network of such
stations..... We need such a plan at once to
give the masses a shining unimpeded prospect to
work: and in ten (or 20?) years we shall electrify
Russia, the whole of it, both industrial and
agricultural.

Central economic planning has become institutionalised in the Soviet Union. This particular type of planning, as defined in The McGraw Hill Dictionary of Modern Economics (1965), "implies the determination by a supreme governmental authority of the quality, kind, and quantity of goods to be produced by a nation". Tinbergen (1963) notes that this experience in economic planning "has taught the world some of the possibilities in this field".

The principal difference between communist planning and the planning models of the Western democracies and the developing countries is that in the latter cases, governments do not attempt to plan for the totality of economic activities in their countries. In the Western democracies, planning is used to neutralise the disruptive effects of economic fluctuations. For the developing countries, the resort to planning is made necessary by the finiteness of their resources and the need to employ these resources in the most productive and efficient manner. In these countries, the benefits of planning are sometimes exaggerated when it is presented as the solution to all the national problems. In practice, however, planning in developing countries is invested with more realism than with myth. According to Tinbergen (1963), their plans are, in most cases, "mixed plans in which the government would act itself in a direct way, by establishing infrastructure (roads, schools, dwellings), but would also act indirectly by measures to stimulate private activity (pilot farms, industrial estates, tax measures, education)".

A Model of Perfect Planning

This model can never be observed in real situation; it may exist, however, in the mind of some Utopians. Like all ideal constructs of reality, a model of perfect planning can provide us with a comprehensive view of the phenomenon - comprehensive in the sense that it brings together and relate a large number of the constituent features or events. Two sets of assumptions are needed for the simulation of perfect planning: one set of assumptions on the internal state and another on the environment. The internal state refers to the operations that take place, and their doers who reside, within the alleged boundaries of the planning set-up. The assumptions on the internal state are: all acts are purposeful; all actors are skilful; and conflict is nonexistent. The assumptions on the environment of the planning set-up are equally important: the environment is benign and the planners can acquire all the necessary inputs from the environment without having to compromise over their purposeful activities.

In the model of perfect planning, outlined in Figure 1, the planning process is represented in terms of a sequence of operations which begins with the setting of goals in the political-ideological system and ends with the transmission of feedback to the planners. Ideally, the goal-setting step is followed by another step concerning the goals, namely the goals-clarifying procedure which allows the planners to seek and acquire clarifications of the goals they are expected to plan for. After this, the planners will have a number of clear and authorized targets for the short-term plan.




Figure 1: A Perfect Planning Model

Given these targets, the planners will then prepare a number of directives which are sent to the government departments, research and development organizations, universities, and business groups in the country. These directives are intended, on the one hand, to stimulate the preparation of economic projects and other inputs useful for planning, and on the other, to ensure that these projects are prepared in conformity with the prescribed limitations of priorities, finance, and time. In response, these institutions can devise projects and submit them to the planners, suggest ideas and issues which can be elaborated into projects in the technical units of the planning set-up, and conduct studies and report on problems which interest the planners. In the technical units, teams of experts will receive, review, and process the inputs of ideas, reports, and projects. Afterwards a number of projects are expected to reach the choice-coordinating centre where a selected group of projects are fitted into a plan. A plan must then win the official endorsement of the political-ideological system.

Experts on planning, like Bertram Gross (1965), argue convincingly that our view of the planning operations should not stop at this point because a plan that is not or cannot be implemented has no value. The extension of the planning model to include the implementation phase involves the political leadership in initiating, directing, and overseeing this implementation.

This extended planning cycle ends with the communication of feedback from the implementing agencies to the planners. These feedbacks can serve, in the context of perfect planning, as a source of ideas for the next planning cycle.

Imperfect Planning

The available literature on planning for development or, indeed, on any form of decision-making is full of incidents of imperfect planning or imperfect decision-making. Actual deviations from the above model can be traced to internal and/or external (environmental) factors. To begin with, the planner may not be able to come up with the optimizing decisions contemplated for perfect planning because his abilities in terms of skills and knowledge are limited or simply because the human actor's decision-making is not solely governed by reason or the goals prescribed for him. Furthermore, interpersonal relationships inside the planning set-up may not always be free of conflict as required for perfect planning. A treatise on imperfect planning due to internal factors can run into great length, however, our concern here is limited to imperfections produced by external contingencies. In the remaining sections of this chapter, the effect of these contingencies on planning will be hypothetically investigated by varying in each case a specific input from the environment.

1. When the political-ideological system fails to specify the goals or to provide the necessary clarifications to the planners and impose constraints on the planners' work.

The notion that goals can be easily identified and clarified is one misleading oversimplification of the perfect planning model. The setting and elucidation of the goals of planning are political functions over which the planners have little, if any, influence. The possibility that the political leadership may fail to set or to clarify the goals cannot be dismissed. Indeed, this can be expected if the leadership does not have enough support or when it is divided amongst itself, e.g. a coalition government. In any case, the setting of the goals of planning involves more than the publication of a statement on the desirability of economic development and economic self-sufficiency or even the prescription of an operational target such as a specific annual increment on the national income. What these explicit formal statements do not make clear are the political answers to some basic political questions such as whom the development programme should benefit and what social and economic costs can be incurred in the process. However, it is doubtful that the political leaders will attempt answering such questions if this involves the risk of major disagreements among themselves and invites the possibility of losing their hold over political power.

The effect that the absence of political clarifications of the goals have on planning can only be contemplated here. Lacking these clarifications, the planners will find it difficult to prepare the relevancy-maintaining directives which are necessary to stimulate and channel the efforts of government departments and other concerned parties. One conceivable outcome of this is that the ingoing communication lines of the planning set-up will be overloaded with demands and projects from the various government departments and the planners will be in a difficult position in trying to sort out and choose from this flood. Also, the research and development agencies will not be able without these directives to satisfy the planners' need for information and technical studies.

If, despite these difficulties, the planners can still put together and issue a plan, the probability that it will be rejected by the authorizing body is high. This is because a discussion of the plan would only give rise to the unanswered questions and if the risk of disagreement is still evident, the easy way out for the politicians would be to reject the plan. On the other hand, the planners may take the safe alternative of incorporating the 'budgetary formula' in their planning. In other words, the funds allocated to development will be distributed among the government activities in the same proportion found in the ordinary government budget. This is labelled in the literature as epiphenominal planning, i.e. planning the possible.

Two important studies by Meyerson and Banfield (1965) and Lindblom (1959) are referred to when the effects of this contingency on decision-making are considered. Meyerson and Banfield describe the situation faced by the Chicago Housing Authority's planners in their endeavour to fulfil a mandate for the construction and distribution of public housing units. Although this goal appears to be sufficiently clear, planning for its achievement was made difficult by disagreements over such issues as which group should benefit first from the programme and whether or not the programme should preserve the existing city configuration of 'pure' white and 'pure' coloured areas. The authors conclude their study with a conception of the goal as having active and contextual elements:

The active elements are those which occupy the foreground of the image so to speak; they are the features of the desired situation which have been singled out and made the focus of interest and activity. Contextual elements are in the background: they are value conditions which ought to be realised or ought not to be violated in the attainment of the active element.

Meyerson and Banfield conceive of a situation in which the contextual elements increase in number and stringency to the extent that it will be impossible to put the goal into operation.

That decision-makers may arrive at their decisions even if they cannot identify the goals they are supposed to fulfil is a situation which Lindblom (1959) finds to be characteristic of public and service agencies in democracies. His observations confirm that factional politics in countries like the United States of America makes the formulation of clear and specific goals an almost impossible task and that decision makers have neither the funds nor the time to redress this. It is therefore justifiable, Lindblom argues, that decision-makers tend to abandon the search for clear goals in favour of an incremental approach which involves minor changes on current policy.

In the developing countries, one contingency facing the planners is irreconcilable goals. Walter Birmingham (1966) observes this in Ghana where he believes it would be difficult for the planners to encourage the flow of foreign investment envisioned in their plans while the political leaders publicize their intention to create a socialist state in Ghana. Another contingency is whether or not the goals handed down to the planners are realistic or not. Unrealistic goals can either be higher or lower than the implementing and absorbing capacity of the system undertaking planning. In either case, planning will not adhere to the rational norm and the negative consequences will be either inflation and political crises in the case of unrealistic high expectation planning or waste and forfeited opportunities in the case of unrealistic low expectation planning. These situations are illustrated in the work of John Lewis (1969).

A disruption of the planners' work may also result from the political leaders' wish at a later date to introduce new goals or major projects in the plan. For example, such arbitrary decisions made by Burma's political leader in 1956 rendered unavoidable major adjustments on the plan, Walinsky (1963) reported. In Iran, the Shah's decision to put into force a land-reform programme resulted in the virtual abandonment of the Third Plan (1962-1968) according to Mejloumian (1969).

2. If the government departments do not abide by the relevancy-maintaining directives, decline to cooperate with the planners or delay and impede the implementation of the plan.

Heads of government departments and senior civil servants can directly or indirectly influence the work of the planners and thus, can effectively impede or foster their chances of success. The power 'to make or to break' that these officials have over planning stems from the fact that in performing almost every planning operation, the planners are dependent on the good-will and cooperation of these officials and in specific on their readiness to provide the planners with certain inputs. To begin with, these government officials are the 'keys' to a significant source of first-hand practical knowledge acquired by the government officials over the span of their careers.

The planners' design is to exploit this source of information and knowledge through the relevancy-maintaining directives. The possibility that this contribution may not be forthcoming because the government officials are uncooperative is reported by Jacobs (1966) when he writes that the "first source of difficulty for Plan Organization (in Iran) is that it has never been able to gain the active cooperation of the old-line, technical service agencies for its policies". If, instead of cooperating, these officials choose to disregard the directives and seek to force all their projects on the planners, the chaos that would result is not difficult to imagine. John Friedman (1967) describes the relevant experience of Venezuelan planners:

'Strong' ministries refuse to be co-ordinated with 'weak' ministries, unless they themselves can do the co-ordinating. On the other hand, weak ministries experience co-ordination as a threat to their already tenuously occupied position. Personal rivalries compound the difficulties even further.

The basic problem which faces the planners in this situation is how to choose from the proposed projects, and thus leave out some, without antagonizing some of the influential government officials. It is feared that this may give rise to more than the "some jealousy and resentment" conceived by Walinsky (1963). The policy of appeasing the strong government ministries, on the other hand, can prove to be wasteful as in the case of Burma's Economic Budget of 1955 when this policy resulted in the depletion of foreign currency reserves.

Often, the planners will have no problem in making a choice of projects. To begin with, there will be only few proposed projects. Martin (1970) observes that due to the shortage in qualified personnel, operating ministries in the developing countries can seldom prepare projects which satisfy the standards set by the planners. As a result, the planners may be forced by the time limit to accept these unskilfully-prepared projects or, if time is not a constraint, prepare the projects themselves. In some cases, planners resort to the commissioning of foreign consultancy firms to prepare blueprints for proposed projects, feasibility studies, and so on.

Another opportunity for senior government officials to exercise influence over planning is during plan implementation. At this stage, the government officials who are usually entrusted with the implementation task may delay or even impede the implementation of projects if they are not convinced of their importance or if they feel that their demands have not been given due attention during the plan-preparation phase. And if these officials do not wholeheartedly attempt to implement the plan, then the feedbacks they will communicate to the planners will not be of much use to them.

3. If no satisfactory degree of cooperation with the private sector is achieved.

Economic planning experts decree that planning should be comprehensive i.e. it should cover all economic activities within a polity, the public as well as the private. Planning for the private sector by the planning agency differs from public planning in that it is indicative rather than prescriptive. Its purpose is to provide direction and incentives for private investment. This calls for continuous consultation between the planners and representatives of private enterprise - a process which would make clear to the private investor their envisaged role in the development process and also inform the planners of the kind of incentives, e.g. legislation, credit facilities, required by the private investors to fulfil this role.

In many of the developing countries, this smooth productive relationship between planners and private investors is yet to be achieved. Mutual suspicions appear to hamper this. While planners doubt that private investors will ever become concerned with other than their profits, private investors are wary of the planners' designs on their interests. According to Ahooja (1966), this situation can be remedied by the promulgation of clear investment laws. However, it must be remembered that the planners' recommendation on this matter must be approved by the political leaders who may find them inconsistent with their ideology.

4. If the government departments, research and development organizations and universities do not provide the planners with the information they need.

Planners cannot by themselves satisfy their needs for information and technical knowledge and thus they are expected to seek such inputs from outside the organization. One major source of such inputs is the government administration. However, since the knowledge factor is generally scarce in developing countries and thinly distributed over government departments, universities, and research and development organizations, its exploitation for planning purposes must be maximised. This can be done by co-ordinating the activities of these knowledge institutions with the planners' need for information.

What kind of information, in terms of quality and quantity, can the planners expect from the government departments? The situation cannot be conceivably worse than that in Iran identified by Jacob (1966): "The surveys often represent only the not-too-educated guesses of officials who have never left Tehran and rely on the usual admittedly inadequate and falsified reports from the periphery". Some form of planning has been proven possible with a minimum of information. Indeed, it is the norm rather than the exception that the plans of the developing countries are prepared on the basis of limited and sometimes even unreliable information.

On average, the underdeveloped country with no previous experience in planning is not expected to collect and have all the information necessary for planning. Although a statistical office may have existed for some time, its output of information is often regarded unsuitable, in kind and quality, for planning. In this event, the planner may have to collect the information themselves. This led Arthur Lewis (1966) to suggest that "in a country with poor statistics, the first Development Plan, and even the second, should concentrate on bringing order into the public sector's programmes, and into economic policy".

The Human Element in the Planning System

Throughout the preceding discussion, the actors inside the planning organization were generally referred to as planners. It is now necessary to specify the skills and talents that these planners must possess in order to perform the planning operations. And since the organization environment interface is stressed here, their first task would be to engender and promote support for their activities among the relevant environmental actors and institutions. Accordingly, there emerges a strong need for the qualities of leadership and diplomacy in some of the planners. Bertram Gross (1966) identifies two of the constituent leadership qualities: first, "to understand the organization's broad environment, as well as, or even more than its internal working", and second, "to know how to build an activation base (or support network) for development programmes by organizing various coalitions

and alliances among public and private groups and individuals". According to Gross, the role of these 'integrating generalists' who prove their mastery of such qualities is vital to the success of planning.

In addition to this generalist, there is an obvious need for the economist to conduct economic analyses for the planning operations. While acknowledging his central role in planning, Gross (1965) finds it difficult to identify the economists' technical contribution: "The continuing innovations in economic technique, the language barriers between economists and other participants in the planning process, the tendency of economists to oversell their wares in order to get a hearing - all these make it rather difficult to estimate their actual role in the technical process of calculation and analysis". In his discussion of this contribution, Gerald Meier (1966) distinguishes between the literary and mathematical economist. He is dissatisfied with the former's descriptive approach which he finds to be of little benefit. He also criticizes the mathematical economist for overemphasizing his mathematical constructs which he regard in general as having little resemblance or relevancy to real situations. Meier detects a strong tendency among developing countries to make use of these techniques which do not permit the inclusion of significant contributions from other social sciences.

The role of the mathematical economist is further questioned by some who argue that the inadequacy and low quality of data available in the average developing country make the formulation of econometric models an impossible task.

In addition to their technical contribution economists are seen by Gross (1965) to have social roles to perform in the planning organization. First, by virtue of their qualifications, they can bestow some legitimacy on the planning decisions. Second, their professional status can impress the politicians and administrators to pay attention to the concrete facts. Also, the participation of economists in planning is somehow seen by Gross as "an indirect form of representation for the interests of weak and unorganized groups with whom the technicians are associated or sympathetic".

The third kind of skills needed for the fulfilment of the planning operations are the technical and scientific skills. Those proficient in these skills are required to study and to give advice on technical aspects of the economic projects. These engineers, technologists and other specialists are placed in the technical units of the planning organization. And while economists will be needed in both the technical units and the choice-coordinating centre, the integrating generalist will make his contributions within the choice-coordinating centre.

As shown above, the functioning of the planning organization depends on the availability of certain inputs and favourable attitudes within its environment. The major sources of these inputs and attitudes are the political-ideological system, the government executive departments, and the knowledge industry. However, it also appears, from the above discussion, that the political-ideological system is the prepotent element in the environment and it is judged in view of its power to intervene in and influence other components of the environment to be the major contingency confronting the organization. In the following chapter, this tentative conclusion will be considered at length with the aim in mind of arriving at an operational conception of the interface between this contingency and the planning organization.

CHAPTER III

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONNECTIONS.

In this chapter, the search for a useful representation of the organization-environment relationship begins with general observations on the increasing relevance of politics and ideology for social and economic action in developing countries. These observations support the assumption made here that these two constitute the major contingency in the environment of the planning organization. The difficulty inherent in moving the focus of attention from the environment to the organization will be dealt with by making use of a proposed 'emerging image of reality' concept in administration research. The implications of this contingency for structure and behaviour will then be investigated at two levels: the management level and the individual member level.

Politics, Ideology and the New Order

Developing countries are said to be passing through a transitional phase. One feature of this transition is the erosion of the traditional institutions (family, tribe, and religion) and their overriding significance for the individual's life in these societies. At the same time, the transitional phase is characterised by the emergence of the new state with its borders extending beyond the dura, the dwelling of the individual clan or tribe. As a result, the domain of politics has moved from the tribal or ethnic context to the national scene. The national politician has assumed significant powers and symbols, subordinating or even displacing the

authority and symbols of the tribal chieftain and the religious leader. Von der Mehden (1964) observes that "parochialism and regional loyalties are disintegrating while nationalistic politicians have been developing plans for the unification of their countries". The new political order has introduced its own channels for social communication through government employment, party membership, and the mass media. These channels are being used to carry the national policies of the political leaders to the individual - not the tribe or the religious group.

The politicization of the individual has become the central concern of many political regimes in the developing world. For the single party enthusiast, the socialisation of individuals in the ideology of the single party is judged to be the best way for integrating the various traditional groupings in the new entity - a condition perceived to be a pre-requisite for the creation of the strong developed nation. Political communications are also being used to inculcate a measure of social sense and responsibility in the attitudes of every individual.

The political leaders of the new nations also have their own ideologies or belief systems. The ideology of a political group sums up its preconceptions of the individual, the nature of the significant social interactions (classes' dialectics, peaceful evolution), the desired Utopia and the role of the political group. According to Almond and Powell (1966), an ideology "provides an inflexible image of political life, closed to conflicting information, and offers a specific explanation and code of political conduct for most situations".

Moreover, the political leaders may be moved by their faith to enforce this dogmatic outlook on all spheres of life; the ideologue may even claim the relevancy of his ideology to the economic, sociological, and psychological fields.

The political leaders are determined to cajole/or coerce their subjects into accepting their ideology. Accepting the new beliefs may not be so difficult for some at least since they are presented as the continuation (or an updated version) of the indigenous culture and religion. Even an apparently alien symbol of the new belief system like socialism has been justified by rediscovering in the indigenous culture and religion the notions of social justice and communal life.

The implications of the new belief systems for planning economic development are manifold. To begin with, the goal of development is seen as both a desirable thing in itself and a necessary condition for the realisation of the 'ideal' state in the future. Ulterior motives are also suspected behind the leaders' commitment to development as this statement by Shils (1964) suggests:

The elites of the new state are committed to economic development. Many wish to raise the standard of living of their people, and they also think that a modern country, to be worth anything at all in the eye of mankind, must be industrialised, and economically advanced.

Some are interested in self-aggrandizement, materially and politically, and they regard economic development as a useful instrument.

Paul Sigmund (1963) finds the goal of economic development to be the common central element in the ideologies of the developing countries. Sigmund also identifies a number of beliefs circulating in these countries regarding this goal and the means for achieving it. He finds the leaders of these countries to be critical of communism and capitalism and to advocate and/or practice one or the other of the many versions of socialism. These leaders maintain that their socialisms are better instruments for the realisation of development in that they avoid the negative practices and disruptive side effects found in communist and capitalist systems. In the words of Mary Matossian (1958), "the nationalist claims to seek a blend of the 'best' in the East and West".

Another feature of the 'stereotype of the nationalist ideology' outlined by Sigmund is the belief in the identity of interests between the domestic capitalist and the international capitalist. The former is also viewed to be merely interested in creating and maintaining a favourable atmosphere for the growth and multiplication of his investment and profits at whatever social and economic costs to the community;

"Together with the feudal aristocracy and the traditional ruling classes, they form the controlling oligarchy whose power, supported by foreign interests, must be broken by the nationalist leaders".

The principal tools of the 'socialist' leaders of the developing countries are central planning and selective nationalisation. It appears to Sigmund that the nationalist leaders are not prepared to use the democratic process in forging the necessary decisions for planning. Instead, there is steadfast reliance on expert planning. With regard to nationalisation, Sigmund detects a recent trend among these leaders to relinquish the policy of nationalisation in favour of "new form of economic life, combining overall government promotion and direction of economic development with a measure of individual initiative and private ownership".

The relaxation of dogma is a necessary condition for the achievement of the goal of development. In both the traditional culture and the new belief system, there are beliefs and assertions which stand as obstacles to the rational pursuit of development. In the teachings of the traditional religion like Islam, it is a taboo to introduce 'alien' concepts and tools which do not conform to the letter or spirit of the doctrine. In the new belief system, a dogmatic trust in the benefits of nationalisation may have an equally constraining effect on planning for development. On the other hand, an ideology may render a positive contribution to the developmental effort.

According to Sigmund, the ideology of modernizing socialism can be productively used "to carry the nation through the period of modernization of traditional society, and to justify the ensuing sacrifices and dislocations".

The Immediate Impact

In any developing country, a number of political decisions must be made in order for the planning organization to survive and function. The decisions which establish the planning organization, specify its position in the political-administrative hierarchy, and entrust it with authority and functions are all political decisions. Furthermore, some political energy must be spent on finding the necessary funds and qualified staff to make this organization operational and productive. Also, political leaders are expected to use their charisma and leadership qualities to engender and sustain support, political and popular, for the organization and its activities. Fainsod (1963) confirms that a "planning agency needs the enthusiastic support of the dominant political leadership".

On the other hand, there are political demands put upon the planning organization and its operations. The most obvious of these is the prescription of the goals of planning. Formal statements on the goals usually prescribe the preparation of short and long term economic plans to realise such things as 'welfare', 'economic self-sufficiency', a yearly increment on the national income. What these statements do

not reveal are the political decisions on the distribution of benefits among social strata and groups, the costs in consumer goods and welfare services which the present generation must bear, and the social costs (political unrest, internal movements of population, cultural shock) which can be tolerated. All these are political decisions which must be made before the planner can proceed to gather and process information, to do research on possible alternative courses of action and to make the numerous choices and decisions involved in the process of preparing plans for economic development.

Some political leaders have been observed to over-estimate their own planning 'intuition' and in some cases this has gone to the extreme of imposing projects on the planners such as steel mills, modern government buildings, stadia, and even nuclear energy projects. Political leaders with strong opinions on what planning for development should and should not be will probably appoint like-minded people in at least the positions of authority in the planning organization. Given the usual scarcity of qualified personnel in these countries, this recruitment policy will result in appointing to these positions either poorly-qualified 'politicians' or timid and defensive specialists.

The planners may also become dependent on the political leaders for creating favourable attitudes toward the planning organization in the relevant environment of the organization. As shown in the

preceding chapter, planners need all kinds of inputs for their work such as information, proposals, and technical studies. These inputs can be provided by the government executive departments, research and development agencies, and universities. The planners do not usually have the authority to order these institutions to cooperate with them but the political leaders can ensure that positive attitudes which make this cooperation possible do exist.

Overcoming a Methodological Difficulty

Having made explicit our general assumptions on the significant factors in the environment of the planning organization, it remains to find a way of approaching and studying the relationship between the organization and its environment. Finding a research model that accommodates the environmental contingency and some features of the organization proved to be difficult. To satisfy the conditions of a contingency approach our perspective must be sufficiently flexible and free of ethnocentrism and parochialism. Moreover, it must be behavioural and depictive of the situation as seen and experienced by the principal actors in the organization. Inspiration came from Theodore Thomas' (1974) identification of an 'emerging image of reality' trend in administration research. The core assumption of this trend is that individuals perceive their self and the environment. For the purposes of this research, the concept of the individual's perception of the environment will be used to fill the methodological 'gap' between the organization and the environment.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, this perspective will be applied in the analysis of the organization-environment relationship at two levels: the organization management level and the individual member level.

The Planning Function

In the preceding chapter on planning, this function was considered at length. It was found that planning is complex and involves a sequence of operations and inter-dependent steps. The organization members who perform these operations include the generalist-manager, the economist, the engineer and the technologist. These operations can be generally divided into two task categories:

1. Management task
2. Technical task

The management task refers to all these activities usually performed by a person or persons who occupy the highest authoritative positions in the organization. These persons are recognized as administrators or managers. A wide range of activities, duties, and responsibilities are ascribed to the manager in the literature and scholars following different approaches put the emphasis on different aspects of the management task.

By choosing a contingency approach, one can avoid the before-the-facts bias involved in viewing management as control, as the source of motivation, or as the designer of the organization strategy for survival and growth. All these views are regarded here as plausible and their priority distribution as a function of the situational contingency.

On the other hand, the technical task refers to all activities which involve the application of specialists' knowledge and techniques. The specialists who are likely to be found in the planning organization include economists, engineers, agronomists, technologists, and manpower analysts. Some of their work assignments include data processing, the formulation of long-term perspectives, and the preparation of feasibility studies and cost/benefit tables.

The Management Task

This task can now be subdivided into the following groupings of activities:

1. Control and coordination activities
2. Supportive activities
3. Planning task activities
4. Environmental-extractive activities

The first group of activities (control and coordination) include these activities which are universally associated with an administrative or managerial position. The exercise of control by persons at the top

of the organization hierarchy is thought necessary to keep all the energy and efforts in line with goal achievement. Managers can exercise control by communicating detailed rules and procedures to their subordinates and by defining and redefining the duties and functional assignments associated with each position. Coordination, on the other hand, is the administrative activity which brings together and relates the constituent operations or jobs in the manner most conducive to the efficient realization of the goals of the organization. There are also several techniques for coordination such as the preparation of a work schedule or plan which represents the inter-dependencies of positions in the hierarchy or the appointment of coordination men or integrators in middle management positions.

The second group of activities (supportive) includes all activities which are intended to produce a favourable atmosphere for work. Under supportive activities, one can list the manager concern for resolving conflicts which arise in the organization, for assuring the productive employees of their promotion prospects, and for making available to them opportunities for further training. All these are calculated to motivate employees to stay in the organization and to produce, and also to entice others to join the organization.

The third group of activities (the planning task) includes all these activities which are technical rather than administrative. The managers of the planning organization may, in addition to their administrative responsibilities, want to participate in the technical

tasks involved in planning. Thus, a manager with qualifications in economics may join the economists' team working on an aggregate model of the economy. An administrator who is also a technologist by profession may be found working on the feasibility study for a proposed industrial project.

The fourth group of activities (the environmental-extractive) is different from the other three in being directed not toward some aspect of the internal situation in the organization but toward the relevant environment of the organization. These activities are essential to satisfy the planning task's needs for certain energetic inputs which can only be found in the environment. The inputs include the goals of the organization, the information required for economic and technical analyses, and proposed investment programmes and projects. Furthermore, the plans and decisions arrived at in the planning organization must be endorsed by authoritative institutions or individuals in the environment.

The Manager Perception of the Environment

Perception is defined in Crabb's English Synonyms (1974), as "either the act of perceiving or the impression produced by that act".

Perception, accordingly, involves three elements: the perceiving actor, the object or phenomenon perceived, and the perception arrived at.

The end result of the perception process is shaped by the characteristics of the perceived phenomenon as well as by the faculties, will, and biases of the perceiving actor. Social psychologists assure us of the usefulness of this concept, i.e. perception, for understanding interpersonal relations. McCall (1966) recognizes such a thing as a 'social perception' through which "we appraise the things and people around us and strive to assess what meanings they have for the fulfilment of our role identities". Smith (1969) identifies a 'perceptual screening process' which "intervenes between the environmental facts and what the person makes of them".

How do these organization managers form their perceptions of the relevant environment? It can be visualised that when these managers join the organization, they arrive with pre-conceived notions of their work and the environment. These may be adjusted or drastically changed when they become more intimately involved in performing their roles and maintaining the vital environmental connections. The perceptions which interest us here are those conscious work-oriented notions which govern these managers' attitudes toward, and their work relationships with, the significant actors and institutions in the environment. It must also be emphasised that these perceptions are arrived at 'after the facts'. While it is acknowledged that the will and personal biases of the manager can influence these perceptions, perceptions must be sufficiently factual and accurate to allow successful interaction.

The perception guiding the manager in his dealings with the environment can vary from a simple image to a complex one based on a thorough screening process. The attempt made here to predict this image or perception, its complexity and its allowance for change in the mood and structure of the perceived phenomenon can only produce an approximation. The following proposition represents the basic properties of the environmental contingency which appears, it is assumed, to the manager in the aftermath of the perception process:


Proposition I: From his experience in trying to obtain the necessary inputs from the environment (goals, proposals, information) and in attempting to have the decisions and plans of the organization accepted and authorized, the organization manager will arrive at a perception of the environment on a continuum from flexible and cooperative environment at one end to inflexible and uncooperative at the other.

It would be difficult to explain and justify this proposition without empathising with the manager, i.e. putting oneself in his position. The manager's perception of the environment contemplated here is the

impression which he acquires after numerous and intensive contacts with the environment. It is an impression reinforced by recurrent experiences. There may be exceptional experiences which deny the suitability of this impression but in general he is convinced and reassured by the majority of his experience that this perception is valid. However, it is not a perception valid for all times since it is conceivable and indeed inevitable that the environment will change and hence, a change in the manager's perception can be expected. The following table identifies the kinds of experiences that lead the manager to arrive at his perception:

Flexible, Cooperative

Inflexible, Uncooperative



The manager experiences the authority centre in the environment to be rational, predictable, and appreciative.

He experiences the authority centre to be arbitrary, emotional, dogmatic, and impatient for results.

His relationship with this authority centre is based on logic and empathy.

In dealing with this authority he must make emotional appeals and frequent references to ideology. Empathy is impossible.

There are specific procedures for dealing with the environment.

There are no established procedures for dealing with the environment. Procedures are subject to arbitrary changes by the moody authority

The manager can predict the changes which can occur in the environment. Uncertainty is low and can be reduced to a manageable degree.

He cannot predict the changes in the 'mood' of the environment. Uncertainty is high.

The Implications of the Manager Perception

This perception is held here to be the key concept from which one can infer the manager strategies for dealing with the environment and for managing the organization. An environment perceived to be relatively inflexible and uncooperative is a source of constraints for the planning organization and the management task. In this case, the authority centre in the environment is viewed to be irrational, emotional, and dogmatic. Accordingly there are few established rules, more than the ceremonial, which regulate the relationship between the organization manager and this authority centre. Nevertheless, the organization manager will have to deal with the unpredictable and moody authority to ensure a regular flow of necessary inputs into the organization. His task is difficult; whatever knowledge he gathers about the authority and the experience he gains in ways of manipulating it are relevant only for the short run. As a result, he cannot translate this knowledge and experience into long-term organizational policies for work, survival, and growth. Instead he becomes personally involved in the day-to-day control of the organization. He feels that by closely controlling his subordinates, he can make sure that the emotional, dogmatic authority in the environment is not antagonized or offended. Every programme, projet, and planning procedure must bear the stamp of his approval before the subordinates can make use of it.

Even the slightest deviation from his directives is not tolerated because if its result proves unacceptable to the authority centre, it will not only mean a waste of organization resources but could also jeopardize his efforts to cultivate a favourable image of the organization with the authority centre. In essence, a high degree of uncooperativeness and inflexibility in the environment constitutes a crisis situation. It is my assumption that if an organization is to survive under such extremely unfavourable conditions which do not allow the routinization of control, the manager must assume direct and close control over his subordinates. It must be made clear here that this is not the management strategy to deal with such a contingency but only the consequence of this strategy which involves the manager, who given the nature of the environment and the small size of the organization is alone experienced in dealing with the environment, in continuous and intensive interaction with the environment. There is perhaps some similarity between this and the situation described by Guetzkow (1965) when he wrote: "During times of stress, just when creativity is needed, some of the slack conducive to innovation is taken up". It follows from this argument that as the manager perception of the environment moves away from the inflexible, uncooperative end of the continuum, the more freedom he will allow his subordinates to exercise their professional knowledge and experience, to develop work procedures, to suggest projects for study and so on. And if conformity is defined here as active structure, then the following proposition can now be suggested:

Proposition II: As the manager perception of the environment moves from the inflexible, uncooperative end of the continuum towards the flexible, cooperative end, the degree of conformity (i.e. active structure) designed by the manager will decrease or, to put it in other words, the freedom of the subordinates will increase.

Further Implications?

The time and energy of the organization manager are limited. The obvious limitation on the time he spends on his job is the average eight hour work day. Within the time limit, he must perform a multitude of activities: extracting the inputs from the environment, controlling and co-ordinating, creating and maintaining a healthy work atmosphere, and exercising his own professional skills. It can be visualised that if the task of acquiring the necessary inputs and support from the environment is difficult and hence time consuming, this situation will produce certain imperatives for the manager's conscious distribution of his time and energy among his various activities. An environment perceived to be relatively inflexible and uncooperative would demand a greater share of the manager's time, attention and energy. On the other hand, the organization manager has learned from experience that it takes less of his resources to obtain inputs and support from the flexible and cooperative environment. Furthermore, the constraints and

restrictions generated by the inflexible and uncooperative environment will necessitate that the organization manager spends more of his time and energy on observing and interpreting the evasive 'mood' of the environment as well as on communicating his interpretations to his subordinates and on making sure that they adhere to his directives.

In accordance with the above argument it can now be proposed (Proposal III) that as the manager perception of the environment approaches the 'inflexible, uncooperative end of the continuum, he is expected to spend more of his time and energy on the environmental-extractive and the control-coordination tasks. This implies that the other management activities (the supportive and the planning task) will be given a lower priority on the time agenda of the organization manager. On the other hand, if the manager perception approximates the flexible, cooperative environment, the urgency of catering to the environment demands and controlling the subordinates decreases thus allowing the manager more freedom in distributing his time and energy among his activities. The latter situation, in contrast with the former, would allow him to allocate more of his time to the supportive activities and to exercising his professional interests.

The Search for Other Indicators

The proposals made above are the product of a personal attempt to empathize with the organization manager, i.e. putting oneself in his position and then trying to visualise how he would perceive the

relevant environment and what implications he would infer from this perception for his design of organizational structure and for the management task. The obvious shortcoming of this armchair exercise is in its attempt to abstract a construct from real life instances. In order to complete our model of the organization, the focus of attention must now shift to another aspect of the organization, namely the individual member. Afterall, "managing is getting things done through people", Urwick (1961) asserts. Again, our search will begin with observations on the environment of the individual and then proceed to consider the consequences of this environment for the individual's participation in the organization.

The Individual and his Environment

One of the issues which has perplexed many organization specialists is how to explain, justify, and ultimately predict the conditions for satisfaction of individuals and groups in the organization. Different hypotheses have been proposed and investigated but the subject is still open for consideration and controversy. At one time, it was thought that the income one gets from the organization is a sufficient inducement for him to join the organization, to be satisfied, and to produce. However, the results of the Hawthorne experiment and other studies revealed that factors beside income and monetary incentives are involved in motivating the employees to produce and to increase their productivity. The current trend in organization research

is in favour of looking at the individual member in terms of a complex model of man who exhibits different needs for, and hence different responses to, motivation.

The stock of available studies on the human element in the organization have been mainly conducted in the developed Western democracies (the United States and the West European Countries). These countries can be described as being economically developed, industrial, secular and having a rational-legal tradition. The research on the human element in organization in these countries is implicitly or explicitly based on a set of assumptions which are contextually relevant. This is confirmed by Victor Thompson (1964): "We are becoming conscious of the fact that administration in modern countries is permeated with behavioural norms which are products of a modern culture. Such norms are rationality, the use of universalistic criteria, achievement, specificity and impersonality..... result from social and cultural conditions". Thus, if social values and attitudes are being tested in the process of studying human behaviour in organization, then the study of human behaviour in societies which are still not developed, not secular, and not having a rational-legal tradition cannot be based on the same assumptions.

Man is viewed here as the product of his environment and, at the same time, as a conscious wilful being. This conception of man is borrowed from Hitt's (1969) composite model of man incorporating the behaviourist and the phenomenologist views of man as a reality and a potentiality. Man, adds Hitt, "represents objective existence, yet he can move toward any one of many different future states that are essentially unpredictable".

The subject of this research scheme is the planning organization in developing countries. These countries have only recently begun to channel their resources into developmental programmes. In their economies, the underdeveloped sector, usually agriculture, is the major sector in terms of human and material investments in comparison with the small industrial sector. Illiteracy is prevailing with at least more than half of the population being illiterate. The individual in these countries may still be traditional in his outlook; he values his belonging to a family, tribe, ethnic or religious group more than his membership in the newly established entity, the nation state. In many ways, his attitudes and behaviour are still conditioned by the norms and customs of his traditional reference groups. Only in major metropolitan centres, one can find few emerging non-traditional associations: political parties, trade and labour unions, professional and business clubs. This can be associated, as Van Nieuwenhuijzer (1965) does, with the fact that "education is effective primarily in urban setting".

In these countries, attempts to infuse the traditional culture with legal-rational institutions and practices have yet to prove effectual; the change of political regime is still made through violent coups or insurrections; political and bureaucratic recruitment is still governed by tradition rather than the merit principle; and legal codes have not completely displaced tribal and religious customs.

The typical developing country is also that which has recently gained its independence from a foreign colonial power. The struggle for independence may have taken the form of guerrilla warfare, insurrection, strikes and riots. The violent struggle and its traumatic effects on the nationalist movement (typical of the David vs. Goliath confrontation) may have left its marks on the post-independence leadership. 'Seeing a colonialist or neo-imperialist behind every bush' is one manifestation of the latent effect of the struggle for independence. The politics of distrust, i.e. suspecting nationals of aiding the neo-imperialist drive is even a more serious by-product which can be said to generate feelings of insecurity especially among the 'outsiders' i.e. those who do not belong to the ruling party or the inner leadership group.

The human and physical entity which the national leaders inherited from the colonial rulers may carry within itself the germs of large scale problems, civil strife and even wars. The new states of Asia and Africa are seldom established around a single religion,

an ethnic identity or a tribe. Their borders were defined by compromises among colonial powers who then competed for the rich and prosperous lands. As a result, the post-independence leaders are often faced with the task of integrating warring tribes and reconciling hostile ethnic and religious groups. Civil wars, as in Nigeria and Lebanon, are not uncommon.

The post-independence period has been characterized by violent political changes. The role of political groups and parties in bringing about the political changes has been minimal while armies, police forces, and security organizations have taken the lead in changing regimes and shaping policies. It is difficult to describe and estimate the impact of these violent changes on the individual's psychology. Yet, one can generalize that except for those who feel that these changes are too far removed from them to affect their lives (the majority of apolitical rural people), many will initially regard their prospects under the new regime with some apprehension. Those who have been active in working with and supporting the deposed leadership will obviously experience a higher degree of apprehension and insecurity. Indeed for some or many of them, the aftermath of the political change will involve the loss of job or source of livelihood, imprisonment, and even a violent death. That a high degree of political instability leads to a high level of anxiety in the people is confirmed by Cottell and Scheier (1961). And even in a country where a measure of political

continuity (but not political tolerance) has been achieved, such as Iran, a high degree of insecurity is observed by Jacobs (1966) to affect all segments of the population except the leadership group.

Political leaders sometimes put strong demands on their fellow countrymen, especially those who owe their positions, salaries and prospects of promotion to the government. These 'beneficiaries' may be asked to join the ruling political party or to make a firm and explicit pledge of allegiance to the regime. If these refuse to make such commitments or plead their apolitical nature, they may suffer retribution in the form of demotion, dismissal or so on.

There are explanations and even justifications for the political leaders' oppressiveness. One possible explanation can be based on Lasswell's (1947) viewpoint that those "who increase abruptly in influence are prone to act destructively - to behave with arrogant lack of consideration toward their fellows". On the other hand, an apologist like Heilbroner (1963) finds a degree of leadership authoritarianism instrumental in enforcing the desirable social changes on the people. In my opinion, political leaders in developing countries are also moved by their own feelings of insecurity, the fear of being over-thrown and then killed or exiled.

They react to this by strengthening security organizations and by appointing loyal elements in the positions of authority in government. Informers are sometimes introduced into organizations as ordinary employees - a situation certain to increase the anxiety felt by those who fear that they may become the subjects of the informer's reports.

It has been argued above that the environment of the individual in developing countries arouses his insecurity feelings. The individual is expected, therefore, to seek ways of neutralizing or at least alleviating this feeling. The prepotency of this motive or need is identified by Davis (1964): "In underdeveloped countries most employees are still seeking basic physiological and security needs".

Satisfying his Security Needs

How does the individual go about neutralizing or at least minimising this insecurity feeling? The traditional society in which his predecessors lived had its own means for alleviating this feeling of insecurity in the individual. Although the situation in the traditional society may have posed more threats to his life and livelihood, the individual could then demand and get the protection of his extended family, clan, tribe, and religious group. These constituted the defensive shell of the traditional individual.

The importance of these traditional institutions is still evident in rural areas but members of the new social sectors, the urban entrepreneurs, educated elements and politicians have lost contact with their traditional groups. In general, however, this importance has diminished as a result of the modernization programme, the spread of literacy and secularization and the breakdown of the tribal order. On the other hand, the new emerging associations did not fill the security 'gap' resulting from the decline of traditionalism. Political parties, professional associations and metropolitan clubs have limited memberships and usually confine their operations to major urban centres. And even these new associations cannot provide the same security that the traditional institutions used to provide. For example, a political party cannot provide its membership with any security unless it is in power and membership in an opposition or clandestine party can add to rather than alleviate the individual's insecurity. Also, a clique is not as stable as the clan or tribe used to be. He may not even get the protection expected from the security organizations of the new state as Goldthorpe (1975) observes: "In a society in which law and order are administered in a lax and capricious manner, the individual cannot rely on the police and the law for his protection, the security of his possessions, or even the safety of his person".

In the final analysis, one can find a useful explanation in Fromm's (1961) argument that the process of individuation by which the individual disassociates himself from his primary ties and attains his freedom may not always be a satisfying experience for him: "Freedom, though it has brought him independence and rationality, has made him isolated and, thereby, anxious and powerless." Is there then no alternative but to accept Almond and Powell's (1966) assertion that "no citizen of any political system ever...outgrows the needs which he feels for the security and support which the intimate ties of the primary group provide"? An answer can only be found empirically. In the meantime, the assumptions adopted here are that first, the transitional situation in developing countries is the source of insecurity feeling in the individual; second, the political leaders and their ideologies produce and strengthen these feelings and they also impress upon the individual ways of reducing this feeling; and third, different individuals will react in different ways to this environmental threat. The latter two assumptions must now be explained and justified.

Political leaders have the means to influence and shape the attitudes and behaviour of their people, argues Johnson (1967). From early childhood until the age of retirement (beyond the average lifespan in these countries) the individual has frequent contacts with the government and its institutions as a student, a government employee, a client, and essentially as a citizen subject to the laws, regulations, and authority of the government. He receives his basic schooling

in a government school, and if he continues, eventually graduates from the government-controlled university. In these educational institutions, the government ideology and its good intentions are impressed upon him. When he leaves school, it is most likely that he will find employment in the government bureaucracy. In this, he is encouraged to, and punished if he does not, exhibit the government-approved attitudes and assimilate the 'proper' ways of doing things which he learns from socialising in the office.

To show how the individual behaviour is specifically influenced by the government institutions and ideology, it may be necessary to make use of an example. How do these affect for example the individual behaviour with reference to the behavioural dichotomy opportunism versus achievement? If achievement is defined here as seeking self-interest by meritorious means then opportunism can be defined as seeking this by means which are not meritorious. If the government is the principal privileges- and rewards-disbursing agent in a polity, then it can obviously influence the ways in which individuals in this polity seek their self-interest goals. If, for example the government's overriding goal is maintaining and securing its hold over power at any cost (government opportunism?) then it can be expected that this government will bestow rewards and favours on those who support it and withhold them from non-supporters and the opposition.

Supporting whatever the government decrees becomes the means of the opportunist to obtain his self-interest goals. On the other hand, the achiever, as characterised above, will be discouraged and will react in withdrawal or active opposition. There is a remarkable parallel to this situation suggested in the arabic traditional saying, Al Nass ala Dini Mulukeh which generalises that people usually follow the ways of their rulers.

Individual differences account for the variance in the individuals' responses to the environmental pressures and threats. If we think of the individual's response to the environmental threat and pressures in terms of a continuum of insecurity feeling from high to low, then it can be proposed, or to be exact conjectured, that variations in individual characteristics, values and attitudes must account for these variations in response. Accordingly, the individual's relative immunity to the environmental threat, identified by a low insecurity feeling, may stem from his belief in the human being worthiness and potentiality and his inalienable rights. His traditional heritage, especially Islam, is also the source of many commandments and principles which call for justice, equality and the communal spirit and condemn amoralism, opportunism and immoderate selfishness. He is reassured of the significance of his values by finding like-minded people in his national history and the history of other nations. Thus, it can be suggested that the stronger this moral and principled superego, the stronger the resistance

of the individual to the environmental threats. In his discussion of the individual in one Middle Eastern country, namely Iran, Jacobs (1966) found it useful to distinguish between the 'inner-self' and the 'outer-self' worlds of the individual. The former is the context of his absolute ethical standards while the latter is conditioned by his social interactions in a real world lacking in ethical standards. Jacob's assertion that the individual manages to keep the two worlds separate and viable without suffering any stress is difficult to accept. After all, Smesler and Smesler (1963) indicate that the conflict between the perceived self, and the ideal self results in a strain within the personality. Yet, his (Jacob's) analysis is useful since in his experience there is something called the inner-self which is equated here with the moral and principled superego referred to above.

The Individual in the Organization

The individual who feels insecure is expected to seek ways and means of alleviating this feeling. The individual who is also a member of the organization can be expected to use his position and the opportunities it provides to minimise this negative feeling. In developing countries, more and more people are becoming government employees. This is especially the case in countries where the operations of the private sector has been restricted leaving government employment as the only

career open to graduates and professionals. Those who are joining this oversize bureaucracy are facing situations which serve as constant reminders of the existing and potential threat to their security. Thompson (1964) recognizes the consequences of an arbitrary political authority for the security of the bureaucrats; an atmosphere of insecurity "can result from the existence of an arbitrary, non-rational, and unpredictable authority at the very top, as in the case of an authoritarian, single party, political system". Jacobs (1966) provides us with the following, albeit extravagant, view of the insecurity-arousing work situation in the Iranian bureaucracy: "Since neither knowledge nor efficiency as such determines security in a work situation, a work situation arouses continued uncertainty and even fear among all office personnel". Moreover, the government employee who cannot adjust to his particular work situation may be discouraged from leaving by the strong probability of not finding another job. The employee who publicizes his intention to leave the government service may risk harassment and even imprisonment by the oppressive regime. And even if the individual is allowed to resign, his freedom of movement may be restricted, e.g. his passport could be seized, to ensure that he does not seek employment elsewhere.

His membership in the organization provides the individual with means for alleviating his insecurity feeling. To begin with, there is the steady income and other material incentives which he receives in return for his work. The work situation also provides him with the opportunity to make friends and to join a clique, associations which satisfy the individual's need to belong and to ward off threats. Joining the political party in power can ensure the individual of job security and enhance his prospect of moving up in the organization. Indeed, as the individual approaches the upper echelons of the hierarchy, his promotion becomes a political rather an administrative issue.

The insecure individual is not a happy individual. His anguish over past things is only surpassed by his anxiety over the future and what it holds in store for him. As such, the individual whose insecurity feeling prevails over other needs and motives can be expected to use all his energy for alleviating or neutralising this feeling. He has an instrumental attitude toward his job which is characterised by Kuhn, Slocum and Chase (1971) as follows:

The instrumentally oriented worker has expectations which include high pay and employee benefits, good working conditions, and so on. He may also expect some variety in his work and the opportunity to talk with co-workers but generally does not seek greater decision-making responsibilities nor job complexity.

He is, by necessity, a conformist whose behaviour follows the accepted ways and the rules prescribed by his superiors and those who control his fate in the organization. Costello and Zalkind (1963) confirm this: "The insecurity of the defensive person makes him particularly susceptible to authoritarian suggestion". He dislikes changes in his work situation and routine because these can disrupt the clique to which he belongs and trigger his apprehension over his ability to adjust to the changes. The change, reason Hellriegel and Slocum (1974), constitutes a threat to his belongingness need. He is also a reluctant problem solver; unless he can foretell the solutions acceptable to his superiors, he will not venture on solving the problem.

The individual who is not solely motivated by his insecurity feeling relates to the organization in a different way. Although he may still be concerned with maintaining his position and career in the organization, he does not view his position as the last resort. His conformity to the rules and procedures of the organization is based on personal conviction in the rationality of these rather on fear of the consequences of nonconformity. He contributes his opinions and expects his superiors to pay attention to him. He accepts changes more readily than the insecure individual and he may also prove to be a reformer and an innovator himself. He is, like the creative person characterised by MacKinnon (1962), "given to expression rather than suppression or repression, thus has fuller access to his own experiences, both conscious and unconscious".

He also expects his work assignments in the organization to satisfy his professional interests.

The Management-Subordinate Mix

In the discussion on the manager perception of the environment, this perception was expected to have certain implications for the manager's design of structure (degree of conformity) for the organization. The analysis of the individual response to the environmental threat resulted in a conception of the individual in terms of a continuum from high to low insecurity feeling. In this section, an attempt will be made to conceive of how individuals with different degrees of insecurity feeling react to and work under different degrees of conformity (structure) set by the manager. By mixing the four ideal types discussed in the preceding sections, the following four typical cases result:

1. high insecurity feeling, high conformity
2. low insecurity feeling, high conformity
3. high insecurity feeling, low conformity; and
4. low insecurity feeling, low conformity

In the first case, the individual whose feeling of insecurity is high is expected to adhere closely to the directives of his superior.

The individual in this case is content since the task of observing and interpreting the environmental unknowns is undertaken by the superior. He is not interested in the rationality of the superior's directives and certainly not in having a part in preparing them. He may even ask that these directives are further elaborated and detailed to the extent that none of his activities will involve decision-making.

The situation is different when the individual with low insecurity feeling is faced with a superior who demands from him absolute conformity to rules and procedures in the making of which he, the individual, does not participate. In this case, the individual may remain in the organization and perform in accordance with the directives he receives but he is dissatisfied. Under such conditions, he observes few available opportunities to exercise his professional knowledge and abilities. The restrictions are overwhelming and if he does not leave the organization, he may resort to cynicism and sublimation to vent his frustration. He can also derive some relief from associating with others, employees, or outsiders, who share his feeling of dissatisfaction and helplessness.

In the third case, the individual whose feeling of insecurity is high is faced with a manager who allows him considerable freedom

in performing his activities. The demands of this work situation may prove to be in excess of what the individual can satisfy. He is reluctant to use this freedom because it arouses and strengthens his insecurity feeling. Since he prefers to have his activities specified in detail beforehand, he is incapable of performing adequately in this situation.

In the fourth and final case, the individual who is not dominated by his insecurity feeling is not closely directed and controlled by his superior. The individual in this case will find satisfaction in this work situation. He is left with considerable latitude in doing his job and ample opportunities for exercising his professional knowledge and talents. He does not hesitate to express his own mind on the work situation and the improvements that can be introduced. He is also assured by the tolerant and understanding manager who finds the time to work with him and to listen to his remarks and suggestions.

Working Hypotheses

In the preceding sections of this chapter, a contingent model of the planning organization's relationship with its environment was proposed and discussed. Before designing the tools for testing this model, it is necessary first to represent the basic propositions of the model in the form of the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis (1): The organization manager is expected to subscribe to a perception of the relevant environment in terms of a continuum from 'flexible and cooperative environment' at one end to 'inflexible and uncooperative environment' at the other.

Hypothesis (2): There is a direct relationship between the manager perception of the environment and his design of conformity (active structure) to deal with the environmental contingency. As the manager perception approaches the flexible, cooperative end, he is expected to reduce the degree of conformity he enforces on the subordinates (i.e. control will be relaxed and individual employees will be allowed a greater part in making the decisions). On the other hand, if the manager perception approaches the inflexible uncooperative end, he is expected to design and enact a higher degree of conformity.

Corollary: The organization manager who perceives the environment to be relatively inflexible and uncooperative will assign to the extractive-environmental activities and the control-coordination activities a higher priority on his work-time table than in the case when the organization manager perceives the environment to be relatively flexible and cooperative.

Hypothesis (3): Different individuals are expected to exhibit different degrees of insecurity feeling which can be represented on a continuum from high to low insecurity feeling.

Hypothesis (4): Under conditions of high conformity, the individual with a high degree of insecurity feeling is more adjusted to the work situation than the individual with a low degree of insecurity feeling.

Hypothesis (5): Under conditions of low conformity, the individual with a low degree of insecurity feeling is more adjusted to the work situation than the individual with a high degree of insecurity feeling.

Testing the Hypotheses

Data for testing the above mentioned hypotheses will be collected by means of the questionnaire and interview methods. Two questionnaires are to be prepared, one to be answered by the organization manager and another to be answered by the employees. The purpose of interviewing the manager is mainly to seek clarifications and real life examples of the situation he depicts in his responses to the questionnaire items. Additional data from written sources will be collected, if available, and used mainly as background material, i.e. to acquaint the reader with the general aspects of the situation on which specific research results are obtained.

PART TWO: THE RESEARCH FINDINGS.

INTRODUCTION.

In the first part of this dissertation, a search was undertaken to find out an operational and useful model of the organization-environment relationship in a developing, socially and economically, setting. The search culminated in the formulation of a tentative model for research which represented dynamically the exchange and interaction patterns between specific contingent environmental variables, i.e. the political and ideological factors, and structure and behaviour in the organization. Finding the necessary data for this purpose was to take the form of preparing and presenting questionnaires to the managers and personnel of the organizations under study, interviewing willing senior officials in these organizations, and reviewing available written sources.

After enduring the hardship of doing research in a number of developing countries in the Middle East, it may be worthwhile now to give an account of some of the difficulties encountered. This is done in the hope that some useful guidelines for the design and conduct of research on the area will emerge.

The first step I took was to look for written sources which deal with my research theme or some aspect of it. My research interests necessitated a search for written material on a wide variety of subjects such as the societies, economies, political systems, and management philosophies and practices in the Middle East.

To my dismay, available written material on such subjects proved to be scarce. Moreover, the usefulness of the few available books and articles is diminished by their constricted legal-formal approaches and by the fact that such studies are frequently based on less than the essential minimum volume of observations and data.

The 'underdeveloped' state of research in these countries can be explained and it is my intention to do so in the following paragraphs. For it would not be sufficient to dismiss this simply as inevitable in a generally underdeveloped milieu. More specific factors can be suggested as the direct or indirect causes of this state.

The first and most significant of these factors is the absence of the essential freedoms which ensures the individual of protection from official harassment if he opposes or deviates from the official dogma or the officially-sanctioned explanations. Without these freedoms, namely the freedoms of thought and to disseminate one's ideas, the scholar in the social sciences in pursuit of his research interests can only choose from a number of precarious alternatives. He can choose a research topic which does not involve a critical consideration of official dogma and actions. Alternatively, he can choose any research topic if he can maintain a neutral attitude toward official dogma and actions and provided he concludes with a favourable attitude.

Another alternative open to the scholar is to endorse the official dogma as a 'legitimate' source for explanations and analytical tools - a course of action although advantageous in some ways to the 'scholar' but will considerably reduce the worthiness of his work.

The second factor which may discourage the would-be scholar from pursuing certain research topics is the high social value attached to, and the scope of the private personal domain. A sociologist or an anthropologist who may want to study the social values and customs of individual and groups in Middle Eastern societies must choose and form his questions carefully. Otherwise, he may find out that he has somehow offended his subjects to the extent of rendering any chance of their further cooperation very unlikely. The high social value of privacy has its roots in the traditional culture and from experience the traditional family head has learned the practical benefits of this social custom. For example, by not giving correct information on the number of males eligible for military service in his family and on the family's wealth, he might escape a harsh conscription and tax quotas imposed upon his family by the representative of the central authority. The list of taboo issues which are not open for discussion because these are aib, i.e. evocative of the individual feeling of shame, runs into a great length and it is in the interest of the researcher to avoid 'intruding' on such issues. The researcher in the political and administrative fields of social inquiry may find equally secretive politicians and bureaucrats in political regimes and bureaucracies regardless of their apparent democratic or authoritarian nature.

Thirdly, the would-be scholar is not usually provided with sufficient inducements to undertake research activities. There are simply no established institutions to which he can turn for patronage or financial help. And the rewards that he may get for doing the research are meagre, ranging from a commending note to a small cash payment - as low as £200 in one oil-rich country.

And even if the researcher can somehow overcome all these obstacles, he will still be faced, fourthly, with the task of publishing his research's findings. Researchers who were asked to comment on this problem described it as being 'critical'. They maintained that abroad they have to compete with a large number of other researchers over a limited publishing space in specialised journals and in books. At home where there is a very small market for specialised books, publishers must be painstakingly convinced of the profitability of such a venture. Government-sponsored publishing houses cater only to the propaganda-oriented quasi political and social studies. Moreover the number of specialised journals in any of the fields of social and scientific inquiry is limited. To illustrate this: a recent commercial addition to the short list of available management and administrative journals was introduced by its publisher as satisfying a long-standing need for management news and information on new management techniques and practices.

These are, in my opinion, the principal causes of the underdeveloped state of social science research in Middle Eastern countries. The existing scarcity of written sources on various social issues was not, however, the only problem which made my search for relevant data difficult.

I was left with only two possible methods for acquiring the information for my research, namely the questionnaire and the interview. Two different questionnaires were prepared: one to be answered by the manager of the central planning organization and the other by his subordinates. The answered questionnaires would have provided me with a considerable amount of data which would make it possible for me to test the proposed hypotheses. Additional data were to be gathered from interviewing the managers and/or available senior officials in these organizations. Interviews were to be conducted after the answering of the questionnaires and in which I would seek clarifications and examples of the situation as indicated by them in their responses to the questionnaire items.

The questionnaires had been originally prepared in English and it remained to translate them into Arabic. That proved to be a difficult task. The development of a modern Arabic which can serve as an efficient channel for communicating social and scientific thought is still to be achieved. Using classical Arabic or an Arabic dialect would not

have been feasible since in that case it would not have been possible to apply the questionnaires in several countries. I was also at a considerable disadvantage for having to do it without the aid and supervision of qualified specialists. The nature of the items, some of which have political connotations, necessitated an exercise of caution. Soliciting the help of management specialists in the universities and elsewhere, of which there are indeed very few, would have made necessary making explicit these connotations and that might have aroused unwanted queries. Nevertheless, the Arabic translations were given to a number of trusty friends who were asked to comment on the clarity of the questionnaires items, on their arrangement, and on whether some items may prove to be unacceptable to the Ss. Having the questionnaires, in their final forms, typed and reproduced was another problem which proved to be time-consuming and not the least annoying.

After fortifying myself with the essential documents certifying my status as a research student enrolled in an accredited university, I approached the first planning organization on my list. From the very beginning, my efforts to secure an adequate sample for the research were met with typical bureaucratic indifference or suspicion.

None was willing to take upon himself the responsibility for allowing me to do the research. High-ranking officials who otherwise would have been expected to help me because of their qualifications and experience explained that such 'confidential' information cannot be handed to anyone who comes asking, and especially if he is a student abroad. However, a small, and reassuring, number of managers did agree to answer the questionnaires. But even these were eventually instructed by a higher authority not to answer the questionnaires. The distributed one hundred and ninety-three copies of the questionnaires were finally returned to me unanswered, except for four, with the lame explanation that this has somehow 'disturbed the work routine of the employees'.

In the meantime, applications were prepared and mailed to senior officials in seven other central planning organizations, asking them if they would consider allowing me to conduct my research on their organizations. In these applications, my readiness to conduct the research either in person or by mail was indicated. Unfortunately, no reply was ever received.

My determination to do the research and to test the hypotheses was not weakened by the generally uncooperative mood of senior officials in central planning organizations.

It became necessary, however, to adjust my research plan by including other organizations in the research sample. The search was for organizations which have been recently established to fulfil certain emerging needs of the new state in the process of economic and social development. In particular, the operations of these organizations must involve new or modern techniques as opposed to the old and traditional techniques. The choice, first, of ministerial planning organizations was obviously justified since these are, like central planning agencies, organizations which have been recently added to the government bureaucracy to serve the purpose of increasing rationality and economy in the government operations.

However, in view of the mood of senior officials in the central planning organizations, it would have been bad planning on my part if only ministerial planning organizations were contemplated for inclusion in the research sample. Including yet other organizations was thought to be necessary if I were to try and find an acceptable sample for this research. The case for the suitability of research organizations was made on the basis that these organizations were recently established to perform functions and services which constitute an innovation on the traditional bureaucratic functions.

Other features shared by the planning organization and the research organization are the presence of a high number of qualified employees at all levels in the organization and the strong dependency relationship with the external environment.

These were the major problems encountered in the process of conducting the field research but there were also problems of a lesser significance. Doing the research in more than one country involved an element of uncertainty since it was not possible to know beforehand whether or not permission to do the research would be given, that is before travelling to these countries and meeting the responsible people in person. In few cases, even this was impeded or discouraged by the refusal to grant me an entry visa or by the tense political situation in the area. To counter some managers' and employees' plea of not affording the time to answer the questionnaire no time limit was set for answering. As a result of this, in one case, I had to call on one official as many as ten times and over a period of five months before he finally produced the questionnaire answered. And what certainly was not a minor problem is the total cost of the field research which amounted to a considerable sum, around £2,000 including expenditures on typing, printing, commuting, travelling and accommodation.

On the other hand, there were specific factors which made possible the modest success achieved in applying this research scheme on a number of planning and research organizations. First, the majority of these organizations are managed by highly qualified persons who either are themselves researchers by profession or appreciate the value of research and study. Second, the help of friends and acquaintances in countries where the research was conducted was instrumental in explaining my case to reluctant managers and employees.

In the chapters that follow, the data which I managed to collect will be put forth and discussed. A detailed examination and analysis of these data was favoured over a short statistical test of the research hypotheses because the former approach would allow a comprehensive account of the data collected and the observations made. Furthermore, since available information on organizations, their managements and employees, in these countries is far from abundant, it was thought that a greater benefit could be obtained from this study if more of the data and observations are included.

The main body of the second part of the dissertation consists of four chapters. The theme of the first chapter will be the nature of the organization environment as perceived by the manager. This will be followed in the second chapter with a detailed discussion of the policies adopted by the manager in dealing with the contingent external elements and in dealing with his subordinates. In the third and fourth chapters, the focus of our discussion will shift

from the manager to his subordinates. In specific, the third chapter will include a report on some of the subordinates' social attitudes and behavioural patterns. In the final chapter, the discussion on the subordinates continues with an account of the research findings on the subordinate's adjustment to the work atmosphere and his perception of his formal relationship with his superior.

CHAPTER IV

MANAGER PERCEPTION OF THE ORGANIZATION ENVIRONMENT

In the organization-environment research model proposed earlier, emphasis was put on two environmental factors, namely the political and the ideological factors. The basic assumption made was that these two factors constituted a contingency for the organization and that the inevitable interaction will influence and determine organizational features at two levels: at the management level and at the individual-subordinate level. In this and the following chapter, the research findings on the manager perception of this environment and the manager response will be presented and discussed.

In relating the organization to its salient environment, the notion of the manager perception of the organization's environment was introduced as an operational measure for detecting the nature of this relevant environment. The manager perception of this environment was described in terms of a continuum from an inflexible and uncooperative environment at one end to a flexible and cooperative environment at the other end. In order to identify these

perceptions, a number of questions as part of a manager questionnaire and in interviews were put to the manager. Answers to some or all of these questions were received from twenty-seven managers in government planning organizations, research organizations, and the planning set-up of a multinational oil firm. These organizations are located in five countries in the Middle East area.

At one point in the process of preparing the research tools, it became necessary to decide what tangible manifestations of the political and ideological contingency in the environment should be singled out for our inquiry. A selective and cautious approach in dealing with political and ideological issues was deemed necessary in view of the controversial context of politics and ideology in these countries and the reluctance of people to air their views on the political leaders' actions and on the 'sacred' ideology. Accordingly, some of the questions put to the manager were meticulously worded to avoid direct reference to the political leaders and their ideologies. In these questions or items, the manager was asked to indicate what notions 'people' entertained about the organization and what moods characterised their exchanges with the organization. A definition of the word 'people' given beforehand restricted its reference to administrators (other than the administrative staff of the organization) and people whose opinions in his estimation

have weight and influence. This may not be as explicit as necessary in its reference to politically influential people but in view of the circumstances this was the only viable alternative. As a result of this, our conception of the organizational environment is now extended to include the following:

1. 'People' - not just any but those whose opinions and judgments carry some weight and influence according to the respondent.
2. Administrators (excluding the administrative staff of the organization): The civil administration in these countries is the institution which employ the largest number of qualified people.
3. The authority centre in the organization environment that defines the functions of the organization prescribes its authorities, and provides it with funds for its operations.

In addition to the section on the manager perception of the environment, the manager questionnaire included also a biographical sheet, and two other sections on management policies. The findings on the last two sections will be discussed in the following chapter.

What proved to be the least controversial of the items in the manager questionnaire were those included in the biographical sheet which managers were asked to fill. In specific, the manager was asked to indicate the following:

1. his position and grade on the organization hierarchy and salary scale
2. academic qualification and experience and the places where these were obtained
3. the time stretch of his stay in the organization and
4. positions he had previously occupied.

All those who answered the manager questionnaire held managerial positions. On the organization hierarchy, their positions ranged from middle to high management positions. In a hierarchically ascending order, they included two heads of section, two assistant directors of bureau, two acting directors, sixteen directors, one assistant general director of department, two acting general directors and two general directors. Their grades and salaries generally varied with their hierarchical positions. Only in three cases, it was found that the grades and salaries of the respondents did not correspond with their hierarchical positions.

Two heads of section in one organization were placed in the highest tier of the grade and salary scale. In the third case, a director of bureau was similarly placed.

Given the scarcity of qualified personnel in these countries, the formal educational qualifications of these managers are indeed impressive. They are all university graduates and a majority of them are holders of post-graduate qualifications. Twenty of them listed post-graduate qualifications of which a Ph.D. degree was one in the case of eleven managers. Eighteen managers received part or all of their formal university training in foreign educational institutions. The majority of these, eleven in number, graduated from universities in the United States of America.

In most cases, the formal training of the manager was in a field of study relevant to the kind of work being performed in his organization. Thus, in the case of a medical research centre, the manager was a highly qualified parasitologist while a qualified economist was the head of the economic planning department in a central planning organization. In the three cases which deviated from this observed trend, the manager's lack of formal training in the line of work performed in the organization was compensated for by a long and intensive experience in one or more of the functions involved.

Managers were also asked to list the previous positions they had occupied, whether in the same organization or elsewhere. Answers show that, in general, managers of planning organizations had more years of experience and in more activities related to their specialisations than the managers of the research organizations. The latter's scope of experience was limited to the usual academic activities of teaching and doing research in institutions for higher education. A few of them had acquired some research experience abroad.

Eleven managers reported some experience in administrative-managerial work before appointment to their present positions. It was found that, in general, the manager of the planning organization had more experience in administrative-managerial work than the manager of the research organization. This experience was seldom obtained in the same organization, that is at a lower managerial level; the majority of planning organizations' managers were promoted to their present positions from middle or low management positions in executive departments.

Managers were also asked to indicate how long they have served in the organization. Nine managers were found to have spent up to two years in the organization while thirteen of them put down a longer duration of time extending up to ten years.

The Environment Scale and the Manager Perception of the Environment

As enumerated earlier, our final sample of managers included managers of different kinds of organization: managers of national planning organization, of ministerial planning organizations, of research organizations and the managers of a planning unit in an oil company. And since the original design of the research did not anticipate the inclusion of all these different organizations in the sample, a single common scale for identifying how managers of different organizations perceive their organization's environments was not prepared. Consequently, there were four such scales for the four different kinds of organizations in the sample. Yet, it was possible and indeed essential to maintain the research focus in all these scales on the basic dimensions of the organization-environment relationship.

The environment scale is the research tool used here for locating the position of the organizational environment on the postulated continuum extending from inflexible and uncooperative environment to flexible and cooperative environment. The environment is described as inflexible and uncooperative when its 'members' (political leaders, administrators and so on) are perceived to lack an understanding and an appreciation of the work being done in the organization and the inherent opportunities and limitations involved in such kind of work.

As such, expectations projected on the organization are gross and unrealistic and specific work assigned to it is impossible to fulfil because of human, material and time limitations. Furthermore, it is inflexible and uncooperative because its 'members' are not responsive to the organization's needs. This unresponsiveness is illustrated by the difficulty encountered by officials of the organization in trying to have their prerogatives specified and their decisions authorised and the ill-afforded time spent for this purpose. Other inputs such as information, reports, suggestions, and ideas for work are scarce and the accuracy and reliability of these are low. Also, inputs in the form of financial support and allocations for motivating the employees are not provided adequately.

On the other hand, the flexible and cooperative environment is distinguished by its 'members' ability to comprehend and appreciate the work being performed in the organization, to show more realism in conceiving of what the organization should achieve, to assign to it only possible tasks, and to provide it with the different inputs necessary for its operation and survival.

In the following sections of this chapter, the total perception of the environment is sub-divided into its constituent dimensions and each of these is considered separately. These dimensions include the following:

Impressions about the organization

Expectations and demands

Inputs: availability and adequacy

Nature of work relationship with other
organizations

Appraisal of the organization products

Impressions about the Organization

Seven of the twelve research organizations' managers (henceforth, research managers) reported that there is no understanding of the work being done in their organizations. They checked in agreement a statement, presented to them, suggesting that 'people' do not differentiate between the work of the research organization and routine work which is usually associated with bureaucratic offices. And even a greater number of the research managers, ten out of twelve, reported that the importance of their organizations functions is not duly appreciated. In the case of planning organizations' managers (henceforth, planning managers), a majority also subscribed to the same viewpoint. Some appreciation of their organizations' functions was, however, perceived by six planning managers.

The same trend is observed when managers gave their estimations of the 'final impression' that 'people' will have about their organizations. Only four planning managers and two research managers expected, or already perceived, this final impression to be positive and to credit the organization (and them) with the accomplishments achieved.

The majority, on the other hand, chose to go along with the alternative statement suggesting that the final impression would be negative and would be biased against them in putting stress on the shortcomings rather than the positive contributions of their efforts.

The impressions held by these people upon whom the organization is dependent for support, co-operation, and inputs are obviously important. As the relationship between two individuals is embettered by a greater degree of empathy shown by both parties, so the more empathetic the attitude toward the organization held by people in the environment the better the chances of a productive dependency relationship between the planning or research organization and these environmental elements. However, when people in the environment label the work of the planners as 'mere paperwork' as one planning manager lamented, and equate research activities with routine work, then it can be expected that such people will not show much readiness to support and cooperate with these organizations.

There are two possible ways of explaining the negative impressions circulating in the immediate environment of the organization. First, one can look at the activities of these organizations and try to ascertain whether these impressions are justified or not. Second, there are possibly factors in the environment itself which can be identified as giving substance to or at least propagating these impressions.

Although the majority of managers did not see in the quality of their work any justification for these negative impressions, two senior officials did conceive of such justification. The following impression about planning organizations in his country was contributed by a head of section in one of these organizations:

To call these organizations planning organizations is to grossly misrepresent the true situation.... these organizations are not performing planning operations in the real sense.

And similarly, AlKhairo and Hamza (1975), two government officials involved in research work, wrote:

Due to the underdeveloped (state) of social research and its limited benefits.... many still regard the social research activities as an undeserving (cause) for expenditure.

But even the managers and these officials who are willing to admit the shortcomings of the organizational efforts explain that the vicious circle begins in the environment where people lack an understanding of their work and fail to provide them with the inputs and support necessary for success.

There are also factors in the environment which engenders and/or sustain these negative impressions. Before the institutionalization of planning in these countries, much of the blame for backwardness and inefficiency was laid on the civil administration (the bureaucracy). The introduction of planning into government systems was then propagated as the final solution for backwardness in the economy and inefficiency and corruption in the bureaucracy. Thus, when the economic plans did not produce the promised dramatic changes and the rationalisation of the bureaucratic processes was not achieved, as much blame was put on 'bad' planning as on bad bureaucracy.

Now, the man in the street as well as the better informed individual have become more familiar with the term planning. Thus, when the concerned agency failed to provide adequate storage space for a tomato crop, this was referred to as a case of 'bad' planning. And since many such examples and deductions can be extracted almost daily from newspapers' editorials and journalistic 'studies' this has resulted in stripping planning of much of its positive connotations.

The repute of both the planning and the research organization suffers also from the propaganda-oriented political leaders. In their efforts to win the largest margin of popular support, political leaders tend to practically rob these organizations of their accomplishments and claim these as their own or the regime's in power.

On the other hand, such political leaders can be expected to disassociate themselves from these organizations when results and accomplishments are not forthcoming.

In general, the research managers reported more unfavourable impressions about their organizations than the planning managers. One possible way of explaining this is by looking at and comparing the ages of the two kinds of organizations. If we accept the notion that familiarity can facilitate understanding and empathy - and may not always produce contempt - then it would suffice to point out the fact that the planning organization has been an integral part of the government system for a longer period of time than the research organization has been.

Expectations and Demands

Another important feature of the organization-environment relationship, chosen for emphasis in this research, is the kind of results and work expected and demanded from these organizations. With regard to expectations, a majority in the case of research managers reported unrealistic expectations while only a minority of the planning managers perceived similar expectations in the environment. Nine of the twelve research managers checked in agreement the following statement presented to them in the questionnaire:

"People expect from us a flood of inventions and dazzling results". On the other hand, only three planning managers (N=15) endorsed the following statement: "People expect us (planners) to perform miracles". It is recognized now that the extreme implications of this statement may have made it easier for the respondents not to endorse it. Nevertheless, the responses of nine planning managers show that they judged the people's expectations to be realistic. The remaining three planning managers in the sample saw fit to give equal support to both statements.

The pattern of the managers' responses changed when they were given the opportunity to specify whether or not expectations and demands are gross and unrealistic in view of certain capacity limitations inherent in their organizations. In the case of research managers, the sample was equally divided between those who claimed that work assignments imposed on them exceeded the limits of their manpower and financial capabilities, and those who reported reasonable demands which matched their organizations' capabilities. On the other hand, a majority of planning managers, nine out of fourteen, gave their support to a statement which suggested that too much is expected of them in too little time. Of the total population of planning managers in the sample, only two indicated clearly that they were given enough time in which to prepare the plans and projects demanded of them.

What is then the general situation with regard to the environmental expectations and demands as indicated by a majority of the responses of managers on these items? First, it can be observed that while the kind of expectations facing research managers are exaggerated and unrealistically high, the actual work assigned to them is not always beyond their capabilities. Second, in the case of planning managers, while the kind of expectation perceived are mostly realistic, the volume of work demanded of them tends to be excessive in view of the time limitation.

With regard to planning organizations, the time limitation is more of a real and tangible constraint than in the case of research organizations. Planners are expected to prepare and submit their plans in accordance with a pre-specified time schedule. The planners in the ministerial planning organizations must submit their ministries' plans on a certain date, thus allowing the national planners time to put together the national plan document. The latter must, on their part, have the national plan ready for authorization not later than a date set for them by the political authority. Political pressures are brought up to bear down on the planners if there are delays. The other party interested in having the national plans submitted and authorized without delay are the executive departments.

In the case of research organizations, however, the time element does not constitute a primary constraint. This is because the output

of research is not urgently needed as an input for operating another organization or a system such as other planning organization and ultimately the government system in the case of the planning organization.

Inputs: Availability and Adequacy

Like all open systems, the planning and the research organizations require for their functioning certain inputs which must be imported from the environment. This dependency relationship presents us with the theme for one significant measure of the degree of flexibility and cooperativeness of the environment of the organization. In specific, the focus of the following investigation will be on, first, the availability of these inputs, and, second, whether or not the quality and quantity of the inputs provided are to the satisfaction of the managers. Four kinds of inputs were identified on the import quotas of these organizations:

1. general information
2. suggestions and ideas needed for the preparation of planning and research projects
3. decisions and authorizations which fall within the jurisdiction of the authority centre in the environment; and
4. financial inputs

With regard to general information, it was thought worthwhile to find out first whether the manager experiences the task of acquiring the information to be easy or difficult. The sources of such information to which reference was made in the items, were government departments, other departments in the same ministry, or the executive departments of the company. A majority of both groups of managers, the planning and the research, asserted that they are faced with difficulties and delays whenever they try to acquire the vital information from other departments. The majority was slightly greater in the case of research managers, nine out of twelve, than in the case of planning managers, ten out of fourteen.

While an input of information is needed for operating both the planning and the research systems, the planner's need for information surpasses in importance all other needs. Information scarcity can be expected to drastically affect the operations and quality of products of the planning organization. However, planners must finally manage to get some information from executive departments and other government organizations. It remains to find out if the information they get is sufficiently correct and reliable to be of use to them. Responses to an item designed to investigate this show that a majority, eight out of ten, thought that the information they received was largely incorrect and unreliable. Such information would either be reprocessed and revised by the planners themselves or otherwise discarded.

Planning managers were also asked to indicate whether they get useful feedback information or not. This was referring in specific to reports on the results of projects execution prepared by the executive departments and ministries. Of the ten planning managers who gave their answers to this item, six confirmed that they did not get useful reports on the progress and final results of plan execution.

The majority of planning managers expressed in several ways their general dissatisfaction with the quantity and quality of the information they received. This situation puts severe limitations on the planning operations. While it may be recognised that decision-makers maximize and never optimize in the use of information for decision-making, the planners in these countries may find it difficult even to work at the maximization level.

The causes of the scarcity and unreliability of information are many and the ones identified here are the cultural forces, the methods of collection and storage of information, and the inefficiency of existing communication channels.

Cultural forces make the task of collecting basic data about the individuals and families very difficult. Traditional people are generally reluctant to contribute information about themselves and their families. Such information has been used by authorities

over the centuries to levy taxes and to take conscripts. Superstitious fears of the envy of others or the 'evil eye' discourage traditional people from disclosing information about their wealth and the number of males in their families. Before the creation of strong national governments, families living under constant threat to their members' lives and meagre possessions appreciated the significance of such items of information for offensive and defensive purposes. In their efforts to discourage potential raiders from other tribes, the members of one tribe resorted also to exaggerating the number of the male population in the tribe, their strength and fighting determination.

The bureaucrat who feels and acts defensively either because he is incompetent and will not survive inter-office competition or because he does not have the assuring protection of a strong patron handles information in much the same way as his traditional predecessors (or contemporaries). He has misgivings about the possible uses the information he transmits will be put to. And just in case it is used to depose him from office, he does not transmit any items of information from which his incompetence or his negligence of official duties can be concluded. If, however, he is pressed to pass on the information, he may defensively remove or adjust in his favour all bits of information which could be used against his person and position in the bureaucracy.

He will go to any length to keep his record clean; it was reported in Al-Thawra (1976) that when newspapers published letters from citizens complaining about bureaucratic practices they had encountered in some offices, responsible officials in a number of these reacted by contacting these citizens and pressuring them to publically withdraw their complaints.

Other factors which contribute to information scarcity and unreliability are the existing methods of information storage, retrieval, and communication. Although records are kept nowadays at the departmental level, methods of filing and classification render them almost useless as sources of vital information for decision-making and planning. Copies of every transaction and office memo are kept in these files and with time these accumulate into mountainous piles of paper. The lack of a uniform filing system also means that with time and as filing officials are transferred or retired, it becomes extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, to retrieve documents from the files. To reduce the volume of these files, every few years a committee of officials in each department is assigned the task of sorting out the important files which must be kept from the less important ones which are then destroyed. And since there are no set guidelines for this important sorting process, officials in these committees decide on this matter according to their best subjective judgment.

In the meantime, and for lack of space, files are stored in garages, corridors and damp basements.

What are the chances then of locating and retrieving an important document required for a research? In the recent experience of one researcher, the difficulties encountered were sufficient to make him give up the search. He told me:

I required an important historical document for my research and I approached the national archives office where I thought it might be kept. They told me there that they did have the document and I was led to a garage where piles of files and papers were stacked, without exaggeration, to the ceiling. I was then told that it is somewhere around and I should try to find it myself. The kind orderly added that I should look out for a snake which had obviously found refuge and privacy in there.

In addition to these problems, planners and researchers must seek and acquire the necessary information through inefficient communication channels which involve tedious paper work and long delays.

The general reluctance of government officials to provide information unless prior authorisation from above is given lengthens considerably the time period spent on retrieval. The time element is, as explained previously, of critical significance to the planners who are pressed by a tight work schedule.

Another of these problems facing planners and researchers is the frequent occurrence of communication breakdowns and the confusion which ensues from them. This can happen when information is sent back and forth between planners and other concerned agencies. One single error can result in a tremendous loss in time and human efforts and may have negative repercussions on the friendly and cooperative atmosphere between planners and other officials. An example of this situation was detailed to me by an official in a national planning agency:

We have just received the comprehensive programme of Department X. They have spent a lot of time and effort in preparing it. There is, however, one problem; we cannot accept or use it. Before they began working on the programme, we sent them a set of conditions and figures and asked them to work accordingly. Now, we find out that the figures they used were not the original figures which we had supplied them with and instructed them quite clearly to use.

In order to redress this situation, governments resorted to the creation of national statistical agencies and statistical offices in every ministry and major department. These organizations were assigned the heroic task of collecting and compiling data on various social and economic topics which could be of use to the planners or other decision-makers. In preparing these comprehensive statistical records, the statistics officials may choose the short course of action by making use of the data stored in the various government departments. This, of course, would expose their compiled records to the danger of contamination by abundant errors at the source, i.e. the records of the government departments. As the chief of a statistical office testified: "Statistics are not prepared properly and scientifically because they are based on official records". Alternatively, officials of the statistical office can conduct their own search for data which they can then process into more reliable information. However, due to lack of qualified personnel and funds, statistical experts can deal intensively with only a limited number of social and economic topics.

Despite government efforts to reform the system of information collection, storage and communication, planners can still observe, and experience, the need for further improvements.

They appear to favour, in particular, working out extra-bureaucratic solutions for these chronic problems. They warn that if such solutions are not forthcoming, then the quality of planning will never be enhanced and the value of past and present planning exercises as lessons of experience for future maximisation of rationality will be lost.

The second kind of input needed in these organizations also fits the general category of information. However, it is not just any information but the specific 'raw material' required for operating the planning and the research systems. Planners and researchers cannot by themselves devise the subject matter of their operations. They cannot from their offices and laboratories perceive the spectrum of issues and problems for which specific economic projects or research projects must be prepared. In most cases, they would have to rely on the accumulated first-hand knowledge of government officials which they obtain through their own scanning efforts and on-the-job experiences. This knowledge reaches the planner and the researcher in the form of proposals and suggestions.

The planning managers were asked, first, to indicate whether or not they get enough ideas and project proposals from other departments. A majority of them (only ministerial planning managers), eight out of nine, answered in the affirmative. Planners must be pleased with

this since the insufficiency of project ideas for planning is usually identified as one of the common obstacles to planning. The project ideas referred to here are the ones judged by the planner, after careful study, to be useful, goal-achieving, and suitable for the situation in that country. However, planners receive also ideas which are neither useful nor suitable and in certain circumstances the abundance of ideas, including both the useful and suitable and the useless and unsuitable, can prove to be a disadvantage. The experience of one country in particular shows that given the availability of funds combined with a political commitment to a fast rate of economic growth can result in the weakening of the rational element in planning. When funds are plentiful, planners may find themselves in a situation where it would be difficult to maintain a high degree of rationality in planning while constantly yielding to strong political pressures to increase the volume of expenditure for development. In this case, the sacrifice to rationality takes the form of incorporating in the plans even the wasteful and unsuitable projects.

Further clarifications on the nature of the project proposals were sought from the planning managers. First, they were given a choice between a statement asserting that the project proposals received were prepared and presented (by the senders) in accordance with their instructions and a statement indicating that these instructions were

disregarded. The experience of four of the nine managers coincided with the situation described in the latter statement.

The proposed project cannot simply be a mere dispatch arguing the desirability of establishing a dairy firm or the extension of the present railways system. Such proposals must include supporting information and figures on such features of the proposed project as its geographical location, its cost, the expected benefits and the kind and volume of labour and expertise needed for operating it. Without this information, bringing in sociological, economic and political insights, the planners would either have to work out the figures themselves, use a common sense approach rather than the rigorous method of cost/benefit analysis, in judging the feasibility of the project, or ignore the proposal. In view of the time limitation enforced on the planners, it can be visualised that they will, in most cases, opt for the latter measures. This situation could result in straining whatever there is of a productive relationship between the planners and their executive clientele.

Another point relating to the project proposals on which a reaction from some of the planning managers was sought is whether or not the number of proposals received by them exceeded their intake and processing capacity. Again, the same ratio of managers, four out of nine, gave evidence that they were faced with this contingency.

The abundance of suggested projects from which the planners can choose the most suitable and economical for implementing the established economic policy is regarded, in principle, as a pre-requisite for better planning. This is, of course, provided that certain conditions are satisfied and especially the condition that the planners can study all these proposals before making their choice. When, however, the processing capacity of the planning organization is stretched to the maximum by a flood of inputs in the form of project proposals, the consequences for the planning organization can be harmful. In that event, if the planners decide to study all the proposals within the time limit, then this could result in the 'clogging' of the planning machine. And since this situation cannot be tolerated, the planner would seek to ease the pressure of too much work either by skipping some of the operations or steps involved in his work or by hastily and ritually going through all the basic steps. On the other hand, if the planner decides to make an initial selection from the many proposals, this decision may result in an unproductive competition among the originators of these proposals. He will then find himself the target of pressures and counter pressures from these officials each of whom will be demanding a priority consideration for his suggested projects. The ultimate outcome of this situation is that some of these officials will emerge, in the

aftermath of the competitive process, as 'winners' while others will come out as 'losers' and hence unsatisfied with the planner's choice of proposals for study.

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that it is not enough to find out whether the planners get enough project proposals or not. Other important aspects of the situation are the form and contents of the proposal and whether their number is excessive.

In the final analysis, only one planning manager, from our sample of nine, confirmed that the project proposals were adequate in number and were prepared and presented in accordance with instructions and that he and his subordinates can thoroughly study them within the given time period.

Research managers, like planning managers, need this kind of information in order for them (and their subordinates) to work out research themes for their organizations. In a developing country, the research organization is expected to contribute possible solutions for problems encountered in the development process. This could be a minor technical problem faced in an industrial firm or a major bottleneck in one of the economic sectors. Knowledge about major and minor problems can be gathered either through a search conducted by the research manager and his subordinates or from information which they receive from people experiencing the problems.

And while managers favoured the latter case because it is, they argued, more practical and time saving, it was, however, not the actual case. they reported. A majority of them, ten in number, agreed with the following statement put to them in the questionnaire: "Our participation in solving the developmental problems is limited because other departments do not inform us about such problems which fall within our field of specialisation". Similar complaints were raised in a general conference which brought together the managers and scientific staff of some of the research organizations included in this study. Further supporting evidence came from a senior official, a head of section, in a research organization for which answers to the manager questionnaire were not made available: "I believe there are not many people who know about our existence..... Nobody bothers to inform us about anything".

What this situation promotes is the isolation of people with extensive training in the physical and social sciences and in the fields of technology whose participation in the developmental process is mandatory for its success. Furthermore, if we accept the current argument singling development as the primary and central process in these countries, then by not allowing the small number, but very valuable group, of scientists and technologists to contribute regularly to this process would be to deprive them from a powerful cause for achievement and the satisfaction derived from doing their job and contributing positively.

What is being said here, in essence, is that this situation is expected to have far-reaching effects in the sense that not only the research organizations will be affected but also, and perhaps even more significantly, the talented people who populate these organizations. To stress the significance of this, one has only to point at the undiminishing brain drain from these countries and to the West. In addition to political, social and financial factors, a major excuse for those who choose to exercise their talents elsewhere is the fact, as they see it, that they have nothing to accomplish here and when there exists the odd opportunity for their contribution, numerous obstacles emerge to wither away their initiatives.

The implications of this situation for the research organization are also negative. By thwarting the research organization's potential role in the development process, the environmental forces and 'actors' are undermining one of its basic purposes - if not the basic. This, in turn, will act to diminish the prestige of the organization, to subvert its chances of survival and development, and may even obstruct or possibly reverse the trend of increasing faith in secular knowledge as the means for enhancing the lot of the people. The alternative to a belief in secular knowledge is the reinstatement of the belief in moral-religious knowledge, i.e. the fekah (theology) and philosophy, as the predominant and exalted field of knowledge.

The third kind of inputs acquired from the environment include the significant decisions and authorizations which cannot be made by the organization managers themselves because they do not have the necessary jurisdiction for making them. Accordingly, the organization managers are expected to seek such decisions and authorizations from individuals who have the necessary legal-formal jurisdiction. This explains then our need to know how the manager perceived his relationship with the authority centre in the environment and specifically whether this relationship facilitated or impeded the operations of the organization. Complete and detailed information on this relationship were difficult to get from the managers because this would have involved them in commenting on people in higher positions of authority. The reluctance of managers to make such comments was confirmed rather early in the process of collecting data for this research and it was then decided to limit the inquiry to the 'safe' aspect of this relationship.

The first question that comes to mind is whether or not these organizations are delegated sufficient formal powers for running their affairs and for adequately dealing with environmental and internal contingencies. In the case of planning organization it can be noted that the political commitment to planning as an institution is still evident in these countries.

There has certainly been many occasions when political and popular faith in planning has declined as a spontaneous reaction to setbacks in the development process. This decline in the prestigious standing of planning has encouraged a 'reformist' movement, led by those educated in the merits of communistic-socialistic planning, who advocate a redistribution of actual powers between political planners and technical planners in favour of the former. What these people would like to see, as suggested in Habib (1974) is the cooptation in the planning set-up of representatives of organized labour and peasants associations to make planning more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the working people. They justify these demands on the basis of what they interpret as the bureaucratization of planning and the tendency of the planning technocrat to overstep the boundaries of his jurisdictions (and into the ideological-political domain).

The notion that more power is going in the direction of the planning technocrat has not escaped the attention of the political leaders in one country and consequently, the scope of the planners' responsibilities and operations has been contracted. However, it would be an exaggeration to conclude that this trend has reached the degree whereby more powers are being formally, or informally conceded (and routinised), to the planning technocrat.

The relationship between the political leader and the planner is, more or less, the same in all these countries regardless of the nature of the political regime in power, and the essence of this relationship can be summed up in the following points:

1. the politician decides on the general state of the economy to be achieved and prescribes the legitimate ways of achieving it;
2. he instructs the planner to work out detailed targets and programmes for the purpose of realizing this desired state; and
3. he holds the final authority to accept or reject the planner's detailed programme.

In effect, this situation puts a number of constraints on the planners' work. In all of these regimes, the role of economics and hence economic planning is considered to be instrumental. Leadership, intuition, and innovation in the economic field are functions solely exercised by the political leadership. Political responsiveness to the imperatives of the economic situation is largely not evident. Moreover, the prescriptions of ideology and politics are enforced on the planners and this is done at the expense of rationality in planning.

This is, in general, the nature of the relationship between the institutions of ideology and politics and that of planning in these countries.

On the other hand, the relationship of the planning organization with its executive clientele has undergone a positive evolutionary process. One significant result of this process is that a clearer and more definite expression of the functions and authorities of the planning set-up is now available. The situation has changed from an early stage wherein the planners' work consisted of nothing more than collecting and putting together the projects lists of the various executive departments to the present stage wherein the planners are vested with the powers to issue directives to executive agencies and to accept or reject their projects.

These are my observations and to find out how the planning manager perceived his relationship with the authority centre in the environment, a number of items and questions were put to him in the questionnaire and in interviews.

In the first item, the manager was confronted with two statements to choose from, one suggesting that the executive departments try to impose their projects on them (the planners) and the other indicating that these departments only submit their projects for consideration. Responses to this item were obtained from four central planning managers, eight ministerial planning managers, and four planning managers in the oil firm.

Two of the central planning managers reported that projects were suggested to them and never enforced upon them. Yet, in one of these two cases, there is evidence, provided by Hassan (1974), which suggests that the basic choices which should supposedly be made with some contribution from the planners are arrived at without their help:

It is feared that the discussion for plan preparation (involve) each minister attempting to acquire a large share of allotted funds for his ministry without taking into consideration the priorities, the set strategy and the goals which the plan is wanted to achieve.

The third central planning manager observed that executive ministries and departments neither imposed nor simply suggested their project and preferred to describe his organization relationship with the projects-forwarding agencies as a 'give-and-take' relationship. In the fourth case, the response of the under-secretary of the planning ministry to this item was more precise and explicit: "Of course, the ministers (a coalition of traditional chieftains, who are also the political leaders) have all the powers. If they want something done, we do it. We merely take orders". In the case of the ministerial planning organization, a majority of five (N=8) did not experience any such pressures from executive departments in their ministries.

A majority in the case of planning managers in the oil firm, three out of four, reported otherwise.

Political leaders prescribe the goals and their priority order which the planners must then use in preparing the detailed programme of action. Does this contact with the authority centre generate problems for the planners? From a sample of eight ministerial planning managers and two central planning managers, seven and one respectively reported that the goals and the priority scale did change at a pace which meant difficulties and delays for them. The goals and the priority scale the planners need for their work are supposedly provided at the beginning of every plan cycle. While second thoughts about the goals and their priorities may not necessarily require launching a new planning effort, the adjustments that must be made and the efforts and time lost may result in unsettling the planners' orientations and the disruption of their work routine.

If the priority scale is to be useful to the planners as a set of guidelines for making choices related to the plan, then it must be set down and detailed clearly. A majority of the ministerial planning managers, five out of eight, and two company planning managers, reported that this condition has been satisfactorily fulfilled. Those who described the priority scale with which they worked as 'not clear' were the two central planning managers and two company planning managers.

The contacts of the planning managers with the authority centre are not limited to the occasions when goals and the priority scale are sent to the planners or when these are changed; every major decision arrived at in the planning organization must be approved by these authority people. Accordingly, it was thought worthwhile to seek the managers' estimation of the easiness or difficulty of this process. Answers show that the overall majority of the planning managers find it relatively easy to acquire the necessary authorization from the authority centre. Only three ministerial planning managers and one central planning manager reported that it was difficult.

In the light of the planning managers' representation of their relationship with the authority centre the incident described below might appear as the exception. Yet, the fact that such an extreme incident does occur gives substance to the argument that ideologically-motivated political leaders can sometimes, and do, make the work of the planners very difficult. The following incident was related to me by a senior official in a planning organization:

The bad state of the prison system has been on our mind for some time. We feel that there is a need for new purposely-built buildings and even a greater need for reforming the penal system.

Accordingly, the responsible people in this planning department decided to work out, with the help of specialists, a programme for modernising the prison system in this country. After putting down an outline of the programme, we took it to the Minister to discuss it. After skimming through it, he gave us his opinion. He told us that we should not worry about modernising the prison system in this country because according to the ideology of the government, prisons would not be needed in a few more years. (His explicit assumption was) that the people under this regime would be satisfied, materially and spiritually, to the extent that social and political crime will be extinct.

This is an example of the kind of political 'logic' which the planners must work with and adapt to. To the ideologues, the goals and policies they set are the 'givens' of the situation and the planners or any other government employee is expected to abide by these givens. Only those who do so are ensured of employment, continuity and promotion.

Like the planning managers, the research manager also requires certain 'political' inputs from the authority centre in the environment.

The kind of inputs that the research manager must have are such things as a definition of his managerial prerogatives and duties, approval and authorization of decisions made inside the organization, and the priority guidelines to facilitate his search for, and choice of research schemes. Such inputs are either already available to the research manager in the stipulation of the organization charter or must be acquired through the established formal channels.

The first item on the 'political' inputs was intended to find out the scope and effectiveness of the manager prerogatives. Limited prerogatives were reported by eight of the twelve managers who confirmed that a prior endorsement of a higher authority is needed before going through with a research idea. Indeed it seems that the majority of these managers and their subordinates have a minimum of influence over the kind of research being performed in their organizations. As the answers of eight of these managers support, priority is always given to research ideas which they receive from above (and outside the organization) over research ideas developed within the organization even when the latter satisfy the interests of research workers and are thought to be economically and/or socially advantageous. Yet, beside this general guideline, six managers maintained that they do not have the basic decision-making tool, in specific terms, a clear scale of priorities, which they could use to evaluate research ideas. One manager added that when these

guidelines were not made available, a committee was set up within the organization to devise the guidelines. In this case, the manager was able to take the initiative because he had the formal authority to interpret the charter of the organization while in other cases the manager must seek such interpretation from the authority centre.

The final item on the research manager's relationship with the authority centre dealt with the process by which the manager acquires the various authorizations needed for operating the organization. In specific, the question which would be answered through this item was: is the process of getting research proposals formally approved cumbersome or not? In the item, the encumbering elements identified were the need to submit detailed justifying statements and the lapse of a long waiting period of time before approval is granted. The presence of such encumbering elements was not reported by a majority of the research managers, eight out of twelve.

The last kind of input on our list includes the financial support received from the environment. The sum and conditions of expenditure of these finances are usually stipulated in a budget issued at the beginning of every financial year. The budgetary allotments are distributed traditionally between the following two items: the salaries and miscellaneous administrative expenses. However, in the case of the research organization, other allocations are needed to cover the cost of materials, scientific equipment and a variety of activities related to research work.

The availability of financial resources for basic expenditure items was reported by seven of the twelve research managers. However, beyond this subsistence level, there remain other activities for which money is not made available. As the responses of ten managers show, their subsidies fall short of making possible such management policies as the provision of encouraging incentives for outstanding achievements in research. Another cause for complaint is the scarcity of funds to finance research workers' participation in international conferences and seminars.

Nature of Work Relationship with Other Organizations

Among the population of environmental elements with which the organization is observed to have contacts or links, other organizations make up a major constituency. In the previous section it was argued that if work was to be performed and results were to be achieved, then certain inputs such as information must be imported from other organizations in the environment. There are also other occasions in which a form of exchange or contract is observed to occur between the organization and one or more organization(s) in the environment. One such contact takes place when the organization exports its products and results, or provides services, to other organizations. All these contacts are essential for the continuous operation of the planning and the research organization.

This explains our interest here in finding out the residual notions that linger in the minds of the planning and research managers after conducting these contacts.

The subject of the first item was cooperation. The planning managers answered this item as follows: six indicated that they managed to get this cooperation with relative ease; six indicated that getting other organisations and their officials to cooperate with them was a difficult task and; two did not choose to go either way.

However, it should be noted here that four of the six managers who reported that the cooperation of other organizations was easily acquired and maintained belong to the oil company. In answering a differently worded item from that presented to the planning managers but which similarly touched on cooperation, six of the twelve research managers checked in agreement the following statement: "When one of our researchers goes to a government department to carry out tasks concerning research it is most likely that he will encounter difficulties". A senior official in the over-all administration of six of the twelve research organizations described the cooperation extended by other organizations as 'not bad'. Some of these managers complained of the lack of cooperation and support from the universities which would otherwise be expected to follow closely and participate in their work.

The extent to which this absence of cooperation can reach is dramatically illustrated by an incident which involved a research organization and another organization in which some research activities have been regularly undertaken. It appears that teams in both organizations have been collecting data and doing research on the same phenomenon independently of each other. This duplication of efforts was only discovered in a conference which brought together members of both teams. While it might be difficult in this case to identify the 'guilty' party, there is no doubt in the mind of Al-Khairo and Hamza (1975) on whom the blame should be put:

There is a lack of a relationship based on reciprocal trust between administrators and the (social sciences) research institutes. These institutes appear in the minds (eyes) of many as if they were entities having an inspective and critical function and consequently their activities are met with suspicion and deliberate hindrance.

So at least in the case of the social sciences research organizations, the problem is not the lack of support and cooperation, but the presence of hostile attitudes and strategies intended to subvert the functions and processes of these organizations.

One factor which contributes to this low level of cooperation between organizations is administrative routine.

Nine of the research managers confirmed that their activities were linked with the administrative routine and that this was indeed a major obstacle. This means that if the research manager observes the need to seek the help of officials in another organization, he cannot do this informally and quickly. The proper procedure would be to begin an official correspondence with the administrative head of the other organization and most probably several written communications will go back and forth between the two before a final arrangement is made.

In the case of ministerial planning organizations, planning for a project may require the coordination of efforts between two or more of the planning agencies. For example, the industrial planners cannot by themselves work out a plan for industrial expansion. In preparing this plan, they must work in cooperation with the planners in the construction ministry who can advise the industrial planners on their capacity to design and build the necessary buildings for the planned factories and also with the educational planners who can better forecast the volume of technical and managerial manpower that will be, or can be, made available for operating the industry. Leaving this task until all the sectoral and ministerial plans reach the central planning agency would put the staff of this agency in the impossible position of having to redraft the several plans into a coherent national plan.

Four of the eight ministerial planning managers reported that their plans are prepared in total and unobstructed coordination with other ministerial planning organizations. However, coordination does not always result in cooperation. Managers of the public industry expressed on one occasion, in the Conference on Low Productivity in the Government Agencies (1976), their dissatisfaction with the limited capacity and low efficiency of the construction administration. A planning official at the construction ministry complained of the shortage in construction materials, the production of which is controlled by the industrialists. The managers of public industry were also critical of the quality of engineering graduates trained in the higher education institutes of the education ministry.

One basic condition for a satisfactory degree of cooperation is a degree of understanding and appreciation of the imperatives of the planning and the research work on the part of other organizations' officials. The underlying assumption here is that there are methods of operation which are peculiar to the work of the planner or the researcher and that these methods must be accepted and viewed as legitimate by outsiders whose cooperation and participation in planning or research are needed.

In the case of research organizations, it has already been reported that a majority of research managers perceived that most 'people' held the misconception that research was not different from routine work. In the following quotation from the Annual Report of the Scientific Research Foundation (1975), the nature of research work and its distinguishing features are made clear and, in my interpretation, it is implicitly suggested here that an awareness of these among people concerned with research work or upon whom the success of research is dependent is lacking:

The work (of the research establishment) requires abilities that other works do not require and requires means and methods which must be free of the traditions that are feasible in other concerns. It also demands the freedom of thought, of work, and of direction and finally (it) calls for an awareness and understanding (on the part of) the one who sees and follows the progress of scientific research - an awareness and an understanding not only of the importance of scientific research but also of its nature, its requirements, and its results. For scientific research requires patience and tolerance of results which could be negative in the beginning and (acceptance of) financial expenditures which could be tremendous, and an unconditional and free scope of work.

In the case of the planning organization, two specific features of the planning operation were chosen for the purpose of our inquiry into whether or not there exists an awareness of the special techniques in planning. These are the characteristics that 'planning sometimes work through a process of trial and error' and that 'flexibility is important for successful planning'. A majority of the managers reported that there was an awareness of the former aspect of planning. The principle of trial and error implies that the planners work at a certain rationality level which is not optimum and hence their planning involves an element of error. These errors result in a waste of resources and human efforts and if the planners are not granted this error or slack margin then their relationship with the executive departments which bear the cost of these errors will be strained.

On the issue of flexibility in planning, a majority of the planning managers, seven out of ten, indicated that there was an awareness of the importance of flexibility for the success of planning. Two of the remaining three managers did not perceive any such awareness while one manager did not choose to indicate either way.

In their relationships with the environment, the research and the planning organizations are not always at the receiving end; these organizations also export products and services to the environment.

The planning organization produces plans and provides technical and economic advice while the research organization exports research findings and specialised studies and works out solutions for technical problems. As any sales manager would know, no organization can survive without selling something and no sales can be made if the clients have no faith in the organization or its products. According to a majority of research managers, seven out of twelve, their research projects do not receive the attention and follow-up of departments which may eventually benefit from the results of these research efforts. The two central planning managers were not satisfied with the efforts put by executive departments in implementing their plans. The four company managers unanimously agreed that other departments are easily convinced to implement and follow the directives of their plans. In the case of ministerial planning organizations, their plans and reports are intended mainly for the attention of the central planning agency. Of the eight managers here, four reported that their plans and reports get sufficient attention from the planners in the central planning agency.

In answering an item on the utility made of research results, nine research managers confirmed that results and findings arrived at in their organizations are put into practice. There is, however, further evidence which does not support the assertion of two of these managers. High ranking employees who work under the two

managers stated in a conference that the quality of research performed in their organizations is so low that results are not put into any use and moreover that potential beneficiaries have strong doubts about the reliability of these results. A research manager who had indicated that the results they produce were not put into practice explained in a footnote that these results are not suited to the needs of the country. His organization is commissioned to conduct research on a 'national resource' of which this country happens to be the primary 'producer' in the world. Another organizational, as opposed to environmental, factor which hinders the utilization of research results is the practice adopted in some research organizations of not disclosing the findings of study and research. This appears to be especially the case in social research organizations. According to Al-Khairo and Hamza (1975), results are kept secrets even in cases which do not justify such a precaution. It is not clear, however, whether or not this practice is encouraged, or even imposed on the research administration, by a higher authority.

Much of the blame for the limited use made of research results is put on the environmental elements. Some of the potential beneficiaries refuse to apply research results because, according to Al-Khairo and Hamza (1975), of their "lack of faith in its feasibility for (understanding) social issues.

This attitude is common among high-ranking administrators who have moved up in (the hierarchy of) administrative responsibilities and acquired practical experiences which they hold dearly and would not trust in anything else and especially (not in) what come from scientists and researchers". These high-ranking administrators see no need for studying social phenomena because to them "everything is clear and there is not anything that has not been discovered through practice and long experience". The same authors who presented this argument were strongly critical of the tendency of some planners and administrators to "turn their faces away" from the results of studies conducted in social research organizations. They went further to suggest that there may be "need" for "painful failures in many of the programmes" before the importance of such studies is appreciated.

Appraisal of the Organization Products

The environment is viewed here as the source of appraisals of the work and products of the organization and hence it would be pertinent to wonder if the manager perceives these appraisals to be justly made or not. Six of the fourteen planning managers who answered the item complained that whenever something goes wrong during plan implementation, they get blamed for it. On the other hand, the responses of the research managers point at an even less empathetic or just appraisal of their work.


All except one of the research managers agreed that they do get blamed for not coming up with results even if unforeseen obstacles emerge to make this impossible. Moreover, the research managers in the sample unanimously endorsed a statement specifying that when their work is appraised, emphasis is put on results while circumstances surrounding them are left out. The research managers were also presented with an item intended to elicit their own appraisals of their work. In answering this item, a majority of nine managers (N=12) were confident that the value of the work they produce exceeded the value of the inputs and facilities provided to them.

Research Findings on the Environment Continuum

The original purpose of our research on the environment was to determine for each organization in the sample the position of its relevant environment on a postulated continuum from inflexible and uncooperative to flexible and cooperative. Accordingly, a search was undertaken to identify a number of events in which some vital exchange or linkage was observed to occur between the organization and an environmental party. Each of these events was regarded as an opportune moment during which the organization manager can perceive the attitudes and/or register the actions of the environmental party towards his organization.

An attempt was then made to tap these perceptions and experiences through the questionnaire and the interview techniques and to derive them from few written sources. The research findings on these perceptions and experiences were discussed in detail in the preceeding sections of this chapter.

What remains to be done is to reconsider these findings in terms of the environment continuum. To simplify this, the continuum is diagrammatically represented below. The first half of the continuum, i.e. from the inflexible, uncooperative point to the zero or midpoint is referred to here as the negative part of the continuum. The second half of the continuum, i.e. from zero point to the flexible cooperative point is hence the positive part of the continuum.



As indicated earlier, the research sample included different kinds of organizations: central, ministerial, and company planning organizations as well as research organizations. There were, accordingly, four environment scales for the four different kinds of organizations in the sample. Nevertheless, there were items which were common to all the scales while other items differed only in their wordings.

On the other hand, it was not possible to maintain the same number of items in all the scales because my knowledge of the various ways in which the organization related to its environment was progressively increasing and this called for an appropriate increase in the number of items in the scales devised at a later stage in the research.

Each item in these scales, except the one administered to the company planning managers, is made up of two statements, placed opposite each other. One statement describes a positive relationship with an environmental party while the other describes a negative version of the same relationship. The manager is instructed to choose one of the two statements in each item and specifically the one which approximates the work situation in his experience and to indicate the degree of its representativeness by choosing from a three-point Likert-type agreement scale. Accordingly, the score for each item in the scales varies from -3 at the extreme negative end to +3 at the extreme positive end. Each item is given the same weight and a total score for each respondent is calculated by adding up his scores on all items. The technique used in the scale administered to the company planning managers is slightly different. Instead of the two sets of numbers (i.e. the two agreement sets) there is one continuous series of numbers from 1 to 7 inserted between the two statements. The respondent is also instructed to choose one of the numbers. These are scored as follows: -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3.

After calculating the total scores for all the cases in the sample, the following results are obtained:

1. Ministerial planning organizations: The scores of the eight managers in this category correspond to the following positions on the environment continuum: four in the negative part of the continuum, one at exactly midpoint and three in the positive part. Actual scores ranged from -9 to +25 while the range of scores that could have been obtained on this scale is from -60 to +60.
2. Central planning organizations: Responses were received from two managers in two such organizations. Their scores were -19 and +17. The range of possible scores is from -48 to +48.
3. Company planning organization: Responses were received from four planning managers in the company. Their scores were equally distributed between the two parts of the continuum, i.e. two in the negative part and two in the positive part. Their scores ranged from -9 to +17 while the range of possible scores on this scale is from -33 to +33.

4. Research organizations: There were twelve managers in the sample representing twelve research organizations. Their actual scores ranged from -48 to +5. Only one score was in the positive part of the continuum. The range of possible scores is from -63 to +63.

From these results, it can be seen that the range of actual scores does not represent the maximum possible range in the scales. It might be then useful to identify here the actual variations on the nature of the organization-environment relationship as revealed by the range of obtained scores or answers. Thus, in the case of the planning organizations in general, as we move from the obtained negative scores to the positive scores, we observe the following changes in the relationship:

1. 'People' become more appreciative of the work being done in the organization.
2. More useful reports on the implementation of plans and projects are received.
3. The priority scale becomes clear.
4. Projects are suggested to the planners and not imposed on them.

5. Planners do not get blamed if obstacles to plan execution, which they could not foresee, emerge.
6. The reports and plans of the ministerial planning organization are attentively received by the national planners.
7. A more satisfactory state of cooperation with other ministerial planning organizations is achieved.

The following responses also distinguish the positive scores from the negative scores but not as clearly or as strongly as the preceding items:

1. In the final analysis, 'people' will remember the planners' achievements.
2. Work assignments are less unreasonable in view of the time limitation.
3. Information received is less incorrect and less unreliable.

With few exceptions, the responses of the planning managers show that the following characteristics of the situation are common to all:

1. Planners are not expected to perform miracles.
2. Acquiring the necessary information is generally difficult.
3. Adequate suggestions and project proposals are received from executive departments.
4. Plan goals and their priority distribution change frequently resulting in delays and problems for the planners.
5. The need for flexibility in planning is understood.

By applying the same procedure to the research managers' responses and scores, we can observe that the following responses separate the 'positives' from the 'negatives' or, since in this case only one positive score is obtained, distinguish the scores nearer the zero (mid) point from those nearer the inflexible, uncooperative point:

1. People show more understanding of the functions of the research organization.
2. Work assignments are reasonable in terms of the human and financial capacity of the research organization.
3. A clear priority scale for evaluating research ideas is obtained.
4. Adequate financial support is provided.
5. Government departments and their employees extend more help to the research workers.
6. Departments who may benefit from the results of research being done in the research organization follow up the progress of research.

The following items also distinguish the 'positives' from the 'negatives' but to a lesser degree:

1. Research results are utilized.
2. A slight improvement on the tendency of 'people' to belittle the work and achievements of the research organization.

3. A moderation of 'people' expectations for dramatic results is perceived.

There were also items which did not distinguish between the 'positives' and the 'negatives'. The responses of the managers on these items were in the majority of cases as follows:

1. In the final analysis, 'people' will remember only the miscarriages of the research work.
2. Acquiring information from other organizations is a difficult process.
3. Research organizations are not informed about the problems encountered in the developmental process.
4. Getting authorizations from a higher authority is neither effort- nor time-consuming.
5. When the research work is appraised, too much emphasis is put on results and no consideration is given to the surrounding circumstances.
6. Appropriations for providing incentives to the research workers are lacking.

CHAPTER V

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTINGENCY

In the preceding chapter, the research findings on the nature of the organization environment were put forth and discussed. From these findings, it was deemed possible to place the relative position of each organization environment on the environment continuum. That modest achievement in itself is not significant. It would be significant, however, if it proves to be useful in explaining internal events within the organization, in specific whatever relevant features of the organization that come under the general labels of structure and behaviour. In the hypotheses suggested earlier, an attempt was made to conceive of what effects the nature of the environmental contingency, i.e. its relative position on the continuum, has on managerial policies. Reference was made then to a certain conformity continuum which sums up the manager relationship with his subordinates in terms of more or less conformity imposed on the latter. Conformity which was defined for the purpose of this research as 'active structure' was expected to decrease, or in other words, the 'freedom' of the subordinates will increase, as one moves from organization environments in the negative part of the continuum toward environment in the positive part. In addition, this movement on the continuum was expected to have specific implications for the way the manager distributes his attention, time and energy among his various activities.

The research findings on these will be reported in the second part of this chapter. What must be done first is to report on the other, and more general, manifestations of the management response to the environmental contingencies.

Whether it is a stimulus from the environment or a response from the organization, such messages or transactions usually pass through, or occur within, formal linkage lines connecting the organization with the environmental parties. If we were to conceive of the whole system in terms of the 'boxes' and 'lines' criteria, then two kinds of lines, an upward vertical and a horizontal, denoting two kinds of organization-environment relationship can be observed to run between the organization and the environmental parties. The upward vertical lines represent these links which the organisation has with a higher authority level, either an administrative or political office or position. The horizontal lines represent these links which the organization has with administrative units or positions whose place on the over-all bureaucratic hierarchy is analogous to that of the organization. There are no downward vertical lines linking the organizations in our sample with administrative units on lesser authority steps of the hierarchy.

Through these formal hierarchy lines, the manager can maintain and conduct the necessary contacts and transactions with various elements in the organization environment.

However, these are only channels or means of communication and their mere existence does not guarantee the smooth and functional fulfilment of these transactions. A message from the manager to an environmental party may not be followed, in an automatic fashion or even 'in due time', by an appropriate response. As one planning official illustrates: "When I tried to draw the attention of officials in..... (executive department) to the proper procedure for performing a specific planning function, I received the message to 'come and do the job yourself'". Faced with such a contingency, the manager would have to consider the policy options open to him, and then to choose a suitable reaction. These policy options have been conventionally categorized into policies designed to change the environment and policies designed to adapt the organization.

Changing the Environment

Students of organization and management behaviour speak sometimes of the organization attempt to influence and restructure its environment. A typical example of this situation is when an organization launches an advertising campaign to influence the public attitudes toward its products. It seems legitimate therefore to ask whether the managers of the research and the planning organizations in our sample can and do change their immediate environments for the purpose of making them more cooperative.

The answer would have to be that there are means which they can use to effect a change in the attitudes and actions of the environmental parties. One possible method is the friendly persuasion method. As the name of this method suggests, it involves the manager in trying mainly to maintain open-ended communication channels with the environmental parties. The impression I have gathered is that managers feel that they can forge better relationships with other organizations if they can develop and maintain close personal contacts with their counterparts in these organizations. It is, therefore, not uncommon to find managers engaged during office hours in what appear to the uninvolved observer as purely social functions. The face-to-face encounter is preferred because, unlike the impersonal formal contacts, it denies the other party the opportunity to refuse the manager's request since by tradition this would be an uncivil and uncourteous behaviour. This is provided, of course, that the other party feels that he will not be breaking any strict established tradition or procedure by not refusing.

Thus, when one manager was pressed to clarify the basis of his relationship with another organization, he answered by elaborating on how nice and friendly a person his manager is. Also, in my efforts to secure a large number of responders to the questionnaires, I was, on many occasions, frustrated by the absence of managers from office apparently visiting other organizations on work-related missions.

However, it is doubtful that the manager has the time or energy to establish such close contacts with all the relevant parties in the environment.

The public relations programme of these organizations is another method designed to create support for the organization in its environment. This is usually a limited programme in terms of its budget, operations, and the public to which it is directed. It involves mainly publishing reports on the activities of the organization and sponsoring conferences and seminars. Also, some research organizations produce monthly or quarterly journals in which research results, studies, and information of public interest are compiled. The purpose of such publications is to create a regular readership and to serve as evidence of the organization's activities and achievements.

Their connections with higher authorities provide the managers with another potential means for influencing their environments. Their access to influential people in their environment is beneficial in the sense that it provides the managers with the opportunity to report on their problems directly to people who can effect changes in the environment of the organization. In reporting these problems, the manager can also suggest ways and means of alleviating these problems. It is difficult to conceive here of a general pattern for the relationship between the manager and his political superiors. The principal factors in this relationship are,

however, the readiness of the political leader to pay attention to the manager's report and his willingness to act upon his recommendations. The responsiveness of the political leader may vary from one government system to another and from one situation to another. In one country the political leaders have appointed professionals and experts in many fields of the physical and social sciences as their personal advisors. These could, in theory, act as intermediaries between these organizations and the political leaders and accordingly could represent more efficiently the case for the organization. However, again, much depends here on the willingness of these experts to assume this role and also on how much value the political leaders assign to their counsel on these matters. The case of one research establishment serves to indicate that in spite of the availability of technical advice, there was little responsiveness from the political leaders to the reasonable requests of this research establishment. Since 1971, there have been three publicized attempts made by the research managers to have the political leaders formally endorse draft laws proposed by them. The recommended legislation would mainly give the research organizations wider and more clearly defined jurisdictions and sanctions the present management plan to build up the research establishment structure. It included also clauses empowering the research managers to introduce and apply a more comprehensive reward and motivation system and allowing them a greater autonomy

in running their internal affairs. The research managers, as indicated in the Annual Report of the Scientific Research Foundation (1975) are still hopeful that the political leaders will soon consider their recommended legislation.

Frequent changes in the placement of this research establishment within the government bureaucracy may have contributed to the weakening of contacts between the research management and the political leadership. Since 1963, the research establishment has been subordinated to the following higher authorities respectively: the University, the Council of Ministers, the Ministry for Higher Education and Scientific Research, the Planning Council, and finally the Ministry. The managers were particularly in favour of its being attached to the Planning Council since this provided them with direct access to the political leadership. The latest change in the placement of the research establishment was interpreted as a demotion of its status and this triggered widespread rumours, though officially denied in the Conference on the Working Paper for the Scientific Research Foundation on Work Obstacles (1976), that the research establishment will be dissolved and its employees transferred to the universities.

One other practice which has been recently introduced in one country and which could facilitate communication and understanding between the organization and the environmental parties is the general conference.

The procedure followed in preparing for these conferences is to appoint and commission a committee made up of employees of the organization to prepare a 'working paper' on the problems encountered, their causes, and their recommendations for solving these problems. Copies of this paper are made available to all employees of the organization who are then invited to prepare and deliver in public their comments on the points raised in the paper. The general conference is usually attended by all the organization employees, interested parties from other organizations, and representatives of the political leadership. From reviewing the proceedings of few of these conferences, one can conclude that there are advantages and disadvantages to this practice. The major advantage of this practice is that it serves as a forum for the presentation and discussion of the problems as perceived by various members of the organization from different vantage points, and the ways which they think are suitable for solving these problems. On the other hand, the tendency of the organizers of these conferences to render instant solutions and the impression one gets that these organizers are staging a public trial of these organizations and especially their managements for purely political reasons are two of the disadvantages involved. Better results would be attained if organization development specialists were involved in preparing for the exercise. Their involvement would have probably precluded the surfacing of personal differences among the organization employees especially since arrangements for their resolutions were not made.

When an issue of mutual interest or a problem arises concerning two or more organizations, managements sometimes resort to the creation of a temporary inter-organization arrangement to work out a joint plan of action or to agree on a solution. This usually takes the form of an ad-hoc committee made up of representatives of both the organization and the environmental party. In most cases, these arrangements are created to deal with a current issue or a transaction and are usually dissolved when their purposes have been fulfilled. However, some of these arrangements assume a degree of permanency when the transaction involved is of a long-term nature. An example of the long-term arrangement is the permanent committee made up of representatives of a building research organization and the construction ministry. This symbiotic arrangement benefits the organization in that it facilitates the management acquisition of information and especially the practical knowledge that the officials of the ministry have amassed through long experience. It also affords them the chance to have a more intensive involvement in the application of their research results.

All the aforementioned methods help the organization manager to explain the case of his organization to the environmental parties and to ultimately effect changes in the environment which are beneficial to the organization's continuous operation and survival.

However, in view of the limits prescribed for the manager's jurisdiction, his reaction to the environmental constraints would probably take the form of adapting and adjusting the organization, its goals, size, the authority structure and so on.

Adapting to the Environment

In the literature, one can find many documented examples of the process by which the purpose of collective effort in the organization is changed. Accordingly, new goals may appear on the organization's charter while old goals are dropped or their priority positions are changed. Such changes are usually undertaken in response to environmental and/or internal factors. Examples of such a phenomenon are observed in cases covered in this research. The basic goal of the planning organizations is obviously to prepare national or sectoral plans for the purpose of economic and social development. Judging from the planning managers' complaint about not having enough time to carry out the basic planning operations, it would seem improbable that the planners will undertake other activities as well. Yet, in many cases, it was found that planning organizations also conduct training courses for executive departments' employees. The provided justification for this is to ensure the proper fulfilment of the primary steps in the planning exercise which are performed at the executive department level.

In the case of research organizations, activities or rendered services which are not aligned with goal-achievement can also be observed and in some cases the 'deviations' are more clearly evident than in the case of planning organizations. In the majority of research organizations covered in this research training services are offered and of which no mention is found in the official charters or laws governing their operations. The principal beneficiaries of these training services are government employees and university students. Seminars and training sessions are held regularly for the benefit of government employees and specifically for the purpose of acquainting them with new developments in the scientific and technological fields and in the social sciences. In addition a number of final-year university students receive some training in the practical application of their academic studies. This is conducted in summer and for a month or over duration of time. And although some research workers complain that such activities disrupt their research schedules, there appears to be no immediate plan for discontinuing them. Moreover, some research officials would like to see the upgrading and extension of their 'educator' role to include the granting of degrees, especially to subordinates who prove their abilities in research work. While all these 'formal' activities have little or no relevancy to the formal goals of the organization, they are obviously pursued for a purpose.

This may be to create a wider clientele for the organization or simply to create the image of business and to fill up the manager's yearly list of achievements.

Not only goals are added or dropped as part of the management adaptive measures but also the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the pursued goals may be affected. The research organizations' mandate specifies that the research shall be of theoretical and/or practical nature with the emphasis put on research themes which will contribute to the efficient utilization of economic and social resources. Achievements sometimes fall short of ambitions and it remains to see whether environmental factors are responsible, totally or partially, for this. In one research organization, the insufficiency of resources provided was pointed out by Al-Khairo and Hamza (1975) as the main reason behind the low productivity of the organization. Since its creation in 1966, "very few studies" were produced and the only field study attempted by research workers in the organization came to a premature halt, after the collection of data had been completed, when an order to that effect came from a higher authority. And since most of these research organizations publish their research papers in their journals, their productivity can be roughly measured by finding out whether or not these publications are issued regularly and as prescribed. In the majority of cases, it was found that

delays in publication and long periods of publication stoppage are frequent. Although 'technical' problems are sometimes alleged, the main obstacle appears to be the lack of high standard research papers which are worthy of publication. In the case of one research organization, only three issues of its quarterly journal have been published since its creation ten years ago. A relatively better publishing record is achieved by another research organization: three issues of its quarterly journal over a period of seven years. The productivity of these organizations would have to be set at an even lower point since these publications include also contributions from researchers who are not members of the organization.

It would be very difficult to assess the net effect that environmental constraints have on this organizational feature. The other significant element in the situation is the performance of the organization members and whether or not they exploit every opportunity for the purpose of maximising productivity and efficiency. However, there is the contention that the environmental constraints constitute, to say the least, one of the main factors contributing to low productivity and low quality products. According to Al-Khairo and Hamza (1975) the 'environmental problem' is one of the problems which lead the organization to "study partial problems from (acute) angles and to rely on incomplete methodology - a fact which makes the information (that can be) derived from these studies deficient".

Environmental pressures and constraints are also taken into consideration before managers decide on the choice of themes for research work. In some of the research organizations, the tendency has been to restrict research activities to practical issues which can result in immediate and tangible benefits, while in others, this principle does not appear to be the predominant policy. It can be argued that the two different management policies are conditioned by two different sets of environmental factors. The emphasis on practical issues is evident in organizations operating under stringent controls and pressures to prove their usefulness. This tendency is sometimes reinforced by the management's need to raise some of their finances by contracting their research services to other organizations. On the other hand, a research management is observed to have and exercise more latitude in choosing the research themes when the organization is not subjected to such environmental constraints.

Adapting the organization to its environment may also take the form of changes in the decision-making structure of the organization. In both planning and research organizations covered in this study, there is a marked trend to involve formally or informally representatives of other organizations in their decision-making processes. The phenomenon is similar to that described by Sleznick in his work on the TVA authority. In the case of planning organizations, the arrangement is an informal one. For example, before the planners make their final recommendations on the appropriations for a ministry or a department, they invite representatives of these parties to meet

them to discuss the merits of the proposed projects and to seek compromises if the planners intend to introduce changes. In the preceding chapter, mention was made of a number of instances in which a part in the decision-making process of the planning organization was conceded to influential environmental parties. One senior official in a planning organization argued that in these organizations it is not possible to make independent decisions because their jurisdictions are not well defined. Accordingly, any decision which comes out of the planning organization is, in fact, the work of planning officials and various environmental parties.

In the case of research organizations, the cooptation of relevant environmental parties is formally pursued by management as a policy which is advantageous to the organization. In all the research organizations covered in this study, a form of cooptation is either already existing or planned for the near future. The usual context in which the environmental parties are coopted is a board which appears at the top of the pyramid on the organization's chart. The board's members are usually appointed by the authority to which the research organization is subordinated. Although the membership of these boards differ from one case to another, a certain pattern can be discerned. In all the cases, the beneficiaries of the research work are given the highest representation on these boards. In the typical case of an education research centre, as outlined in its Annual Report (1976), four of the board members represent environmental parties which could potentially put the research results into some use. Such representatives are usually drawn from the

highest decision-making bodies in their particular ministries or department. Accordingly, the planning departments in these ministries are usually represented on these boards. The second major environmental party of which representatives can be usually found on these boards is the university department whose teaching and research activities are in the same or a related field of knowledge to that of the research organization. Also, politicians sit on the boards of big research establishments comprising a number of research organizations.

The authorities of these organizational arrangements vary from one case to another. However, a list of the most common functions of these boards would include:

1. ensuring and supervising the fulfilment of the goals
2. formulating the general policy guidelines and especially the long-term research plans; and
3. approving research projects.

In addition to these authorities which come under general policy, research organizations' boards are sometimes made responsible for making recommendations and decisions on administrative matters. Some of the occasions in which a recommendation or a decision is called for are the appointment of new recruits to vacant positions in the organization, the transfer of employees to other organizations, and the promotion of senior research staff. The board meets regularly

to consider pending matters on its agenda and to arrive at its decisions. The manager of the research organization who is also a member of the board, and sometimes presides over its meetings, is made responsible for implementing the directives and decisions of the board. He reports yearly on the organization activities, the successes achieved as well as the problems encountered and the ways and means of dealing with these problems.

The importance of this arrangement for the organization is confirmed by the opinions and designs of concerned managers. In all cases, such a policy board is either already operational or its creation is on the top of the list of planned future changes. The principal reason behind managers' preference for this arrangement is that it affords them a near-by source of policy decisions which, otherwise, must be sought from a distant authority - a process which is sometimes cumbersome and time-consuming. The existing or proposed membership of such boards in which the profession to which the researchers belong is predominantly represented enhances the likelihood that the research organization business which require technical and scientific consideration will be properly handled. In addition to its facilitation of the management job in running the internal affairs of the organization, this organizational arrangement can prove to be instrumental in linking the organization to its salient environment.

By bringing into the board, and hence into the organization, representatives of the potential beneficiaries of the research work and those who are likely to contribute to and participate in this work, the organization can benefit in two major ways. First, communication and understanding between the organization and the environmental parties are likely to increase since these representatives will be strategically placed to acquire a more realistic view of the organization and to transmit this to their organizations. Second, involving these elements in the decision-making process of the organization provides additional legitimacy to the decisions arrived at and removes any basis for accusing the organization of non-responsiveness to the needs and demands of its clientele. And by associating itself with established institutions, the organization image in the environment is enhanced and its acceptance in the bureaucracy is hastened.

It is observed that research organizations with such boards have better and more productive relations with their environments than those without. Compiled lists of major problems encountered in four research organisations, in Negative Aspects Affecting the Centres and Institutes of the Foundation (1977), all include mention of the problem of lack of coordination and cooperation in the environment. Stated opinions agree also on the nature of

a solution for this problems which would involve representatives of other organizations working closely and within some form of a permanent organizational unit with the research officials.

The Managerial Position and the Manager

Whether there is a policy board or not, the manager of the research organization and the planning organization is expected to make decisions and issue directives regarding routine and non-routine matters.

It is, therefore, important to find out if these managers have the necessary authority to carry out their jobs properly. Unfortunately, the data collected do not allow a definite statement on this issue.

The difficulty is compounded by the assumption that different managers have different conceptions of what their prerogatives should ideally be. Those who fear responsibility will obviously be content with a minimum of authority. Others who are motivated to develop the organization would prefer an increase in their prerogatives. Similarly, existing prerogatives will be interpreted and exercised in different ways depending on the personality type of the manager and the situation. Unfortunately, for lack of time, funds, and willing managers, it was not possible to extend the research to cover all these contingencies. Accordingly, the following observations are, in the main, the outcome of personal impressions rather than a comprehensive set of data.

The first impression that deserves mention is the general ambiguity of the manager's prerogatives. In most cases, a general definition of the manager's authority and prerogatives can be gathered from relevant laws, decrees, and regulations. To appreciate the ambiguity and inadequacy of these sources, we must go back in history to the very first official contemplation of such an organization. Here, it can be generalized that the decision to establish any organization is usually based on less than adequate study and reasoning. Many organizations are created simply because similar organizations have been in existence in developed countries and the example is being copied in other developing countries. The usual procedure for bringing into existence a new organization is to appoint and commission a 'study committee' of government officials which may or may not include qualified people who can give expertise advice on the nature of the desired organization. The organization model that will be worked out by this committee will probably be a borrowed one and with a minimum of innovation, if any, to suit the local situation. And in societies where indecision and inactivity is generally considered safer than committing oneself to a decision or action which involves the risk of failure, as little shape as possible is given to the organization upon its creation. As a result, the burden of seeking definitions and clarifications of the organization functions and the managerial prerogatives falls upon the manager.

This burden is well appreciated by one manager, Mahdi (1968), who writes:

In truth the task confronting the local manager is more difficult than the task confronting the manager in America or in most of the developed European countries. In our situation and circumstances, the general manager or indeed any manager at any level must be concerned, first, with the transformation of the organization.....

As described earlier, the experience of some of the managers indicate that getting the higher authority to define and clarify their prerogatives is not an easy task. And until the manager can acquire these, he must do his best to get work done with the few inadequate prerogatives he has.

In some cases, it was found that while the law stipulates for extensive authority to be exercised by a management policy board for the organization, the creation of such boards has been delayed by the political authority. The limited scope of the manager authority is illustrated by his inability to transfer allocated sums in his organization budget from one item of expenditure to another unless the consent of a higher authority, sometimes the council of ministers, is obtained.

As a result of this procedure, Al-Khairo and Hamza (1975) observe that a residual sum may appear on the final accounts of some research organizations, giving the false impression that a surplus has resulted.

There are also other factors which make the manager assumption of a creative and constructive leadership role very difficult. In some cases, managers are appointed for a short term or on temporary bases as acting managers. The knowledge that they may not last long in their positions can discourage even the most talented person in the managerial position from pursuing an independent and aggressive policy. Furthermore, the blueprints for the future are not reassuring; one such design, A Suggestion to Organize the Research Centres and Institutes of the Scientific Research Foundation (1977), makes a recommendation that the research manager should be appointed for a three-year term and that the managerial position should be rotated among senior research staff. The committee which came up with this suggestion did not dwell on the justifications for this unusual arrangement. In my opinion, this would only institutionalise the existing ambiguity and instability surrounding the manager position.

The fulfilment of the managerial task depends to a considerable extent on the incumbent. For example, if the manager thinks that he should

adhere to the letter of the law and regulations concerning his job, then little constructive reaction can be expected from him when confronted with an environmental challenge, whether it is an opportunity to be exploited or a threat to be warded off. On the other hand, the manager who regards his jurisdictions not as givens but as variables, regarding which he can approach his superiors to define, clarify and expand, can better lead the organization in an unfriendly and uncooperative environment.

In the majority of cases covered in this research, the qualifications of the manager in terms of his formal training and on-the-job experience, are high. The only outstanding exceptions to this finding were the managers of a planning set-up in one oil-rich country. Regarding these, it is found that many of the managers' subordinates are better qualified than their superiors. These subordinates are mostly expatriates who are employed because of the shortage of similarly-qualified manpower. An unusual situation is created wherein a manager whose only qualification is a degree of literacy controls and directs, at least theoretically and formally, a number of highly qualified individuals. And while this manager can better handle relations with responsible nationals in other departments, this situation constitutes a violation of one of the organization principles which dictates that authority should be allocated to the better qualified.

On the other hand, the fact that the majority of these managers are highly qualified does not mean that they are the best choices for these positions. This possibility becomes more vivid when the recruitment and selection policies are considered. To begin with, it must be pointed out that these managers are not the only highly qualified people eligible for consideration for appointment to these positions. Similarly or even better qualified people can be found even among their subordinates. One element, which, if we accept the hearsay evidence, is certain to have an influence on the candidate's chances of appointment is his political affiliation. Accordingly, the selector is expected to examine the political 'record' of the candidate to determine whether his loyalty is to the political regime in power or to some other group or ideology. Such information are usually gathered, stored and supplied by the government security agencies.

The higher the post on the hierarchy, in one country beginning with low management positions, the more the likelihood that this factor will be given a priority consideration in the selection process.

Political leaderships who aspire to rapidly change their societies sometimes regard changing the administrators as part of the revolutionary course of change. According to one authoritative source, Al-Jazrawe (1973), such changes are inevitable and

would include "finding qualified persons who believe in the Revolution's path.... and benefiting from other persons who are not considered hostile to the path.... and removing hostile persons whom the concerned authorities believe to be a stumbling stone....." The believers or loyalists are obviously the favoured group and by the fact of their loyalty to the ruler or ruling clique, they are looked upon as potential leadership elements. Persons who belong to the opposition are not tolerated and certainly would not be appointed to important positions in the bureaucracy. The non-committal persons who constitute the 'silent' majority of the population are, in essence, the ruled. Those who distinguish themselves among the non-committal group are sometimes subjected to various pressures to join the loyalist party. Those who refuse to join may lose their chances of promotion and face occasional harassment in the office.

In one country, it has become a customary practice that whenever a new leadership assumes power, it resorts to 'purging' the government administration of employees whose 'stay in office constitutes a threat to the public interest.' One administration specialist, Al-Kubayci (1974), reports that the administrative system has lost many qualified personnel as a result of misapplications of the purge laws. According to him, misapplications occurred when the decisions of the implementors of the laws were influenced by political considerations. (!)

What kind of managers do these political appointees make? It would be difficult to answer this question without a detailed study which is not possible under the circumstances. Yet from the little information available, it appears that the suitability of these for management positions is not always assured. As an example of this, Al-Windawe (1975) brings up the case of forty-two managers who were appointed, en masse, to important managerial positions in newly-nationalised industries. Within the span of one year after their appointment, twenty-six of them were removed from office. Political considerations may also result in the ascendancy of opportunists as one political leadership has belatedly found out.

Their political affiliations would certainly facilitate their transactions, on behalf of the organization, with other parties. For in addition to the official bureaucratic channels, there are available to them the political party hierarchy channels which they can use in their dealings with the environment. On the other hand, their membership in a political party may diminish whatever independence they may have and limit the scope of their thinking and choice. The former effect is engendered by the emphasis put on obedience in security-minded political parties. The latter is the result of having to adhere to the dogma of the party which often spells out for the individual member the goals that he must pursue, the conceptions of the world, the social

order and so on that he must have and, and the kind of relationships which he must maintain with different categories of nationals in his surrounding. One student of administrative leadership, Al-Atiyyah (1975) concludes that the appointment of loyalists to managerial positions produces a policy-administrative atmosphere which is characterised by a politically-inspired conformity to the political ideals, methods of operations and code of ethics. This preference for like-minded people in leadership positions in the bureaucracy can, thus, result in the absence of diversity and hence flexibility and innovation in running the administrative set-up. And if the favouritism of the political leaders is copied by the manager then this can lead to the alienation of many of their subordinates, especially among the non-committal and opposition groups. The ultimate cost to the organization may take the form of a breakdown in cooperation, the formation of cliques and even sabotage by disenchanted employees.

The responsibility of managing an organization and supervising the expenditure of large sums of money is a heavy burden and not all people are able to undertake and to exercise this responsibility. Yet, it appears that this factor is not given due consideration in the selection process. As reported in the Working Paper for the Scientific Research Foundation Conference on Work Obstacles (1976), "it is observed that even after the delegation of some authority to lower officials (managers) in the Foundation, some of them are showing unreadiness to bear the responsibility in a complete and

correct way.... This can be explained in two ways: first, the fear of practising the authority and of deciding on issues conclusively, and second, the low competence of these officials".

Two Research Establishments: A Comparative View

As indicated earlier, it was not possible to collect data on all the organizations and their managements included in the research sample. The available data, however, allow us to make a comparison between two research establishments in two different countries, before reporting on the questionnaire results. The focus of this comparative view will be the management policies adopted in the two establishments and their suitability for dealing with their particular situations.

The salient features of the two research establishments (hence referred to as X and Y) are presented in the following chart:

X

Y

Objectives	To conduct research on theoretical and practical themes. Research conducted is mainly theoretical,	To conduct research on theoretical and practical themes. Research conducted is mainly practical.
Status	This is a government set-up; a semi-autonomous status is pending political leadership decision.	This is an autonomous set-up with strong government connections.
Organization	<p>1. Number of research organizations has increased although some are not functioning as planned. A further increase in their number is also planned.</p> <p>2. Each research organization has its own administrative unit and there is also a central administrative unit for the whole establishment.</p>	<p>1. Since beginning of operations, four of its constituent research organizations have been dissolved. The addition of new research organizations is planned.</p> <p>2. There is only one central administrative unit.</p>
Finance	This establishment receives the greater part of its finance in the form of a government subsidy and receives also some contributions in return for services. Major changes on this situation are not contemplated.	Its revenues are received in the form of loans from national and foreign governments, a national government subsidy, and payments for services. The long-term plan envisages independent financing through contracting their services and research work to beneficiaries.
Personnel	Reports indicate set backs in efforts to recruit needed staff especially for senior research positions. The two major causes of this are low salaries in comparison with current market rates and uncertainty surrounding the future of the establishment.	Reports indicate a steady increase in number of staff in all categories: senior research, technical and administrative.

The principal difference between X and Y can be seen in the context of the management-leadership policies. It appears to me that the current management design in Y is to build the establishment gradually, that is by beginning with a viable number of research and auxiliary units and not to attempt bigness in the short run. This, however, was not the original policy of the leadership when the establishment was created. During that phase in the establishment history, the emphasis was put on expansion and instant growth. However, when it became difficult to sustain the establishment at its original size without intensive government involvement, the decision was made to contract the size of the establishment by dissolving research units which were not contributing significantly and thus had only been a burden on other functioning units. It was not possible to find out whether the management of Y did not favour excessive dependence on the government for finance or that the government was not willing to provide the funds. In any case, as a result of this decision, a number of the research and management staff left the establishment. The loss of the establishment included an active and distinguished scientist-research leader.

The flexible, realistic approach and the readiness to adapt the organization in view of environmental and internal conditions exhibited by management in Y are in sharp contrast with the management policies pursued in X.

In the latter, the emphasis has been on expansion and bigness. Whether this is the management policy or the design of a higher authority imposed on them is difficult to ascertain here. Yet, it may be revealing to know that the futuristic plan of the present management does not envisage a contraction of the establishment's scope of operations; on the contrary, the policies for the future appear as a continuation of the current trend. These management policies have little justification if we take into consideration the facts that the status and authorities of X are not well defined, its revenues are limited, and the difficulty it has encountered in recruiting suitable talents. It appears that the management in X has not for a long time responded to the environmental conditions in a creative and constructive way; it has not implemented a shift in research policies toward the practical field and has persisted in maintaining and even expanding the size of the establishment. A decision taken a few months ago to restrict the research activities to practical themes came after changes in the management and reports on the imminent dissolution of the establishment. It came to my knowledge that as a result of this some of the research projects currently in progress are expected to be discontinued.

On the basis of the available data on X and Y, it can be suggested that one major factor behind the absence of flexibility and a

realistic interpretation of the environmental indicators on the part of the management in X is the total dependency of X on the government. A false sense of security may have come to prevail in X as a result of the knowledge that the government will continue to provide the necessary funds for operating the establishment even if results cannot be shown - at least in the short run.

On the other hand, the responsiveness of management in Y to the environmental conditions is made necessary by its autonomous status and the need to augment the establishment's revenues by finding a clientele for the research activities. Another advantage of the autonomous status is the introduction of a flexible salary scale which is designed to motivate talented people to join the establishment. However, it must be added here that although a flexible policy in choosing the research themes is advantageous under certain environmental conditions, the management must set a limit for flexibility. Although I have little knowledge of the technology involved, it appears to me that a research organization which lists among its major achievements, as appeared in the Yearbook of the Royal Scientific Society (1975), such things as walkie-talkies and audio amplifiers, may have, in its attempt to meet the environmental forces of demand, become an electronic amateurs' workshop.

In both establishments, a large number of auxilliary employees, i.e. those who do not participate in actual research work, are employed. This phenomenon is more manifest in the case of X where administration and service units are found at the individual research organization level as well as at the central establishment level. In this case, each transaction is processed at both levels, a situation resulting in unnecessary delays and waste.

In the manager questionnaire, two sets of questions or items, in addition to those discussed in the preceding chapter, were put to the manager: the first set constituted what was earlier termed the conformity scale and the second set was intended to find out how the manager distributes his time and energy among a number of prescribed managerial activities.

Research Findings on the Manager Conformity Scale

In the research model, a correlation between the manager perception of the environment and his relationship with his subordinates, in specific the degree of conformity expected of the latter, was hypothesized. To test this, the manager was asked in the questionnaire to indicate, by choosing a number from a set of numbers from 1 (low) to 7 (high), the following:

1. degree of participation in decision-making he allows his subordinates;
2. degree of cohesiveness, i.e. closeness of relationship and mutual understanding, with subordinates;
3. allowance for subordinates to disagree with him;
4. number and scope of subordinates' responsibilities;
5. degree of subordinates' freedom to choose their work themes and co-workers and to make suggestions; and (planning managers only)
6. degree of participation in setting the goals and targets of the plans.

The subordinates referred to in the items include all the scientific and technical employees of the organization who participate in the core research or planning operations. Responses to these items were received from twenty-four managers: eight ministerial planning managers, four company planning managers, and twelve research managers. The results obtained are shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3. In each table, the managers are listed in the first column (I) in order of their scores on the environment scale beginning with

Manager 1, whose score on the environment scale is the nearest to the inflexible, uncooperative end of the environment continuum and so on. In the second column (II) the score obtained for each manager on the conformity scale is listed. The possible range of scores on this scale for managers in Tables 1, and 2 is from a minimum of six to a maximum of forty-two, and in the case of research managers listed in Table 3, from five to thirty-five. A relatively low score on the conformity scale implies a higher conformity imposed upon subordinates, i.e. more structure and centralisation of responsibilities and decision-making, or alternatively less freedoms enjoyed by the subordinates.

Table 1.

MINISTERIAL PLANNING MANAGERS' SCORES ON
THE CONFORMITY SCALE LISTED IN ORDER OF
THEIR SCORES ON THE ENVIRONMENT SCALE

	I	II
Manager	1	28
	2	21
	3	24
	4	31
	5	33
	6	33
	7	34
	8	32

Table 2.

COMPANY PLANNING MANAGERS' SCORES ON THE
CONFORMITY SCALE LISTED IN ORDER OF THEIR
SCORES ON THE ENVIRONMENT SCALE.

	I	II
Manager	1	31
	2	33
	3	33
	4	36

Table 3.

RESEARCH MANAGERS' SCORES ON THE CONFORMITY
SCALE LISTED IN ORDER OF THEIR SCORES ON
THE ENVIRONMENT SCALE

	I	II
Manager	1	14
	2	33
	3	21
	4	27
	5	26
	6	28
	7	28
	8	30
	9	32
	10	18
	11	21
	12	17

As shows above, the results obtained in the case of planning managers (Tables 1 and 2) appear to support the hypothesis while the results obtained for the research managers (Table 3) do not.

In any case, the size of the data is not sufficient to allow any firm conclusions.

In the case of the results obtained for ministerial planning managers, the scores on all but one of the items in the scale show a steady increase in value, with minor exceptions, as we move down the list of managers in Table 1. In other words, as we move toward organizations' environments at the flexible, cooperative end of the continuum, we observe an appreciable increase in the following:

1. subordinates' participation in decision-making and in setting the goals of the plans;
2. allowance for subordinates' disagreement with manager's viewpoint;
3. allowance for subordinates to suggest projects for planning; and
4. number and scope of responsibilities held by subordinates.

With regard to the remaining item in the scale which dealt with the closeness of the manager-subordinates relationship, responses indicate that a relatively high degree of closeness of relationship exists in all the ministerial planning organizations.

All scores obtained on this item were above the middle point (4) on the answer scale from one to seven, and five of the eight managers marked in response the highest number (7). In comparison with scores on other items, scores obtained on the number-and-scope of responsibilities item were the lowest.

In the case of company planning managers, the size of the sample - only four managers - and the range of the obtained scores (from thirty-one to thirty-six) do not allow any further analysis.

Results obtained in the case of research managers, shown in Table 3, do not reflect the expected pattern. The steady increase in scores on the conformity scale from Managers 1 to 9, with the exception of Manager 2, is offset by a sharp decline in the case of the last three managers. This does not correspond with the expectation that the increase would be steady and continues as the organization environment is perceived to be less inflexible and uncooperative or alternatively more flexible and cooperative. Although the low scores obtained in the case of the last three managers reflect low scores on all individual items in the scale, the two items which account for much of this are the one on the degree of cohesiveness between managers and subordinates and that on the freedom allowed to subordinates to choose their research topics and work associates. Inconsistencies in answering these items were more frequent in the case of the research managers.

For example, four of the research managers indicated that the degree of their subordinates' participation in decision-making is relatively high while maintaining that they do not allow their subordinates much freedom to disagree with them.

In view of the incompatibility of some of the results with the hypothesis, it becomes necessary to search for explanations. One explanation for this could be simply that the relationship hypothesized is not valid. On the other hand, it can also be argued that other variables, besides the manager's perception of the environment, may have influenced the results. The nature of these variables, discussed below, makes it difficult to include them in the research model or to control their effect.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the politicization of the organizational set-up has created an unusual situation in which two hierarchies are expected to coexist within the same structure. The 'peaceful' coexistence of the two hierarchies, the political and the organizational, can only happen when the two hierarchies are congruent. However, when the two are not, then disruptions of the organizational hierarchy can be expected because of the two the political hierarchy within the organization is the more powerful. This power is derived from its strong links with the political-government leadership based on a common ideology and a common interest in the survival of the regime.

In such circumstances, the manager's authority could be challenged by a subordinate who outranks him on the political hierarchy. Although such incidents can hardly be expected to be publicized, one such incident between the manager of a research organization and one of his subordinates, who is also the 'political security officer' in the organization was exposed in a public conference. And even if an 'official' political hierarchy does not exist, a similar situation can result if the subordinate has the patronage of a higher authority in the bureaucracy or the government. In effect, this may restrict the manager's response to the environmental situation by varying his relationship with the subordinates, i.e. varying the degree of structure.

Another factor which could influence the manager's action in this respect is the security of his tenure in office. This is especially the case with regard to research organizations where some managers are appointed on a short-term basis and as acting managers. The knowledge that at some point in the future he will return to the ranks of his subordinates may discourage the manager from fully exercising his authority vis-a-vis his subordinates. The precarious position of the manager is also one of the main factors behind the emergence of the shalalia or clique-ism phenomenon. A clique is an informal grouping of employees which could include superiors and/or subordinates. The common objectives of the clique members

are the continuity of the members in office and the use or, to put it aptly, the abuse of office to further the personal and common interests of the members. An editorial in an official newspaper confirms that cliques are sometimes formed by members of the ruling party and are usually found "surrounding weak administrative positions," Al Thawra (1976) reports. Therefore, a clique is sometimes a by-product of the weakness of the managerial position and it involves in this case the weakening or even the disappearance of the formal hierarchical relationship between the manager and members of his clique.

Another major factor which may have a limiting influence on management relationship with the subordinates, and hence contributes to the distortion of the results, is the current belief of political leaders in one country in the merits of "sound democratic relationships" within the office. A recent communique issued by the highest leadership council emphasizes that there is a "clear 'backwardness' in the democratic practices between the superior and the subordinates". This, the communique continues, has "deprived the nation of creative innovation and (impeded) the cultivation of the feeling of shared responsibility". This call for democratic relations within the organization has not escaped the attention of some research employees as the proceedings of the Conference on the Working Paper for the Scientific Research Foundation (1976) show.

This may have some influence on the manager's structuring of his relationship with his subordinates.

One interesting result on the conformity scale is the high value assigned by a great majority of the manager to the personal relations they maintain with their subordinates. This and the managers' preference for personal contacts with the environmental parties to ensure better understanding and cooperation suggest a certain style of management. However, this management style or strategy may not always be viable since it is inconceivable that the manager can maintain the same kind and intensity of personal involvement with all the subordinates. The following example serves to illustrate this management style and its major shortcoming: when it was put to a manager that he is closer and more informal with only some of his subordinates, he retorted that it is only 'natural' for him to do so because these are the ones he 'trusted'.

All these factors intervene in the situation to make it very difficult to measure the validity of our hypotheses. However, our search to identify the degree of structure or freedom in the organization does not stop here. In the employee questionnaire, the subordinates were asked to answer the same items appearing in the manager conformity scale. Their responses will be used here to categorize the authority structures in the organizations in accordance with the following conceptions.

1. An authoritarian structure in which the manager makes all the decisions without the participation of any of his subordinates.
2. An elitist structure in which the manager and only his senior subordinates make the decisions.
3. A hierarchical structure in which the contribution to decision making of each employee is in proportion to his position on the formal-technical hierarchy.
4. A participative-democratic structure in which the subordinates are allowed a greater degree of participation in decision-making than in the hierarchical structure.

The results of this exercise appear in Column III in Tables 4, 5 and 6 which include also the data appearing in Tables 1, 2 and 3 (Columns I and II)

Table 4.

TYPE OF STRUCTURE IN MINISTERIAL PLANNING
ORGANIZATIONS LISTED IN ORDER OF THE MANAGERS'
SCORES ON THE ENVIRONMENT SCALE

I	II	III
1	28	Insufficient Data (ID)
2	21	Hierarchical
3	24	Elitist
4	31	Hierarchical
5	33	Hierarchical
6	33	ID
7	34	Participative-democratic
8	32	Participative-democratic

Table 5

TYPE OF STRUCTURE IN COMPANY PLANNING
ORGANIZATION LISTED IN ORDER OF THE MANAGERS'
SCORES ON THE ENVIRONMENT SCALE

I	II	III
—	—	—
1	31	ID
2	33	Participative-democratic
3	33	Participative-democratic
4	36	ID

Table 6

TYPE OF STRUCTURE IN RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS
LISTED IN ORDER OF THE MANAGERS' SCORES ON
THE ENVIRONMENT SCALE

I	II	III
—	—	—
1	14	Elitist
2	33	Hierarchical
3	21	Authoritarian
4	27	Hierarchical
5	26	Hierarchical
6	28	Hierarchical
7	28	Hierarchical
8	30	Elitist
9	32	Hierarchical
10	18	Authoritarian
11	21	Authoritarian
12	17	Elitist

The additional data on structure do not significantly alter the situation indicated by the previous set of data on structure and conformity. It is interesting to note the absence of any structure which approximates the participative-democratic type in the case of research organizations. In half the number of the cases in the research organizations sample, decision-making was exercised either solely by the manager or by the manager with some contribution from the senior research staff of the organization.

Research Findings on the Manager Distribution of his Time and Energy

In the research model outlined earlier, it was hypothesized that the nature of the manager's perception of the environment will influence his distribution of his time and energy among his duties and responsibilities. In specific, the assumption was that the organization manager who perceives the environment to be 'inflexible and uncooperative' will assign to the extractive-environmental activities and the control-coordination activities a higher priority on his work-time table than in the case when the organization leader perceives the environment to be flexible and cooperative. The task of the manager was subdivided then into four groups of activities:

1. environmental-extractive activites
2. control-coordination activities
3. supportive activities, and
4. planning task activities

The first group of activities is directed toward the environment and includes the manager's effort to extract the various inputs from the environment. The control-coordination activities are all the activities initiated and set in motion by the manager to maintain the degree of structure deemed appropriate by the manager and also to ensure a steady flow of products from the organization. The third batch of activities, the supportive, includes all the activities intended to establish and maintain a co-operative and productive atmosphere in the organization. The final group includes the activities which satisfy the professional interests of the manager, i.e. either planning or research activities.

To test the hypothesis mentioned above, it would have been necessary to ask the manager to specify the time he spends on each group of activities. However, due to earlier setbacks in the progress of the research and the frequently heard complaint that the questionnaire was lengthy, it was decided to include in the questionnaire items on only the first two groups of activities. Only the research manager questionnaire included an additional item on the manager's research task activities.

Each of the items in this part of the questionnaire is made up of a statement which outlines briefly the activities involved and then the manager is asked to indicate:

- a) the relative time he spends now on the activities;
and
- b) the relative time he would like to spend on these activities and which in his opinion would suffice to fulfil them in a complete and ideal way

Responses to these items were received from seven ministerial planning managers, four company planning managers, and ten research managers.

The usefulness of the obtained results is diminished by the limited number of items and activities included in the questionnaire.

Accordingly, no conclusive statement can be made with regard to the hypothesis. The only observation which can be made here is that the majority of managers appear to agree on what tasks they would like to spend more time and also on what tasks they would like to spend less time. The former tasks are the following:

- 1. the task of seeking a more definite and clearer statement of the goals, the organization's mandate and so on;

2. the task of acquiring the needed inputs for operating the organization;
3. the task of preparing a work plan for the organization; and
4. the task of finding the manpower to fill vacant positions in the organization.

On the other hand, the tasks on which most of the managers indicated that they would like to spend less time are:

1. the task of acquiring authorization; and
2. the task of administering the day-to-day affairs of the organization.

The majority of planning and research managers in the sample indicated that they would like to spend less time on the task of seeking and acquiring authorizations for their proposals and plans from a higher authority. In the case of some of these managers, this contradicts their earlier position that acquiring authorization is neither difficult nor time-consuming. There would be no contradiction, however, if this is interpreted as an indication by these managers of the unpleasantness of this task. This post-experience attitude is not unjustified when it is known that this task involves ritual and ceremony and sometimes contacts with the 'moody' higher authority.

A similar line of argument is also applicable in the case of the other task on which a majority of the managers indicated that they would like to spend less time. Eight of the ten research managers who answered this item were among these. Their answers are confirmed by another source, Negative Aspects Affecting the Centres and Institutes of the Foundation (1977), in which it is stated that the administrative load is so big that the research manager and his assistant spend much of their time on this task and often the senior research members are found performing purely administrative work. As in the case of the previous task this one can be included also in the unpleasant tasks category. According to one manager, running the day-to-day affairs of his organization involves dealing with a lot of trivial matters such as keeping record of absentees, listening to the employees' excuses for arriving late at work, making sure that no one leaves during office hours, and resolving petty quarrels between employees. All these deprive the managers of spending adequate time on other activities and especially on pursuing their own research interests on which all the research managers indicated that they would like to spend considerably more time. On the other hand, the manager's spending of much time on the administrative-control task supports the argument outlined in the research model that if the organization environment is perceived to be relatively uncooperative and inflexible, then the higher the conformity expected from (and imposed on) the subordinates, and consequently the higher the priority of the control task on the manager's work-time table.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORGANIZATION HUMAN ELEMENT

In the research model preposed earlier, it was thought that a better representation and understanding of the organization-environment web of relations can be achieved through a two-step detection scheme. The first step involves an investigation of this relationship and its manifestations at the management level of the organization. The findings on this were reported in the preceeding two chapters. The second step in this scheme is conducted at the individual-employee level where an attempt is made to find out the environmental influence on the attitudes and behaviour of employees. The task was not easy. It was made particularly difficult by the scarcity of data and studies on relevant issues. The little data available on the individual's social institutions, his attitudes and behaviour are used here as background information to the research findings.

The individual in this area is governed by a number of institutions. It is usually assumed that the strongest of these are the traditional institutions, namely the family, the tribe and the religious group.

Other institutions whose influence on him is increasing are the political and the economic institutions.

In all these countries, when the individual is asked to introduce himself in terms of his group associations, his reply would include reference to more than one group. To begin with, this would include a statement of his ethnic origin, either an arab or one of the several ethnic minorities which inhabit the area, e.g. Kurds, Turks, Chaldeans, Persians, Assyrians, Armenians. Second, he may specify that he is a true arab and thus distinguish himself from those who are arabicized. Third, he may add that he is an assil, i.e. his lineage is known, as opposed to the non-assil who may conditionally belong to the same tribe of the assil, enjoying the same rights and privileges, but not allowed to freely intermarry with the assils or aspire to leadership. Fourth, he may name the tribe, clan, and family to which he belongs. The social identity of the individual is, finally, made complete by his indication of his religious and sectarian affiliations.

All these labels denote the several and distinct dimensions of the individual's social identity. His membership (and acknowledgment of this membership) in an ethnic group provides him with his basic identity. The importance of this varies from one locality to another, and from one historical period to another.

In the current turbulent history of the Middle East, a certain degree of polarization of ethnic communities is observed. One cause of this polarization is the general absence of an equitable system of representation which is open to all communities within a polity. Accordingly, the individual born within an ethnic community will necessarily become conscious of being a member of either the majority group, usually overrepresented in the political and administrative systems, or the minority group, usually underrepresented and deprived. This consciousness may result in the individual's adoption of certain attitudes and behaviour toward members of his ethnic group and a different set of attitudes and behaviour toward members of other groups.

Within the extended predominant ethnic group, distinctions are sometimes made between the ethnically pure individual and others known to be of a different or suspected ethnic origin. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the major urban centres in the Hijaz area (the Western area) are inhabited by people who speak the arabic language and follow the indigenous traditions but whose ethnic origin is not arabic. The Najdi (Eastern area) arabs label these derogatorily as the 'pilgrim left-overs'. Mutual resentment is common and a marriage between a male of the suspect ethnic origin group and a female of the ethnically pure group is a taboo.

The same social distinctions and distance are kept by the assil in his dealings with the non-assil among the Najdi arabs. Nevertheless, members of the outside groups, the Hijazis and the non-assils, enjoy the same rights and privileges. Many members of these outside groups have been allowed to accumulate large fortunes and to rise to influential positions in the administrative hierarchy.

The ethnic community is further subdivided into tribes, clans, and families. In the traditional society, the individual acquires his identity through his association with these traditional sub-ethnic groups. These groups can also be expected to influence the individual's attitudes and behaviour. In his dealings with others, he is expected to abide by an unwritten code of law, the Urf, i.e. custom. His feeling of solidarity with members of his tribe or clan is summed up in the concept of asabiya which Khadduri (1970) defines as a "tribal sense of unity derived from a claim to one fatherhood, or an ancestor, real or fictitious". In the modern setting of a political or administrative office, behaviours which reflect the bonds of asabiya are not uncommon. Important political and administrative positions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates - to name only the obvious cases - are monopolized by certain families and to a lesser degree by members of their clans and tribes. Moreover, Al Dahiri (1969)

adds, "his (the individual's) standing in the community, and even his range of choice in selecting a wife were all determined by the status of his family - wealth, power and prestige".

The traditional order also prescribes for the individual the occupations from which he can choose his own. If a bedouin in Najed of Saudi Arabia decides to change his occupation, his choice would be between commerce and government employment, the two available occupations which do not require him to work with his hands. In semi-bedouin communities in other parts of the area, even commerce is not looked upon as an honourable occupation; Gubser (1973) reports: "The Karkis (in Jordan) had and still have attitudes which somewhat preclude them from entering into commerce. They consider the occupation 'ayb' (shameful or disgraceful) because being a merchant would involve dishonesty, selling inferior products as good ones, and over-pricing. Equally, one would have to practice fannan (craftiness, slyness, artistry) to make ends meet". In a typical peasant community in Southern Iraq, it is considered unfitting one's good reputation to cultivate 'inferior' crops such as vegetables.

Religious associations are also strong in these societies. Their manifestations are extreme in multi-religious or multi-sectarian societies or in a society where a strong fundamentalist movement exists within the predominant religion. For the individual, his

religion, as in the case of Islam, may represent a total way of life which he must aspire to emulate. Al Dahiri (1973) observes; "Religion in Iraq governs not only the people's way of life, but also their thinking and attitude to a very marked degree". Minor ulemas whose knowledge of Islam is scanty often misrepresent it to the people. They advocate fatalism and submission to the unknown. Gardner (1959) explains: "The quality of the religious life of the area emphasises submissiveness under the ruling hand of God and leads to considerable emphasis on acceptance as an approved attitude toward the vicissitudes of dailing living". Al Dahiri (1973) confirms: "those fatalistic people do not plan anything in detail because it contradicts with the Will of God". The teachings of the second largest sect in Islam, the Shia, envisage a Utopian future under a just Imam (a theocratic leader) and, thus, the believers are not urged to create their own Utopia.

In religion, the individual finds a useful escape mechanism from his harsh surrounding. The religious doctrine of the Shia has been interpreted to justify submission to power and authority regardless of its just or unjust nature. A Shiite moslem may practise taqqiyah i.e. assuming in public a different belief or opinion from the one professed in private, if his life is threatened. In his anthropological

study, Saleem (1956) observes that the faith of the traditional Shiite, as interpreted by provincial ulemas, requires from him acceptance of the authority of the tribal leader and his elders. Some interpretations of the Islamic doctrine also justify the disparities in wealth by ascribing to the wealthy the element of God's favour or bakt which is extraordinary or God-bestowed luck. Religious influences extend to all other social institutions, the judicial, the educational and the political.

In as much as the individual identifies with his religious group, he is setting himself apart from members of other religions or sects. And although the presence in the area of large groups representative of the major religions as well as fringe religious groups and sects like the Sabian and the Christian Jacobites is an indication of the tolerance of the majority religious group, the Sunni moslems, this tolerance has not always been extended to rival moslem groups. This is reported by Qubain (1958): "Despite their numerical majority, the Shia have traditionally played the role of a minority group in the country (Iraq). This is because, despised as heretics, they have suffered almost continuous persecution at the hands of the Sunni rulers from the Abbassid Caliphate (est. 750 AD) till the end of the Ottoman Empire". The monopoly of the majority

religious group over political power and the sources of wealth is sometimes challenged and, as the case of the present predominantly Alawite political leadership in Syria illustrates, can be undermined by a minority religious group.

The individual in these societies can be viewed as surrounded by these institutions whose pull on him varies with the situation and the individual. His loyalty and identity are divided among his family, tribe, religious group, country, and his own self image. The negative effect of this on the individual is clearly identified by Gardner (1959): "The strong emphasis on in-group loyalties, epitomised by the familiar phrase 'our people' or 'one of us' as contrasted with all others, has led to a faulty development in the individual's sense of responsibility to the larger community" The task of changing the negative practices perpetuated by these institutions is made difficult by their pervasion through the new institutions of the new state.

Impressions of the individual in this area which can be found in a small number of published works all emphasize the traditional roots of his personality. Available studies tend to be less rigorous and methodical than necessary and there is little observed effort to collect first-hand data from the subjects. As a result, there is little one can gather from these studies on such things as the kind of adjustments the individual may consider in view of the demands of the current transition. As a rule of thumb, the traditional heritage is singled out as the cause of his underdevelopment and his

alienation from or opposition to the change process.

General Traits of the Individual

It is not easy to arrive at a representative view of the individual in this area from the available literature; the characteristics often ascribed to him are either lacking in positive quality or deemed unsuitable for this change and progress period. There is an impression that the individual is over-sensitive especially concerning matters which reflect upon his honour, standing in the community or some basic value of his. Khadduri (1970) observes: "Contrary to their submissive appearance and pacifist manners, they are robust, violent and highly sensitive people whose volatile emotions may rise to a very high pitch in moments of excitement". He is also characterised as having a zeal for ceremony, formalism and high ideals. From his early childhood, the individual is instilled with the value of respecting, or at least showing respect, to one's parents and elders. As the study of Al-Rawe, Ibrahim and Baqger (1969) shows the traditional system also favours in the individual such characteristics as generosity, hospitality, gallantry, courage and boldness. These are some of the characteristics given the highest positive value in the traditional tribal community. It is doubtful, however, that these characteristics are equally favoured

or even practicable in the modern urban milieu.

Stereotypes of the individual are often nothing more than unsupported generalizations built upon a set of popular or the author's notions and hearsay. Impressions are, thus, offered not to support an observed and well-documented phenomenon but as substitutes for the real world which is by far more complex. These caricatures of the individual are consequently inconsistent. For example, Al-Atiyyah (1975) makes the following analyses of some basic traits of the Iraqi individual:

The Iraqi individual is accustomed to cruelty and inhumane treatment from childhood to maturity. He is used to frequent beating and proscription from his parents for trivial reasons. He never receives the measure of (parental) attention and care necessary to develop his personality.. and to instil in him self-confidence, pride, and a concern for his dignity.

And while this statement appears to suggest that the individual's sense of dignity is not well-developed Jurjis (1975) recognizes in the traditional individual an "intensive sensitivity about dignity".

Further evidence of the preponderance of the individual sensitivity about dignity is provided by one political leader who makes the following comment on the individual's excessive resort to interceding parties to put his case to the bureaucrats: "One of the reasons for the spread of intercession is to avoid humiliation".

His indifference to all things that affect his life, now or in the future, has resulted from long periods of harsh and subsistence existence during which his only concerns were survival and the security of his meagre possessions. Accordingly, he does not see himself as the master of his surrounding. Barakat (1971) describes him as:

a being fated to be what he is. He
creates neither his present nor his
future. The values he believes in ...
are the values of mind comfort, contentment,
obedience, allegiance, reliance, tranquility....

Tomeh (1974) adds that this individual views "risks, uncertainty, scientific exploration, philosophical speculation" as "leaps into the unknown" and hence, "challenges to fate" are viewed as intrusions on the sacrosanct domain. Even those who manage, against the strong

odds, to move themselves out of the quicksand of apathy do not always achieve a healthy attitude. Hourani (1956) describes what amounts to a cultural-psychological shock: "All around is a sea of nihilism: the cynicism of men cut off from their own past, deprived too long of responsibility for their own fate, tied too long to a decaying Empire, exposed too soon to the corruption of wealth and power".

In all these countries, efforts are being spent to realise economic and social development goals. In these change processes, the individual's leadership, participation and acceptance of change and its consequences are pre-requisites for success. In contrast, the leaders of these countries tend in general to regard themselves and their ideologies as the only legitimate agents of change. In support of this one of them, Al-Jazrawe (1973), argues that "every individual is selfish, and especially if he has not been a member of a revolutionary movement for a long period of time". These leaders, Khadduri (1970) observes, guard their powers and privileges vigilantly: "Most dangerous of all seems to be the difficulty in persuading the military (rulers) to delegate power to a wide circle of supporters". These leaders who frequently proclaim their intention to transform the lot of the individual, to give him a better education, and to raise his living standard sometimes

exhibit attitudes toward the individual which contradict this intention. Barakat (1971) recognizes such attitudes as common to all Arab regimes: "In reality, the human being here is not important and perhaps he is the cheapest element the Arab regimes are dealing with. Organizations have absolute rights over him and nothing in his life is outside the organizations' jurisdictions". That he is treated with contempt and arrogance is confirmed in the statement of one political leader on intercession, referred to earlier. There is usually a wide gap between what the rulers and their propagandists describe as their relationship with the ruled and the way they actually relate to them. The actual version is almost never made explicit but the following statement made by a loyalist Egyptian journalist, A. Mansoor (1977), is the exception since it unveils the true condescending attitude:

Peoples are like children who expect
miracles from their fathers and the
government is father and mother to
the people.

It is therefore justified that the government (the father and mother) can discipline, in any way it sees fit, their unruly people (the children) as happened in the Cairo food riots of January 1977.

Barakat (1971) underlines the significant features of this relationship:

"It is the relationship of a governor with the governed. That is how the regime understands the relationship of the government with the people. We observe these vertical relationships even between those who call themselves revolutionaries and those who work with them. Important positions are understood as privileges, as rights..... ". Another observed tendency of people in authoritative positions is their discriminatory application of the laws and regulations. Accordingly, relatives and friends can expect and do receive preferential treatment.

Given these facts about the way the individual is treated by the rulers, it is justified that he should value his parochial affiliations and feel indifferent to, and unconcerned by the process of change. In a recent study of the relative importance of various affiliations to students in a Middle Eastern university conducted by Melikian and Diab (1974), it was found that "family still ranked first, followed by national (ethnic) affiliations and third by citizenship". Also, Barakat (1971) refers to another study on alienation in which it was found that there is total harmony between the individual and his family in 62% of the sample. His apathy is not necessarily produced by his tribal origin or the far-reaching contamination of imperialism as some would like us to believe. His disrespect for order and the established authority and his identification with his traditional groups constitute, in my opinion, his response to the aloof, condescending, and brutal regime.

Saab (1972) puts the blame on the institutions: "Our military catastrophe (in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War) would not have been what it was if armies had educated their officers and soldiers reliance on individual initiative".

Finally, since in the available literature, only the negative traits of the individual are recognized, it seems appropriate to conclude this section with Sadek Al-Azm's recapitulation of the faulty characteristic of the arab personality in his portrait of the fahlawi person. Al-Azm's fahlawi, according to Baaklini (1974) is "characterised by the search for short and faster (thus superficial) solutions, spontaneous enthusiasm, belittling difficulties, and zeal for only a short time". It, Baaklini adds "lacks qualities of perseverance, endurance, and systematic work... indulges in exaggeration, baseless individual assertion, and unfulfilled promises.... and shies from responsibility and blames others for its failure".

The Employee Questionnaire

These partially-demonstrated conceptions of the individual in this area cannot be accepted or used in analyzing the individual's role in the organization. If these characteristics were accepted as having general applicability then one can judge that these people

are unsuitable for planning or research work whose fulfilment requires an absence of management and individual authoritarianism, and an open-minded approach to new ideas and technologies which may destabilize the social status-quo. However, since some work is being performed in these organizations and products of this work are evident, it is difficult to accept the one-dimensional excessively negative typology of the individual. It seemed justified, therefore, to try to find out more about these individuals by communicating with them directly and privately through the questionnaire. The prepared questionnaire was not, however, designed to collect general information about the individual but to test specific postulated conceptions.

The questionnaire is made up of four parts which are: the biological sheet, the insecurity feeling scale, the adjustment-satisfaction scale, and the employee conformity scale. Research findings on the latter two parts will be reported in the next chapter. First, the data gathered from responses on the biographical sheet are discussed.

Although three versions of the employee questionnaire were administered, the items included in the biographical sheets were essentially the same except for minor variations. Thus, in all versions, the employee was asked to provide the following information about himself:

1. his position and grade;
2. his qualifications and experience and the locations where he acquired these;
3. the duration of time for which he has been in employment in his organization; and
4. the positions he had previously occupied.

Although the respondents were not asked to indicate their sex, this could be gathered from their answers to the position-and-grade item. In Arabic, some grammatical forms are written differently depending on the gender. From this additional information, it can be observed that females are underrepresented in both the planning and the research organization. In percentage, they are 5.79 in the case of planning organization and 24.7 in the case of research organizations. Their number in planning organizations is sufficiently low to suspect that they are being discriminated against in recruitment. The relatively high age bracket of managers and senior officials in the planning organizations may explain this.

The hierarchical positions of planning employees (only university graduates) in the sample vary from director of bureau to a mere employee. The planning organization which is similar in its hierarchical

formation to bureaucratic offices is more differentiated in terms of hierarchical steps than the research organization. Thus, one finds in the case of the planning organization the following hierarchical positions, in an ascending order of authority: assistant supervisor, supervisor, and head of section. In the case of research organizations, only one hierarchical position, i.e. head of section, stands between the new recruit and the director/manager position. However, in research organizations, employees are also distinguished in accordance with a three-step task hierarchy which includes: technician or laboratory assistant, assistant researcher, and researcher. The academic hierarchy open to employees in the researcher category is made up of the following steps: lecturer, assistant professor, associate professor, and professor. In some of the planning organizations, a confusing combination of the authority hierarchy and the research task hierarchy is used. Thus, while one employee reports his position as assistant researcher, another employee who has the same qualifications and has spent the same period of time in the organization puts down his position as assistant supervisor which is not equivalent to assistant researcher. The confusion of the observer is further increased by the appearance of such position labels as 'university teacher'. Apparently, these are university graduates who have been appointed earlier as elementary school teachers and it was thought necessary to distinguish them from other elementary school teachers who usually possess lesser

qualifications. In one research organization, a different, and perhaps exaggerated, system of job classification is used. In this case, employees identified their positions as either assistant expert, expert, or head of experts. Another thing which deserves to be mentioned is the presence of a small number of employees in few of the planning organizations who described themselves as 'attached' employees. These are employees of other organizations who have been 'attached' to planning organizations either to acquire specific skills or to disseminate their special knowledge among the regular employees. These employees retain their formal links with their original organizations and are expected to return to them when the purpose of their temporary placement is fulfilled. This practice, however, invites a consideration of other possible motives behind its application. The example of a 'high school teacher' who has been attached to a planning organization for a period of three and a half years leads us to suspect that this practice may be used to provide well-connected employees with temporary positions in organizations having a more satisfactory atmosphere until a suitable permanent position is vacated.

In three central planning organizations, it was found that employees could be appointed on contract bases. While in two of these, this is the customary procedure for employing foreigners, in the third organization even the locals can apply for such an

appointment. The employment regulations of the latter stipulate that this is admissible only if the qualifications and/or experience of the applicant are in great demand. The applicant in this case can negotiate with the management the terms of his contract which would usually involve a higher salary and additional benefits. This is another practice which can be abused by the employer to exercise favouritism. An employee appointed on a contract arrangement acknowledged that he was receiving a higher salary than another employee who, in view of his academic qualifications and seniority, is more deserving. According to my informer, his underpaid colleague as well as other employees are displeased by this.

The second item of information which the respondents were asked to provide is their academic qualifications and training and the locations where these were received. Responses show that a relatively large number of highly qualified individuals are employed in these organizations. In addition to the universities, the planning and the research organizations are the places where one would expect to find a higher proportion of these. In the population of two hundred and forty-five respondents to this item, there are twenty-nine with a Ph.D. degree who make up in percentage 11.83. The majority of these, twenty-four in number, are employed in research. The ratio of females among the Ph.D.

degree holders is low, only four in number. The number of Master degree holders in the sample is thirty-six who make up 14.69 percent. Females in this group are a minority, again only four in number. A majority of the sample population are holders of a university first degree. They are, in number, one hundred and seventy four and constitute 71.02 percent. Among this group, the number of females still makes them a minority but compared to their numbers in the other groups, they make up a larger minority. Although the questionnaire was restricted to university graduates, six of the answered questionnaires were received from less qualified employees. These indicated either a high school certificate or a technical institute diploma.

Indications of the places where qualifications have been received are available from two hundred and twenty-three employees. A majority of these, one hundred and twenty, received their formal training in their home countries and a considerable number graduated from universities in other Arab countries. Those who listed qualifications received in non-Arab foreign countries make up 26.45 percent. Slightly over one fifth of them (20.33%) graduated from universities in Eastern Europe and the remainder graduated from universities in Western Europe (57.62%), and in the United States of America (22.05%).

The respondent is also asked to list his non-academic qualifications. Responses show that only a small number of the research and the

planning employees have such qualifications. If we include under such qualifications training as well as participation in seminars and conferences, the number would still be small, only eighteen. This finding is significant and alarming since it means that a majority of the highly qualified employees (the M.A's, M.Sc.'s and Ph.D's) have not attended any seminars or conferences which are two important media for the exchange of information on new developments in the fields of knowledge. Participation in these activities is also an acknowledgment by the scientific community of the participant's status as an active member - a status for which few of these employees seem to qualify.

In another item on the biographical sheet, the employee is asked to indicate the duration of time for which he has been in employment in this organization. This information is requested on the assumption that it may prove useful in understanding the employee-organization relationship. A more immediate benefit can be derived from this by comparing the average time indicated by the employees with the average time that has lapsed since the establishment of these organizations. For thirteen organizations, these are respectively 34 months and 100 months. A difference of more than five and a half years between the two average times signifies that employee turnover is high and/or that the managements

of these organizations have been, until recently, making little progress in recruiting employees. Both interpretations are supported by information from other sources.

In response to the final item on the biographical sheet, two hundred and five employees listed positions they had previously occupied, if any. Among them, eighty-one in research and nineteen in planning, put down that they had not occupied any position prior to their present ones. Respondents who entered positions held previously in the same organization were twelve in research and five in planning. The remaining respondents, forty-five in research and forty-three in planning, all listed previous employment in other organizations. Only a small number of these, fourteen and sixteen respectively, were previously employed in jobs related to either research or planning. The remainder listed administrative positions or high school teaching. In the final analysis, only 18.84 percent of the respondents in research and 31.34 percent of the respondents in planning reported spending some time in other positions which are functionally related to their present work.

In view of this, it seems opportune now to wonder whether these organizations can function properly and goals can be realised

with only small groups, too small in the case of research organizations, of qualified, trained and experienced employees. It should be remembered here that upon these small groups fall the responsibility of training the large number of new recruits to research and planning who enter the organization with only their academic qualifications. The training of the inexperienced cadres must be provided by the experienced staff at the expense of production time. In one research organization, a permanent functional unit was set up to provide the necessary training to new recruits.

The problem of maintaining an adequate core of qualified employees will remain as long as the managements of these organizations remain to put too much emphasis on academic qualifications. The progress of the employee in most of these organizations follow a certain pattern which appears to me as the primary cause of this problem. Typically, when a new recruit enters the lower echelons of one of these organizations, he, first, spends a span of time learning the techniques of research or planning within a small research group, or planning unit. After two or three years, the time needed to train him in these techniques, he is tempted to go abroad to seek further academic qualifications. Those who do not make use of this opportunity or are not offered the financial support can never become eligible for promotion, for example, from technician to assistant researcher because only Master degree holders can be appointed to the latter position. Accordingly, every cycle of

two or three years, a significant drop in the number of trained and experienced employees occurs and there may also be a drop in the morale of their equally-qualified colleagues who remain behind. There appears to be no short-term solution for this problem unless the by-laws governing promotion and professional status are adjusted to give recognition, in both financial and status terms, to the experienced low-qualified employees.

Findings on the Insecurity Feeling Scale

The second part of the employee questionnaire includes the insecurity feeling scale. In the research model, it was argued that the transitional stage, from traditionality and economic underdevelopment to modernity and development, is the source of insecurity feelings in the individual. The role of political leaders and their ideologies as the principal generators of these feelings was also emphasised. This was assumed to be another environmental contingency to which different individuals react differently and in the form of attitudes and behaviour that influence their participation in the organization.

Formulating a scale to measure this insecurity feeling was the first task. This involved two things: deciding on the contents of the items for the scale and choosing a scale technique. The contents

of the items were derived from the assumptions on the reaction of different individuals to the environmental contingency. Accordingly, the high insecurity feeling individual was expected to show high need of belongingness expressed in his acceptance of the social status quo, the tendency to identify with and submerge himself within the group, and his aversion to risk-taking assertiveness, admittance of failure, and working under uncertainty conditions. On the other hand, the low insecurity feeling individual was expected to show least agreement with these attitudes. The choice of a technique for the scale was between a one-statement five-point agreement-disagreement scale or a two-statement three-point-each-way agreement scale. In the first scale and for the sake of testing their relative measurement efficiencies, both techniques were used. This scale included seventeen items which are listed in Table 1. To verify the validity of this scale, selected items from Rokeach's (1960) Dogmatism Scale (form D) and from a scale used by Crutchfield (1955) in his research on conformity, both judged to have some relation with the insecurity feeling phenomenon, were also included in the first edition of the employee questionnaire. However, after the early disappointment with the response to my field research efforts, these additional items were omitted.

Table 1


ITEMS INCLUDED IN THE FIRST
INSECURITY FEELING SCALE

1. One should be proud of one's abilities and skills and trust in them always	vs	One should not have strong faith in his skills
2. There is no objection to accepting the majority's opinion but only after arguing strongly in defense of one's own	vs	One should accept the decision of the majority even if this contradicts one's own
3. One highly qualified (individual) performs the job better than two or three with average qualifications	vs	Two or three with average qualifications perform it better
4. People prefer and respect the person who surpasses his peers and exhibits his qualifications and deeds	vs	People prefer and respect the person who works quietly and does not publicize himself or his work
5. One can be frank with all	vs	One can be frank only with close friends and his family
6. Important social changes are made by few individuals (leaders) within a relatively short period of time and without loosening the social structure	vs	Important social changes cannot be made successfully unless made gradually and (by introducing) minor changes on customs and ideas and over a long period of time.
7. Social relations with family and friends hinder the individual's activities, ambition and personal freedom	vs	Social relations are the source of numerous advantages

Table 1 continued.....

8. In general, when I perform a job on my own, the results are better	vs	In general, the results are better when I participate with others in performing the job.
9. The individual achieves the important things alone and without the help or support of his family and friends	vs	The individual cannot achieve an important thing in this life without the support and help of his family and friends
10. When one encounters a difficult problem one should turn to other subjects	}	agreement-disagreement scale
11. When one is faced with strong opposition it is wise not to stand against the tide		
12. The correct opinion is to avoid and to be cautious of becoming the subject of others' criticism and attack		
13. It is not wise to take sole responsibility for an important and critical decision		
14. Although one should admit his failures, it is not wise because others will not understand or appreciate the circumstances		
15. It is better to keep a large number of friends		

Table 1 continued.....

16.	When one receives information, the fastest way to know its correctness and to confirm its importance is by knowing its source		agreement-disagreement scale
17.	When opinions settle on a decision it is better to put it into application immediately because taking a long time to decide may lead to the emergence differences in opinion which are difficult to overcome		

Responses to the first scale were received from seventy-one employees from central and ministerial planning organizations. To calculate the total score for each respondent, values ranging from -3 to +3 were assigned to their responses to each item. In the case of the first nine items appearing in Table 1, agreement with the left-hand statement is awarded a positive value and, depending on the indicated strength of the agreement, a numerical value from high (+3) to least (+1) agreement. The same procedure but with negative values is

applied if the respondent agrees with the right-hand statement.

In the case of the remaining items, values assigned for the five points on the scale, i.e. strong agreement, agreement to an extent, do not know, disagreement to an extent, and strong disagreement, are respectively -3, -2, 0, +2 and +3. The values assigned are then summed up to arrive at a total score for each respondent. The highest possible scores that can be obtained on this combined scale are + 51 and - 51.

The distribution of these results on the scale in the form of internal frequencies is exhibited in Figure 1. As can be seen from the distribution, the scores of a majority of the respondents put them close to the high insecurity feeling point on the continuum. Indeed, only seven of the seventy-one respondents have positive total scores whose average is + 10.71. On the other hand, the average score for the remaining respondents is - 18.09.

Table 2

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON
THE FIRST INSECURITY FEELING SCALE

<u>Score</u>	<u>Intervals</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
(-39)	- (-30)	4
(-29)	- (-20)	22
(-19)	- (-10)	29
(- 9)	- 0	9
(+ 1)	- (+10)	5
(+11)	- (+20)	0
(+21)	- (+30)	2

For fourteen of the seventeen items, a majority of the respondents endorsed the statement assumed to be indicative of a high insecurity feeling. The three items in which the opposite was the case are those appearing in Table 1 numbered 2, 3 and 10. The decision to refine this scale was made for the following reasons:

1. The items in which the agreement-disagreement technique was used, i.e. items 10 - 17 produced a high number of agreement responses. This was sufficient justification to suspect that the agreement set phenomenon was in force here.

2. A scale using a single technique was thought necessary to make the scale harmonious and to avoid the difficulty involved in scoring a scale using more than one technique.
3. After subjecting the items to a careful content analysis, it appeared that some of the two-statement items were not balanced and that the wording of some items resulted in what is identified as a 'leading' item
4. It did not require much thought to decide that the last item in the scale, i.e. item number 17, is rather long and in its present form, irrelevant, if not nonsensical.

In view of all these, a new scale was then prepared making use of the sixteen acceptable items in the first scale and two additional items. Considerable verbal changes were made on most of the two-statement items while the other incorporated items from the first scale were transformed into two-statement items. The themes of the two additional items were borrowed from Crutchfield (1955) and these were:

- | | | | |
|-----|---|----|--|
| 17. | When I decide to work on a problem I do not consider whether I will reach a clear result or not | vs | I do not like to work on a problem if there is not a good chance of arriving at a clear result |
| 18. | I find no difficulty in changing the decision I have taken even if others know about it | vs | When I reach a decision I seldom change it |

The task of preparing a valid and reliable measurement was made difficult by two major problems. The novelty of the questionnaire method to many of the subjects and their natural suspicion of the motives of the researcher made up one. The second problem was technical and arose in trying to formulate balanced and intelligible statements for the items. The first problem made it impossible to cover the totality of relevant attitudes and behaviour while the second problem resulted in the social desirability bias. Despite my best efforts to guard against the latter, such a phenomenon did appear in responses to two items in the second scale. These two items are similar in content to those appearing in Table 1, numbered 10 and 14.

The effect of this bias can be observed when the responses to these two items on the first and second scales are compared. While 44.8 percent of the respondents to the first scale agreed that "when one encounters a difficult problem one should turn to other subjects", only 8.9 percent indicated agreement with a similar statement in the second scale. Similarly, while 85.9 percent

of the first sample agreed that a person cannot admit his failures because others would not listen to his explanations, only 6.10 percent of the second sample registered agreement with a similar statement in the second scale. Nevertheless, some reassurance that this bias did not influence all the items was derived from requests made by a number of respondents to know which of the two statements in each item was the 'ideal' one.

The discriminative powers (DP) of the items included in the second scale are shown in Table 3. As suggested in Nachmias and Nachmias (1976), this is a useful measure of the power of the item to distinguish between the high and the low. The general themes of the items as enumerated in Table 3 can be identified by referring to the items in Table 1, and the two additional items mentioned previously. The full text of these items (the second scale) appears in Appendix II.

Table 3
DISCRIMINATIVE POWERS (DP) OF THE ITEMS
INCLUDED IN THE SECOND INSECURITY FEELING
SCALE.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>DP</u>
1	2.11
2	1.93
3	1.79
4	1.37
5	1.57
6	2.23
7	0.70
8	1.49
9	1.21
10	0.51
11	1.20
12	3.79
13	2.11
14	0.303
15	1.33
16	2.16
17	2.33
18	1.40

As shown in Table 3, all the items pass the test of DP but some are more discriminative than others. The two items having the least DP, i.e. items numbered 10 and 14, are the same ones to which responses were thought to be influenced by the social desirability bias. By using the split-half method to estimate the reliability of the measurement, a correlation coefficient of + 0.3248 resulted (N=165) significant at the 0.001 level. The reliability of this scale can still be further enhanced by refining its items and removing

the least relevant ones.

Responses to the second scale were received from two hundred and eleven of the research and the planning employees. The distribution of their scores is shown in Table 4. A comparison of scores obtained on the two scales (Tables 2 and 4) reveals that there is movement toward the positive end of the continuum in scores obtained on the second scale.

Table 4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES OBTAINED
ON THE SECOND INSECURITY FEELING SCALE

<u>Score</u>	<u>Intervals</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
(-39)	- (-30)	1
(-29)	- (-20)	6
(-19)	- (-10)	44
(- 9)	- 0	72
(+ 1)	- (+10)	54
(+11)	- (+20)	28
(+21)	- (+30)	5
(+31)	- (+40)	1

The next step in reporting and analysing the research findings on the insecurity feeling is finding out if there are any associations between this and other variables on which data have been collected. A clear

and consistent relationship between educational achievement and the degree of insecurity feeling is not supported by the analysis. Only in two cases a significant difference between the means (using the t-test, p at 0.01) resulted. These were between the BA graduates and the combined MA and PhD graduates in sample I and between the BA and PhD graduates in sample II. It would certainly be in harmony with the research perspective to expect, and indeed the results appear to support this, that at least some of the PhD graduates will show on appreciably lesser degrees of insecurity feeling. After all, one can logically argue that this educational achievement requires, on the part of the aspirant, a measure of open-mindedness and learning to work under uncertainty conditions. Moreover, spending a number of years in another more developed country which is a necessity at least for the PhD graduates may help him to transcend his parochial attitudes. This is a suitable moment to bring up the observation of one administration specialist that graduates of American universities who return and join the government bureaucracy tend to accept and perpetuate the existing negative bureaucratic practices. If this is true, then the scores of these graduates on the insecurity feeling should be lower, i.e. indicative of higher insecurity, than those of a comparable group. Although this is initially confirmed by comparing their mean score ($\bar{x} = 1.18$, $n = 11$) with that of graduates of West Europe ($\bar{x} = 2.696$, $n = 33$), the difference does not satisfy

the condition of significance.

Table 5

MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ON
FIRST AND SECOND SCALES BY EDUCATIONAL
ACHIEVEMENT

		<u>Up to BA</u>	<u>Up to MA</u>	<u>PhD</u>
First	n	46	6	4
Scale	\bar{x}	- 15.52	- 9.6	+ 2.75
	s	10.66	9.93	22.36
Second	n	131	39	25
Scale	\bar{x}	- 1.79	- 2.25	+ 2.84
	s	11.07	10.53	11.73

The mean scores of female (n = 48) and male (n = 148) employees on the second scale are respectively - 0.458 and - 1.349. The difference is small and insignificant (t = 0.4862). Our expectation is that the male population would show a relatively

higher degree of insecurity feeling than the females since the male in these societies acts as the familyhead and the principal provider for his family and hence, his contacts with the environment and the government (the source of hostility) are more direct and intense.

Another possible relationship which deserves investigation is that between the items on social attitudes in the second scale (items corresponding to those numbered 6, 7, 9 and 15, in Table 1) and the items with more direct implications for individual behaviour (items corresponding to those numbered 2, 5, 11, 12 and 13). This would make clear whether or not the acceptance of and identification with the established social system is correlated with attitudes which show fear of assuming responsibility, of becoming the target of criticism, reluctance to assert one's opinion and stand and so on. Such an association is often taken for granted. The correlation coefficient (r) calculated for the two sets of items is positive but small, only 0.096 ($N = 178$), and hence it does not constitute an evidence of such a relationship. A clear trend emerges from observing the distribution of scores on these two sets of items. As we move from high to low insecurity feeling cases, it is observed that individuals tend to acquire the non-traditional behavioural attitudes at a faster pace than their conversion from the traditional social attitudes. This confirms the finding of other researchers, referred to earlier in this chapter, that the individual still identifies with his

traditional social groups, especially his family. This could also mean that traditionality is multidimensional and that the positions of individuals on these dimensions are not uniform. Accordingly, it is conceivable that a person can be traditional in his social outlook and views and at the same time exhibit other attitudes which are not supported by his immediate traditional culture.

CHAPTER VII

THE ORGANIZATION CLIMATE, CONFORMITY AND EMPLOYEE ADJUSTMENT

The central theme of this study is to demonstrate the far-reaching effects of the environment on structure and behaviour in the organization. In the preceding chapter, the research findings on the degrees of insecurity feeling exhibited by the organization members were reported and discussed. If this proves useful in understanding the employee's involvement in the organization, then the line of thinking pursued in this research will have been verified. In the research model, it was proposed that a relationship exists between the employee's position on the insecurity feeling continuum and his adjustment to the work situation. However, there is a third element in this relationship, namely the employee's perception of the degree of conformity enforced upon him in the organization. Accordingly, our prediction is that the employee's adjustment will be high if:

1. his feeling of insecurity is low and he perceives a low degree of conformity enforced upon him; or

2. his feeling of insecurity is high and he perceives a high degree of conformity enforced upon him.

A detailed analysis of the research findings on this prediction will be conducted in the second part of this chapter. The first part will include a concise account of the observations made and the data collected on the internal organization climate. The major aspects of the organization climate will be considered under the following headings: the physical climate, the operation-production climate, and the social climate. A brief discussion of the employee's rights and the remuneration and incentive systems in the planning and the research organizations will appear in a separate section.

The Physical Climate

The physical climate of the organization, in contrast with the social climate, refers to such features as buildings, space, materials, and equipment. These features have been thought, especially by the adherents of the Classical School, to have some influence over the satisfaction and productivity of the employees. The significance of these physical features is more evident in the case of research organizations. Most of the organizations which

I was able to visit were housed in old buildings or in modern buildings which are inadequate in terms of the space and the provided facilities. Often the decision to establish a research organization is put into effect before all the necessary conditions for its proper functioning are satisfied. A building is then hurriedly requisited or rented to accommodate the researchers and the equipment. And since it is inconceivable that a building which has been purposely built for private accommodation or for a school can serve this purpose, problems are created. For example, because of the smallness of the rooms, members of a research team are put into separate rooms. Employees in one research organization, housed in an old building, complained about the unsuitable lighting. One of them added: "It is so dark in here that every now and then we stop working and leave our rooms to see the light and have a breath of air in the garden". In general, the ratio of employee per office or laboratory space is high. Senior research members are not usually allocated private rooms for their use. Often they have to share the limited space in which their assistants, technicians, equipment, and furniture are crowded. Another physical condition which is characteristic of even some modern buildings is the lack of central heating and air-cooling systems. Extreme weather conditions in summer and winter in these countries make it imperative that such temperature-moderating systems are installed.

An even more significant finding is that precautions to safeguard the health of the employees are lacking or are not adequately maintained. In one research organization where experiments being conducted involve a risk to the safety and health of the employees, the only safety measure introduced is the training of some of them in first aid. The hazards to which these employees are exposed include serious burns and infection with one of various disease-causing viruses and bacteria which are regularly experimented on. Although the majority of the employees are resigned to this situation, one recently-recruited researcher has been adamant in refusing to do any research work unless some basic safety conditions are satisfied. As a form of compensation and/or incentive, employees working under such hazardous conditions are awarded an additional payment on their salaries, amounting to 20 percent of their basic salary rates in one country.

The acquirement, storage and maintenance of materials and equipment have a conditioning effect on the physical climate of the research organization. In most cases, the acquirement of equipment and materials needed for research work is a cumbersome process involving much paper work and long delays. Sometimes, the difficulties encountered in this process can delay a research scheme up to three months, according to one research manager. This is due to the

fact that any transaction involving the expenditure of public funds must be checked and re-checked at various accounting levels in the bureaucratic structure. Furthermore, since the needed equipment is often imported, this prolongs the procurement process and adds to the lost time. And although expenditures incurred on such purchases are relatively small, the lack of clear principles upon which these regular activities can be conducted has been mentioned in the Conference (1976) as the cause of 'waste' in one research establishment. Various involved sources have maintained that equipment is sometimes purchased and then left unused - stored in their freight containers, as one research worker reported. Also, equipment which breaks down is sometimes left unrepaired.

The Operation - Production Climate

This refers to all features of the work situation which are related to performance and production. The first observation which deserves mention is the general scarcity of qualified employees who can perform the basic planning or research operations. In the case of planning organizations, it is reported by Hassan (1974) that the employees are in need of training in planning techniques and that the demand for specialists in statistical techniques and applications exceeds the supply. One of the principal complaints of the research management is the insufficient number of highly qualified employees,

especially Ph.D graduates with research experience. As a short-term solution, some research managements have resorted to the appointment on contract basis of foreigners who have the necessary qualifications and experience. Although the number of senior research staff is generally low in these organizations, it is interesting to note that many of them can still find the time to give lectures in the universities. They are either required to do this because they are the only available specialists or are apparently in need of the extra income to augment their salaries.

One of the principles of organized work is the assignment of clear and specific tasks and duties to the participants. Accordingly one can expect that employees participating in a specific activity within an organization can recognize and define their particular roles and contributions. However, this was not the case reported to me by a research employee responsible for administrative affairs in one organization:

We distributed to the employees forms in which they were asked to state briefly their jobs' duties and responsibilities. when the forms were returned to us, we found out that many of our employees were not able to do this.

Research workers point out a number of conditions and practices which, they feel, act as constraints on their efforts and ambitions. In a previous chapter, mention was made of such constraints as the prohibition on the publication of some research findings and the limitations on the researchers' choice of issues and research methods. On the discouraging influence of the failure of concerned parties to benefit from research results, Al-Khairo and Hamza (1975) report that there is "a feeling of being wronged which is clear in the behaviour of many researchers when they see their efforts transformed into neglected papers in some corner of a library". Another constraint is the restriction enforced on the employees of some research organizations that they can only publish their work in journals published by their organizations which are seldom issued anyhow. In a Letter (1976) addressed to their superiors, some of these employees grudgingly point out that this restriction does not apply to the university staff.

Another cause for complaint is the lack of systematic appraisal of the research efforts and results. Thus, the researcher receives little in the form of feedback on his work. The state of isolation in which the researcher finds himself can negatively affect his enthusiasm for work. For the research assistant, an equally discouraging condition is being deprived of due acknowledgment

in the published research results. In the Conference on the Working Paper for the Scientific Research Foundation on Work Obstacles (1976), a number of research assistants complained that they were not benefiting from their work in terms of training and experience. Others, however, were confident that they can lead the research work as competently as their more experienced and qualified colleagues.

If we were to include all the complaints raised by different employees, the list would run into great length. Although these grievances cannot be projected here as general problems, some, as the following example shows, have strong implications for the issues which are being considered here. In the Conference (1976) which brought together the research workers in a number of research organizations, one of these workers claimed that the research project on which he was working for some time was then taken from him and assigned to a colleague. When his superior was given the chance to reply, he justified his action by explaining that the research project required at a later stage some engineering knowledge and this is why the involvement of the first worker came to an end. The obvious conclusion from this incident is the manager's need to appreciate the value of team work. This would have given the first worker the satisfaction of seeing the end result of his efforts which he was denied by the manager's action.

The Social Climate

The gist of the research findings underlines the importance of interpersonal social relations as a basic feature of organizational life in these countries. The organization social climate can be regarded as the social framework within which these interpersonal relations are maintained. Accordingly there is justification for an attempt here to identify the major factors which influence the nature of the social climate. One of these factors is obviously the role played by the management. In societies where frank exchanges of opinions and feeling are discouraged, this may prove to be a delicate task for the manager and examples of the manager's mishandling of this are available. In a previous chapter, reference was made to the case of the manager who in relating to his subordinates distinguished between those whom he trusted and the others. Also, if the manager is a member of a clique in the organization, he can be expected to treat preferentially members of his clique. It is not difficult to imagine the negative effects that such practices can have on the social climate in the organization. The popular conception of the government manager as an ill-natured despot who treats his subordinates and clients with contempt and subjects them to verbal and sometimes even physical abuse, has led one administration student, Al-Atiyyah (1975), to conclude: "They (the Iraqi managers) do not appreciate the importance of having a work atmosphere in which there exist the conditions

(for healthy) human relations..... and a concern for the employees' personalities and their problems".

The clique is one form of social grouping which is sometimes formed in the organization. Unlike other informal groups, it is characterized by a strong esprit de corps and commitment to a set of goals. The solidarity of the group is made necessary by its informal nature and the fact that its goals often contradict the formal principles of organizational life. The goals of the members are centred around their selfish interests which are often realised at the expense of others' and the organization's interests. In one country, the spread of this phenomenon reached such an extent that it could not be overlooked by the political leadership. Cliques were then labeled in Al-Thawra (1976) as 'umbrellas' formed "for the purpose of undertaking deviant behaviours and shielding them". Its methods are opportunistic; "when they (the Cliques) know about the existence of a vacant position, they will struggle (to secure the position) for one of them". The ultimate goal of the clique is to acquire for its members benefits and privileges and this is made possible by occupying the control positions in the organization. The clique, as the official commentary claims, acts also as a pressure group to impede the efforts of 'honest and loyal' employees and to silence their criticism.

The influsion of the organization life with politics is one cause for the emergence of cliques. Employees who belong to the ruling or loyal party will constitute one clique which is obviously the strongest while, on the other hand, employees who belong to the oppositional parties or groups or who simply feel threatened by the other clique, will form their counter-clique(s). However, informal groups are also formed along social differentiating criteria other than the political ones. Social status, individual and family wealth and prestige, and religious, sectarian and ethnic affiliations are also important criteria which influence the employee's fit in the social milieu of the organization.

The employment of foreign specialists in some organizations can prove to be an obstacle to the emergence of a social climate characterised by unrestrained interpersonal contacts. Large numbers of these are employed in some countries of the area where the local supply of qualified people falls short of the demands of the extensive construction and development activities. These expatriates who come usually from other countries in the area are generally attracted by the exceptional monetary benefits offered and in the case of some of them, the motive may be political oppression in their countries of origin. One major problem facing them is the social isolation imposed on them by the local inhabitants. It is suspected that those among the expatriates who resent this isolation and being

looked upon as 'the hired help' may not be strongly committed to their organizations.

Open interpersonal relations among the employees can be seriously disrupted by the implantation of informers in their midst.

This practice is resorted to by political regimes to check on the political activities of government employees. There is no way of knowing what kind of information are usually included in the informer's regular reports or how much value is assigned to them as evidence by the security agencies. A political leader while admitting the existence of this practice, has maintained that these reports are carefully examined before an action is considered:

There were incidents. Some employees and especially the independents surely know that when an opinion is formed about someone..... reports are made and this can culminate in (his dismissal).... Even the report that comes from the Party we check it.

The eroding effect of the informer on the social and the productive systems in the organization cannot be overemphasised. It is not difficult to imagine managers and employees alike being haunted by the prospect of becoming the subject of the informer's report. It

is my opinion that this, more than anything else, can have a hampering effect on the development process, in general. Working with informers discourage the suggestion of new ideas, innovation, flexibility and creativity - all the factors which are not only necessary for the development and the growth of any system but also for its survival and continuity.

The Employee's Rights, Pay, Incentives and Promotion

The employee who joins the organization gains certain rights and is expected to fulfil certain obligations. An impartial and fair treatment of the employee in which a balance is maintained between rights and obligations may not always be evident. In other words, one can expect that some employees sponsored by influential people will enjoy more rights than other employees. The enforcement of the obligation clauses can also be expected to vary accordingly.

Most employees who join the government bureaucracy stay there until retirement age. In one country, this appears to be regarded as an unwritten or implied clause in the employee-government contract. Hence, the employee may not be allowed to leave the bureaucracy when he chooses to. The strength of the government in this contractual arrangement is derived from its authority to accept or reject his

resignation. In the event of the government rejection, if the resigned employee refuses to work he is liable to legal prosecution, according to one legal source, Al-Watre (1976).

For his participation in organized work, the employee receives a salary and is entitled to fringe benefits and incentive payments in accordance with the law stipulations. It is my impression after meeting many employees in three countries that there is widespread dissatisfaction with pay. There are specific reasons for this. First, as a result of the newly-found wealth in oil revenues, the cost of living is rapidly rising while authoritative bodies have been slow in updating the pay scales. Although it is a common practice in these countries to add to the basic salary rate a cost-of-living payment, this payment is not actually linked to the cost-of-living index. Second, even within the same government bureaucracy, different organizations are observed to have and to apply different pay scales. For the highly qualified individual, it is more financially rewarding to work in the universities or elsewhere rather than in the research organizations. It might appear profoundly unjust to a Ph.D graduate in engineering receiving a total monthly salary of less than £400 to learn that a first-degree engineering graduate is receiving more than double his salary - both of them are government employees.

Three negative results are observed to emerge from this situation: corruption and misuse of public funds, the brain drain phenomenon, and low productivity. Official data on corruption are inaccessible.

However, the hearsay evidence describes corruption as both large scale and widespread. In a special report on Jordan in the International Herald Tribune (1977), it is alleged that "corruption is tainting the administration; some observers estimate that through corrupt dealings 10 percent of government funds are 'diverted' but most estimates would put the figure at least twice as high." In addition to other factors, the inadequacy of government-paid salaries contribute to the brain drain. Governments whose administrative and productive systems are suffering from this are aware of its serious ramifications. This is made clear in the Jordanian Five Year Plan (1976):

The past three years were characterized by a drain of skilled manpowers in some administrative, technical, and professional areas, both from government service to the private sector inside Jordan and from the two sectors to the outside, owing to high levels of income there..... The drain was concentrated in the areas of managerial, technical and professional expertise essential for the development process. If this phenomenon continues, it will have an adverse effect on the government's ability to implement and manage development projects and maintain the present levels of public services.

The numbers involved in the brain drain in Jordan, as reported in the International Herald Tribune (1977), justify this warning: two thirds of the engineers, a third of the doctors, and half of the agricultural engineers and the nurses. In the case of Iraq, the number of qualified Iraqis working abroad, mainly in European and North American countries, it put at around 3,000. A United Nation's (1976) report finds that "most of them are qualified scientists and engineers and some hold highly responsible positions in developed countries". An unspecified number of them have recently returned to their country to benefit from the incentives offered to them in a legislation.

Inadequate salaries can also result in low productivity. This is the opinion expressed in a report on Negative Aspects Affecting the Centres and Institutes of the Foundation (1977):

One of the principle factors which lead to low productivity in scientific research is the non-existence of a favourable atmosphere for scientific research and its leader the scientific researcher. (His) bad financial state and the difficulties which ensue from this make it impossible (for him) to create and to study the problems and find solutions for them. The provision of the basic life necessities for the scientific researcher such as a good salary and a suitable accommodation.... helps to settle his mind and to direct his efforts into research work.

This viewpoint was reaffirmed by a senior employee in a research organization who observed that the employees' minds are preoccupied with daily living matters such as the rent payment, the car instalment and the holiday expenses.

Other causes for the employee's complaint are the few provided fringe benefits and the lack of monetary incentives. It appears that employees can always justify such complaints by bringing up cases of other employees, similarly qualified but receiving more benefits. In a detailed comparison between their condition and that of the university staff, research workers in one research organization list, among other things, annual holidays and mandatory number of work hours in which the university staff are apparently getting a better deal. The same comparison, conducted in the context of provisions for monetary incentives, reveals that while the research workers receive no such incentives, the university staff members are entitled to a grant-in-aid payment, a publishing subsidy, and 50 percent of sales revenues from their published research works.

The value of incentives as a management tool for increasing productivity is appreciated among managers. In a general conference on the causes of low industrial productivity in one country, the introduction of an incentive scheme was discussed as part of a solution. The representative

of the political leadership, attending the conference, labelled this as 'deviant thinking'. While acknowledging that monetary incentives may increase productivity, he reproachfully put to them the following question: "Where is the role of revolutionary education?"

The individual who joins the organization expects to rise in the official hierarchy and to receive increases on his salary upon his satisfaction of certain prescribed conditions. The failure of management to assure the employee of his career prospects and to act meritoriously on such matters can have negative effects on the employee's productivity and adjustment to the work situation. Managers, however, may have to comply with political demands. A report of the International Bank (?) on one of these countries affirms: "Political considerations, including personal relations, (are given priority) over merit in getting a government job or a promotion to a better position".

The employee's superiors, especially his organization manager, control his promotion prospects. In this case and even in the case of the yearly raise, the manager must prepare a recommendation on whether the concerned employee is deserving or not. For a final decision, the recommendation is brought before a committee of senior officials appointed for this purpose. Such a committee is found in

every ministry or the major administrative divisions of a ministry.

The recommendation of the manager is based, in principle, on the employee's performance record. In this record, referred to as the employee's file, his achievements and shortcomings are registered. In addition to his formal qualifications and the training received, his list of achievements would include, in the case of one country, such things as 'commending notes' which are official notes sent to him by his superior acknowledging and praising specific achievements. On the other hand, the employee's shortcomings are revealed by the punishments he has received. The least severe form of punishment is the verbal warning which is not recorded in his file. Other forms of punishments are, in an increasing order of severity a reprimand, a warning, an official warning, and concurrently an official warning and a salary deduction. The last two forms of punishment can seriously affect the employee's prospect of promotion. The employee can dispute the punishment or its form by raising the matter to a higher authority, i.e. the manager's superior. A committee may then be formed to conduct a hearing on the matter and to make a final decision. Finally it must be remembered that, according to Al-Watre (1976), "all promotions are legalistic and not obligatory". In other words, the employee is not assured of promotion if he satisfies the conditions of qualification, experience, and the performance criteria.

The manager lacks the aids which can make the appraisal of his subordinates more systematic and less personal. In an effort to redress this in one country, a management consultancy team prepared an appraisal form or guide to be used in evaluating the performance of employees in leadership and supervisory positions. The suggested form, as described by Al-Kubayci (1974) is simplistic and reflects the current inadequate preconceptions of the major elements which must be attended to in the appraisal process. In the form, the employee is assigned numerical scores on four appraisal criteria or items on which a total 'ideal' score is 100. Thus, he is scored on 'performance of duties' out of 50, on 'attendance record' out of 30, and on 'public relations' and 'personal abilities' out of 10 each. The fact that no justifications were offered in support of this distribution of values encourages the suspicion that the scale is arbitrary and is based on conventional attitudes rather than on a thorough investigation. Furthermore, its benefit as a managerial tool of appraisal is limited because it still leaves the 'performance of duties' item undefined.

The laws governing promotion also reflect convention. For example, in one country, a married employee is by law (Article 27, Iraqi Civil Service Law, 1936) favoured in promotion over an unmarried employee if both are equally qualified and satisfy the

conditions for promotion. There is also no apparent justification for applying different conditions for promotion in essentially similar cases. For example, while promotion to the position of assistant researcher in some research organizations requires the publication of three research papers, promotion to the equivalent position of lecturer in the university requires the publication of only two papers. In the case of promotion to the position of researcher, it is stipulated that two of the required six published papers must be 'original'. Allegations were voiced in the Conference on the Working Paper for the Scientific Research Foundation on Work Obstacles (1976) that in applying this condition, the research management were impressed more by the number rather than the quality of the published papers. If the application of such conditions in the universities can be taken as a measure, then these allegations are not unfounded, as Derwish (1969) reveals:

The requirement of three papers of 'valuable' research has been liberally interpreted and in many cases even popular magazine articles have been admitted for supporting promotion to the title of assistant professor. The more serious requirement for promotion to the title of professor (three original research papers) is only now being applied rigorously.

The Research Findings

The employee questionnaire included, in addition to the parts discussed in the preceeding chapter, the employee conformity scale and the adjustment-satisfaction scale. These were included for the purpose of testing the research hypotheses in which the influence of certain forces on the adjustment and satisfaction of the employees was represented. In these hypotheses, it is envisaged that the employee adjustment and satisfaction is dependent on his position on the insecurity feeling continuum and his perception of the degree of conformity enforced on him. Toward the end of this chapter it is hoped that some conclusion will be reached on the validity of this conception. First, results obtained on the employee conformity scale and the adjustment-satisfaction scale will be reported and discussed.

The Employee Conformity Scale

The first employee conformity scale is made up of five questions or items and the respondent is instructed to answer them by encircling in each case, an appropriate number on a scale from (1) low to (7) high. These are:

1. the number and scope of his job responsibilities;
2. the degree of his participation in formulating the decisions arrived at in the organization;

3. the degree of closeness and cohesiveness between him and his immediate superior;
4. the extent of the freedom he is allowed to disagree with his superior; and
5. his contribution toward setting the general goals and targets of the economic plans

In addition to these, two other items which are related to conformity are included. However, results obtained on these two are not integrated with the results obtained on the five items in the scale for reasons which will be mentioned later. The first of these two items is devised to measure the degree of control exercised by the superior over the employee. In specific, the employee is asked to indicate whether this control in the form of direct checks and work reviews is made annually, monthly, several times in a month, weekly, or daily. In the second item, borrowed from the work of George A. Miller (1972), the employee is instructed to choose one of the following statements which outline different possible relationships between him and his immediate superior with reference to decision-making:

1. We do not discuss the issues in detail and he, alone, (i.e. your immediate superior) makes the decision.

2. We discuss the issues in detail but he alone makes the final decision.
3. We discuss the issues in detail and we, I and him, reach a common decision.
4. We discuss the issues in detail and my decision is usually confirmed.
5. We do not discuss the issues in detail and I make most of the decisions.

These two items will be henceforth referred to as the control item and the decision-making item.

In the second employee questionnaire, answered mainly by the research employees, the only change introduced on the first conformity scale described above is the replacement of item number 5 with the following item:

5. the extent of freedom you are allowed in choosing the themes of your research and your research associates and assistants.

The decision-making item was retained unaltered while a minor adjustment was made on the control item. This involved changing one of the forced-choice options from 'weekly' to 'several times in a week'.

The reason for not including the control item in the conformity score calculated for each respondent becomes clear when the answers of some employees on this item are compared with their answers on the items in the conformity scale. In these particular cases, the answers are found to be inconsistent. For example, a number of employees put the frequency of the control event at annually while their answers on the other items indicate a high degree of conformity expected of them. The explanation offered here is that these employees marked a low frequency of control to draw attention to the fact that they have fewer contacts with their superiors. On the other hand, there were also employees who answered the control item by marking 'daily' to indicate close and frequent contacts with their superiors.

Except for few, the responses received on the decision-making item were limited to the first three forced-choice options provided in the item. The joint decision-making option, i.e. number 3, was perceived by the respondents as representing the relationship allowing them the highest degree of participation in decision-making. The few employees

from one planning organization who marked option number 5 explained that they exercised de facto the decision-making powers because their superior was not qualified to do so.

The Adjustment-Satisfaction Scale

Testing the hypotheses proposed earlier required some measure of the employee adjustment to the work situation and his satisfaction with the social, financial and career opportunities it provides. Accordingly, a scale was developed for this purpose. Two forms of the adjustment-satisfaction scale were prepared and administered to the planning and the research employees as part of the employee questionnaire. Each item in this scale is made up of two statements, placed opposite each other, of which one is a positive comment on some aspect of the work situation while the other is a negative comment on the same aspect. The respondent is instructed to choose only one of the two statements and to specify the degree of his agreement with it by encircling one of three numbers from 1 (high) to 3 (low).

The first adjustment-satisfaction scale (form A) is made up of eight items. In these items, the following aspects of the work situation are referred to: the clarity of the employee's duties and responsibilities, his satisfaction with past achievements on the job and his expectations for the future, the strictness of orders and

procedures, the frequency of getting consulted, his share of the superior's support, help, and encouragement, his opinion on the tolerance shown by his work associates, the opportunities he gets to make suggestions and to work on important research, and whether or not he thinks that his knowledge and experience will be enhanced in this job. In addition to these, the respondent is presented with two hypothetical situations and his responses to them are sought. Both of these involve job offers, one paying a higher salary than his present salary and the other affording him the opportunity to do 'interesting research work with a small group of researchers.'

The respondent is instructed to choose one of the following five statements in response to each of the two items: I will seize the opportunity and accept the offer without hesitation; I think I will accept the offer; I do not know what my reaction would be; I do not think I will accept the offer; and I am certain I will reject the offer. Results obtained on these two items are not integrated with the results obtained on the adjustment-satisfaction scale.

Sixty-eight of the planning employees answered form A of the adjustment-satisfaction scale. It seems worthwhile at this point to use their answers to form a list of 'dissatisfiers'. The order in which these elements are listed below corresponds to the frequency with which

the respondent indicated each element, i.e. from the element given the highest vote to the one given the least vote:

1. There are only few opportunities to make suggestions and to work on important research
2. Orders and procedures are detailed and delimited to an extent which hinders the employee's initiative and there is insistence, from above, that the orders and the procedures must be followed.
3. The employee's knowledge and experience will not increase as a result of performing the tasks he is assigned presently or expects to be assigned in the future.
4. The employee is not satisfied with what he has achieved until now and has doubts about the future.
5. Fellow employees do not tolerate opposition from others.
6. The duties and responsibilities are not clearly specified and there is wide scope for interpretation which causes difficulties.

7. The employee is seldom consulted on subjects which fall within his specialisation.
8. The employee is seldom the object of the concern of his immediate superior or his encouragement and help.

When the decision to include research organizations and their employees in the research sample was made, it was thought necessary to extend the adjustment-satisfaction scale to include other features of the work situation. Accordingly, a new version of this scale, form B, was prepared. It consists of seven of the eight items in form A, excluding the item on the strictness of orders and procedures, and six new additional items. In the new items the following features of the work situation are referred to: whether or not the deserving employee gets encouragement and recognition, the employee's opinion on the importance and usefulness of his work, the presence of cooperation and understanding in his organization, the provision of incentives, the supply of scientific equipment and information, and whether or not the researchers' interests get priority consideration in the management choice of research topics. Only the item on the higher-salary job offer was retained in conjunction with form B.

Two hundred and one employees from mainly research organizations completed and returned form B of the adjustment-satisfaction scale. If their answers on only the items incorporated from form A, i.e. all the items except item number 2 are considered, the following list of dissatisfiers results: 1, 5, 4, 6, 7, 8, 3. It is noted that except for one major difference, almost the same order is repeated here. This difference is observed in the higher confidence shown by the respondents to form B that their knowledge and experience will increase as a result of performing their present and expected future work assignments. A list of 'dissatisfiers' making use of all the items in form B follows:

1. As 1 in form A
2. The organization does not provide the employee with adequate and encouraging incentives.
3. As 5 in form A
4. The individual who proves his technical and scientific ability does not necessarily get the appreciation and encouragement.
5. As 4 in form A
6. As 6 in form A
7. The organization does not provide the employee with all he needs for work and there is usually a delay before equipment and information necessary for research work are made available.
8. As 7 in form A

9. When choosing the research topics, responsible people consider last the interests of the researchers.
10. As 8 in form A
11. The organization climate is not characterized by understanding and cooperation.....
12. The employee feels that his work has no clear significance or a known benefit
13. As 3 in form A.

Testing the Hypotheses

Our prediction is that the employee will show high adjustment and satisfaction if:

1. his feeling of insecurity is low and he perceives a low degree of conformity enforced upon him; or
2. his feeling of insecurity is high and he perceives a high degree of conformity enforced upon him

It is also implied here that the employee's adjustment and satisfaction will be low if:

3. his feeling of insecurity is low and he perceives a high degree of conformity enforced upon him; or

4. his feeling of insecurity is high and he perceives a low degree of conformity enforced upon him.

It remains to find out if these expectations are supported by the data. The cross-tabulation method of analysis is preferred here rather than the multiple correlation method because it affords us a comprehensive view of the data. Results obtained on the two samples who answered different employee questionnaires will be first considered separately. Finally, an attempt will be made to identify the overall trend of the aggregate evidence.

The First Sample

Sixty-four employees of planning organizations completed and returned copies of the employee questionnaire. This questionnaire includes the first insecurity scale, the first employee conformity scale, and form A of the adjustment-satisfaction scale. In accordance with their scores' position from the arithmetic mean, they are classified into different categories or groups as shown in Table 1:

Table 1

ADJUSTMENT AND SATISFACTION BY DEGREE OF
ENFORCED CONFORMITY AND INSECURITY FEELING

Adjustment and Satisfaction	Insecurity Feeling			
	High		Low	
	Low Conformity	High Conformity	Low Conformity	High Conformity
LOW	I 4	III 9	V 5	VII 5
HIGH	II 10	IV 16	VI 13	VIII 1

Results which confirm the expectations are found in groups I, IV, VI and VII in Table 1. The number of cases in these is thirty-eight. On the other hand, cases found in II, III, V, and VIII constitute the non-fit group. Their number is twenty-five. Although it is reassuring that a majority of the cases verifies our expectations, the number of the non-fit group is sufficient to undermine the validity of the hypotheses. If an alternative explanation is to be produced, a rigorous examination of the result must be conducted. The first hint of an explanation comes from considering the results on Group II. The adjustment-satisfaction scale (form A) administered to this sample includes two items, number 7 and 8, which dwell on the frequency with which the

employee is consulted and the degree of attention, encouragement and help (henceforth support) he gets from his superior. In eight of the ten cases in Group II, the employees indicated that they were frequently consulted and get support. The remaining two indicated that they were supported but not consulted. When their answers to related items in the conformity scale (on participation in decision making and on closeness to the superior) are considered, it is found that only half their number marked both their participation and their closeness as high. Four of the remaining five marked low participation and high closeness and one put both factors as low. These findings encourage us to pay particular attention to the closeness-to-the-superior factor.

The following comparison is between the answers of employees in III and IV on the consultation and support items:

	III	IV
	—	—
Consulted and supported	-	15
Not consulted but supported	-	1
Neither consulted nor supported	7	-
Consulted but not supported	2	-

This comparison shows that while a majority of the fit cases in Group IV felt consulted and supported, a majority of the non-fit cases in Group III complained that they were neither consulted nor supported. A better view of the situation may emerge from considering the following comparison between the answers of the same two groups, on the participation and closeness items:

	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
Low participation, low closeness	8	-
High participation, low closeness	-	-
Low participation, high closeness	1	16
High participation, high closeness	-	-

One outstanding difference between cases in III and IV is the high closeness to the superior indicated by a majority of employees in the latter group. An equally significant observation is that in all the cases in III and IV the degree of participation in decision-making exercised by the employee is put as low. This leads us to pose the following question: Is the satisfaction of employees in the high insecurity feeling category related to the closeness-to-the-superior factor? The results obtained for the second sample may provide the answer.

The Second Sample

The second sample consists of one hundred and ninety-one research and planning employees (mainly in research). They answered a different questionnaire from the one administered to the first sample. This includes the second insecurity feeling scale, the second employee conformity scale, and form B of the adjustment-satisfaction scale. The analysis of the results obtained on the second sample will follow the same steps applied on the first sample. This begins first with an overall view of the cases, as shown in Table 2:

Table 2

ADJUSTMENT AND SATISFACTION BY DEGREE OF ENFORCED
CONFORMITY AND INSECURITY FEELING

	Insecurity Feeling			
	High		Low	
Adjustment and Satisfaction	Low Conformity	High Conformity	Low Conformity	High Conformity
LOW	I 13	III 32	V 7	VII 27
HIGH	II 27	IV 31	VI 45	VIII 9

The fit groups are found in I, IV, VI and VII and they include one hundred and sixteen cases. On the other hand, the non-fit cases are found in II, III, V, and VIII and their number is seventy-five. Again, the number of cases in the non-fit groups is sufficiently high to make us doubt the worthiness of the relevant research hypotheses. However, some compensation can be gained if the question raised in the discussion on the first sample can be answered in the affirmative especially since most of the non-fit cases are within the high insecurity feeling category (i.e. II and III; $n = 59$).

The cases in Group II are considered first. A majority of these, twenty-four in number, indicated that they were consulted and supported. The remaining three indicated that they were not consulted but get some support. By turning to their answers on the participation and closeness items, it can be observed that while a majority of fifteen marked low participation but high closeness to the superior, ten put both factors as high. The potency of the closeness-to-the-superior factor in determining the degree of adjustment and satisfaction shown by the low insecurity employees is again confirmed.

A comparison between the responses of employees in III and IV to the consultation and the support items follows:

	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
Consulted and supported	9	23
Not consulted but supported	5	6
Neither consulted nor supported	11	-
Consulted but not supported	7	1

It is observed that while the cases in Group III are dispersed among the four positions, a majority of the cases in Group IV are clearly centred round the 'consulted and supported' position. Even those who were not consulted but supported in Group IV, the second largest subgroup, were satisfied and adjusted. The following comparison is between the answers of the two groups on the participation and closeness items:

	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
Low participation, low closeness	23	8
High participation, low closeness	1	1
Low participation, high closeness	8	20
High participation, high closeness	-	1

Our attention is drawn again to the fact that the principle difference between the two groups is the high closeness to the superior experienced by the adjusted and satisfied group (IV). In contrast, participation in decision-making appears to be of secondary importance.

On the other hand, the importance of participation in decision-making increases as we move to consider cases in the low insecurity feeling category. Only four of the forty five cases in Group VI (adjusted and satisfied) indicated that they are not consulted. Also, only ten among this group marked low participation. In summary, a significant majority of employees in Group VI showed a high degree of adjustment and satisfaction in a situation allowing them a greater role in making the decisions.

To find out if this finding is also valid for the remaining cases, in VII and VIII, the following comparison is made:

	<u>VII</u>	<u>VIII</u>
Consulted and supported	7	3
Not consulted but supported	2	-
Neither consulted nor supported	9	6
Consulted but not supported	9	-

The importance of the employee relationship with the superior is again confirmed by the number of unadjusted and unsatisfied employees (Group VII) who marked 'consulted' but 'not supported'. The data, however, do not allow a definite statement on the participation factor. This situation is not significantly changed by results shown in the following comparison:

	<u>VII</u>	<u>VIII</u>
Low participation, low closeness	18	3
High participation, low closeness	1	-
Low participation, high closeness	8	6
High participation, high closeness	-	-

The evidence presented above shows that a key element in the adjustment and satisfaction of employees in the high insecurity feeling category is the degree of closeness to the superior. Support is also given to the proposition that the degree of participation in decision-making is related to the adjustment and satisfaction of employees in the low insecurity feeling category. This evidence is summed up now in the following comparison between adjusted and satisfied employees in the high insecurity feeling category (II and IV) and those in the low insecurity feeling category (VI and VIII) in the first and second sample:

	<u>II, IV</u>	<u>VI, VIII</u>
Low participation, low closeness	10	5
High participation, low closeness	2	-
Low participation, high closeness	55	19
High participation, high closeness	16	44
Total	<u>83</u>	<u>68</u>

As shown above, only a minor role in decision-making is exercised by the high majority of adjusted and satisfied employees in groups II and IV: 55 + 10 (78.3%). In contrast, a more active role in decision-making is reported by a majority of cases in groups VI and VIII: 44 (62.85%). However, this is only a partial view of the situation supported by the evidence. An element whose significance is made clear throughout the preceding discussion is the degree of closeness to the superior felt by the employee. This is recognized as having some correlation (and probably a strong one) with the high adjustment and satisfaction shown by employees in the high insecurity feeling category. And while it is still effective in the case of employees in the low insecurity feeling category, a higher degree of participation in decision-making is also significant. It is obviously the case that a high closeness to the superior is not always a sufficient condition for the adjustment and satisfaction of the latter group.

This result, although it does not coincide with the research expectation, is consistent with the theoretical framework of this research. In specific, the high insecurity feeling employee's preference for a closer relationship with his superior is conditioned by his high security need. It is only when he is confident of his

superior's support that this employee can feel assured of his prospects within the organization. On the other hand, the above comparison between the adjusted and satisfied cases among the low and high insecurity feeling categories also shows that the satisfaction of employees in the low insecurity feeling category is a function of the closeness-to-the-superior factor as well as participation in decision-making. That this difference is not due to chance is verified by the chi-squared test: $\chi^2 = 33.184$, $p < 0.001$. This finding also bears much similarity to Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs. However, it is my opinion that a significant reduction in the insecurity felt by the employee cannot result from his satisfaction and adjustment to the organization because the origins of insecurity are in the environment.

It is also reassuring to find that a higher proportion of the satisfied employees in the high insecurity feeling category show more readiness than their opposites in the low insecurity feeling category to leave their organizations for jobs offering them higher salaries. This can be seen in the following comparison between adjusted and satisfied employees of both categories ($\chi^2 = 11.951$, $p < 0.01$)

	<u>II, IV</u>	<u>VI, VIII</u>
Will accept the offer	32 (41%)	16 (23.88%)
Will not	22 (28.2%)	36 (53.7%)
Undecided	24 (30.7%)	15 (22.38%)

Like maintaining a closer personal relationship with his superior, a higher salary helps to reassure the security-conscious employee. In contrast, employees in the other category indicated an appreciably less readiness to forfeit their present satisfying jobs for the higher salary offer. This is even more significant since current pay scales in these organizations have been generally described as unsatisfactory.

Finally, a measure was developed to find out if the degree of satisfaction indicated by the employee is related to his productivity on the job. In the final section of the employee questionnaire, the respondent is asked to fill in two graphs, one representing his satisfaction with his job over the last six years and the other representing his productivity and 'activeness' on the job over the same period. This was answered by two hundred and twenty-six employees. Seventy-six percent of them drew graphs in which satisfaction and productivity simultaneously increased and/or decreased.

CONCLUSIONS

The original purpose of this study is to demonstrate that a better understanding of the organization can be achieved by focussing on its interface with the environment. Adopting a contingency approach was thought necessary to arrive at a view which comprises a greater number of the environmental contingencies and the responses from the organization. A search was then undertaken to find out from available written sources the significant elements in the planning organization and its environment. The operational research model included a representation of these elements, the patterns of their interaction and the consequences of this for structure and behaviour in the organization.

Preparing this research model proved difficult because of the scarcity of studies not only on management and organization in the countries where the research was to be conducted but also on every relevant - sociological, psychological, political and economic - aspect of the situation. Difficulties of another kind were encountered when the data needed for testing the research hypotheses were being collected by means of the questionnaire and interview methods. Requests for cooperation were often met with typical bureaucratic suspicion and secrecy. These difficulties made it necessary to adjust the initial research plan and to enlarge the research sample. On the

other hand, it must be acknowledged that the more than moderate enthusiasm shown by some officials and their readiness to cooperate made this research possible.

The problems arising from the field are not alone responsible for all the disappointments. Given the situation in these countries, results will probably fall short of expectations especially if the expectations are too high. On the other hand, to accept the average available study on the area as a measure of the possibilities for research would discourage the researcher from choosing specific issues for his study and from looking for sources of data other than the few available studies, legal sources and uninformative public statements. It was perhaps necessary to set high but realistic ambitions for this research in order to realise the modest success achieved. In my experience, doing this kind of research requires, more than anything else, the ability to work under uncertainty conditions, to persist despite frequent disappointments and to tolerate dilemmas such as: how to develop reliable and valid measurements without, in the process, using up all the cooperativeness of the subjects?

The final task which remains to be done in this concluding chapter is to sum up and to critically review the research results. The theme of this research, to state again, is the significant implication

of the environmental contingencies for structure and behaviour in the organization. Accordingly, the organization-environment model of analysis used here involved making assumptions on the nature of the contingencies in the environment, the principal actors in the organization who perceive and interpret these contingencies and the specific ways in which structure and behaviour in the organization are conditioned by these. This is essentially a selective and hence partial model of reality. To begin with, the political-ideological component of the environment is presented as the major contingency confronting the organization. Also, two contact or interaction points between the organization and its environment are chosen for emphasis in this study, one at the management level and another at the individual-employee level. Inside the organization, the environmental influences act upon each other in the context of the decision making process and the manager-subordinate relationship with certain postulated consequences for the adjustment and satisfaction of the employees.

The choice of the political-ideological component of the environment as the principal contingency was justified by support from the literature and a subjective assessment of the situation in the countries where the research was to be conducted. And since two points of interaction between the organization and the environment were envisaged in the research model, two perspectives on the

environment resulted. The first perspective, the manager's perception of the environment, has direct implications for the operation and survival of the organization. This is because the role of the manager comprises the tasks of preparing a strategy for dealing with the environmental contingency and designing the organizational structure and policies for achieving effective operation under the circumstances. A relationship was hypothesized between what the manager perceives the environment to be, on a continuum from uncooperative and inflexible to cooperative and flexible environment, and the degree of structure (conformity) he designs and imposes on his subordinates.

The individual employee stands at the other point of interaction with the environment. The little knowledge about the individual in the area one can gain from the few impressionistic studies made it difficult to find a plausible conception of him. The search for this conception led to a representation of the individual in terms of the result of an interplay between two forces: his basic internalized values and attitudes or his ideal self and the threats to his happiness, livelihood and survival from the environment and in particular those threats emanating from the political-ideological component. Depending on the strength of their moral convictions and the standards, ethical and/or professional,

they set for themselves, different individuals are expected to react to the environmental threats in different ways. These different ways are represented in the insecurity feeling continuum. The discussion on the individual culminated in hypothesizing that the adjustment and satisfaction of the individual in the organization is a function of the degree of insecurity feeling he exhibits and the degree of structure imposed on him by his superior.

This is, in essence, the model of the organization-environment relationship used for analysis in the research. In retrospect, it does not appear to me as comprehensive as following a contingency approach would require it to be. However, this is not surprising. From the very beginning, it was recognized that including environmental elements in organizational analysis would multiply the difficulty involved in representing and studying organizational systems. The focus of the research's view on the environment is kept on only one component and other components are either excluded or the importance of their impact is subordinated to that of the political-ideological component. Moreover, the organization in this model is represented by two structural levels: the managerial and the subordinate levels. This is essentially a nascent image of the organization which underestimates its real-life functional and structural complexity. Its neatness is a sufficient reason to make one doubt its representativeness. On the other hand, this may be the best strategy if the lack of

information and the obstacles to doing research are taken into consideration. The attempt, made below, to identify some of the excluded possibilities is not intended to compensate for their initial exclusion.

The first doubt which remains in my mind is whether the way in which the environment was depicted and its postulated implications for management design of structure is, in retrospect, convincing. This doubt has been strengthened by the inability to reach from the limited data a definite statement on whether or not there exists a relationship between the manager perception of the environment and his design of structure for the organization. This leads one to appreciate the need to take into account the largest number of contingencies facing the manager and to withhold judgment on the relative importance of these contingencies until after the research is done. Some of these contingencies are probably external while others are internal. Moreover, it is possible that many of these contingencies are intricately interwoven and can be expected to put different demands on the manager's design. One of these contingencies which should have been considered is the general ability of management, i.e. their ability to perceive the environment and the contingencies and to arrive from this perception at a viable organizational strategy. The expectations of the employees make up another contingency which

was identified but whose impact was not attended to. Also, there is the possibility that the contingency which was actually represented in the research model is made up of a number of constituent contingencies and that these contingencies and their effects do not add up to one. In the final analysis, the need to include in organizational models for study the widest spectrum of contingencies and as many as possible of the macro and micro aspects of organizations must be reconsidered in the light of available sources of information and the limitations on doing research.

Similarly, the view of the individual employee suggested in the research does not exhibit the depth of characterization and analysis which is demanded by the current emphasis on the complexity of man. This is also due to the situational limitations rather than to any lack of awareness of this complexity on my part. The exercise of caution was essential in deciding what hypothesized relationships can be tested and in choosing the 'safe' features of the measured relationship. Accordingly, no attempt was made to test the assumption on the relationship between the political-ideological component and the individual's feeling of insecurity. It was necessary also to exclude from the scale on the insecurity feeling items which would have been construed by the subject as intrusions on his privacy and items having obvious political connotations. The task of

testing the research hypotheses and at the same time guarding against offending or antagonizing the subjects was another case of tight-rope walking. Despite this, it was possible to achieve two results which I believe are significant. First, evidence was found of a relationship between the adjustment and satisfaction of the employee and the degree of his insecurity feeling and his perception of the degree of structure imposed on him. Although this relationship does not coincide with the hypothesized one, it confirms the general validity of the perspective on the individual adopted in this research. Second, in the process of arriving at this result, it was observed that individuals in the sample exhibit varying attitudes toward social institutions and behaviour. One significant aspect of this variation in attitudes is the general tendency of individuals who adopt non-traditional patterns of behaviour to retain their traditional attitudes toward their traditional social groups. This leads one to question the worthiness of the dichotomous distinction, conventionally used in sociological and anthropological studies, between the traditional and modern personality. There is still much unknown about the process of social change in these countries and research can contribute toward resolving the value issues concerning the pace and content of change.

In the following paragraphs, an attempt will be made to convey an impression acquired in the process of doing the research and, to some extent, confirmed by the research results. This impression

sums up the observations and findings that personal and informal considerations enter into almost every conceivable interaction occurring within an organizational context - interactions within the same hierarchical level or between hierarchical levels in the organization or bureaucracy. As evidence of this, a certain management style was identified involving the manager in informal and personal contacts with other managers to acquire the necessary energetic inputs and support, in joining informal groupings and cliques to secure and promote his interests and to ward off threats, in emphasizing the personal dimension of his relationship with his subordinates and, in the case of one manager which may not be exceptional, in discriminating between trusty employees and the others. Similarly, results obtained on the employee questionnaire underline the general significance of the personal relationship with the superior for the subordinates and its central significance for those employees characterized by a relatively high degree of insecurity feeling. It must be admitted that these dysfunctional practices are keeping the sluggish bureaucratic machine in operation and producing some results but at a high cost to the survival and growth of rational bureaucracy. Some of the negative consequences of these practices include the frequent violation of the merit principle, the abuse of office and legitimate authority, the breakdown of formal communication and coordination channels, the waste of scarce and valuable resources

and the alienation of productive and talented employees. The dysfunctional practices and their negative implications form a closed vicious circle. And although it may appear that these practices have their roots in the traditional culture, it is my contention that the governing political leaders, their methods of governing and the like-minded people they appoint in senior positions in the bureaucracy are setting the conditions for the generation and continuity of these practices.

The informal patterns of interaction among and within bureaucratic levels go further than the usual consultation or information-exchange patterns observed in western studies of informal organizations. The content of the informal exchanges indicates that these contacts serve as major channels for doing work. It is found that one of the reasons which prompts the managers of the research and the planning organizations in the research sample of resort to informal exchanges to supplement or in place of the formal channels is the fact that their organizations have been recently introduced into the bureaucracy and their contacts with other established departments are not sufficiently formalized and routinized. There is obviously an unsatisfied need for a degree of formalization of the relationship between these organizations and other organizations in their environment.

It is also observed that a manager joins a clique to strengthen his uncertain position on the hierarchy. This uncertainty stems from the

fact that his authority and prerogatives are not well defined. Moreover, whatever authority he can claim as his own is sometimes challenged and undermined by one or more of his subordinates who outrank him on the extra-bureaucratic hierarchy, i.e. the political or social status hierarchy. In the final analysis, only his informal contacts can protect the manager from the arbitrary political leaders who are constantly seeking scapegoats to put the blame on for inefficiency and lack of development. It is not difficult to imagine the negative implications which this situation poses for the management task. It suffices to mention the lost time spent by these managers on creating and maintaining these informal contacts and the general demoralizing effect these practices have on the serious manager.

Interpersonal relations within the organization also exhibit the dysfunctional characteristics of informal and personal relations. Like the manager, the employee is not assured of job security and career and promotion prospects even if he proves his ability on the job. He learns from experience that befriending the superior, joining a clique and enlisting in the political party in power can better serve his general interests in the organization. He may be put under pressure by his work associates to adopt these patterns of adjustment to the work situation.

From these impressions, one can move to a conception of the organization as made up of bureaucratic, impersonal and rational

elements and informal, personal and irrational elements. The apparently peaceful coexistence of the two is, in my opinion, deceptive and temporary because in the long run the inherent contradictions can be expected to become more manifest and intensified and one possible outcome of this is the total breakdown of rational bureaucracy and chaos. If this possibility is to be avoided, some basic and effective solutions must be worked out and diligently implemented.

Instant solutions, like the ones derived from the untested dogma, are often unfeasible. On the other hand, the success of pragmatic technical solutions which disregard the values and wishes of the people may prove short-lived. As I see it, solving this problem calls for a comprehensive strategy which must stress the general design of bureaucracy and organizations. This is because we know from the literature that the emergence of unofficial practices can be traced to deficiencies in the official structure. These deficiencies take the form of faulty designs of links within the total bureaucratic system, inadequate job definitions, a dual hierarchy (one political and the other bureaucratic) and so on. It is within this context that the contingency approach can offer valuable insights.

What can be suggested here in the form of specific guidelines for approaching the problem of organizational design in these countries? First, the approach must be multidisciplinary. In other words, this problem must be recognized as having many dimensions which cut across many fields of inquiry and hence requires the participation of different specialists in dealing with it. It follows from this that there should exist a thoroughly free atmosphere in which specialists as well as non-specialists can bring up aspects of the problem for discussion and offer solutions or alternative strategies. This, would require the abolition of the much-practiced privilege that solutions must originate from the top of the political or bureaucratic hierarchy.

An equally important condition is that designers of organizational systems must approach their task with a thoroughly open mind. The first question which I imagine they should try to answer is whether or not there is a genuine need to create an organization. In some cases, they may find that the organization they want to create is already there in a rudimentary form in the traditional culture and it may be worthwhile to experiment with adjusting the existing structure to accommodate the new technology and functions. The relevancy of posing this question extends to other situations. For example, it is necessary before deciding to establish a research organization - especially if there is a shortage of qualified people - to consider whether it would not be more beneficial if the staff needed for operating the research organization is assigned to the university thus allowing all, the original university staff as well

as the new recruits, time to spend on doing research. It must also be recognized that there is nothing sacred about existing organizations and that their continuity in operation must be considered in view of the utility they produce. The cost to society of an inefficient and/or unproductive organization are the valuable resources and qualified employees that are employed by the organization. This is mentioned here because it is suspected that political leaders who put much emphasis on face and popularity may hesitate to dissolve an organization which fails to render any contribution, or to render it at a reasonable cost.

In view of the situation in these countries there is a clear need to incorporate some of the features of bureaucracy in organizational design. But bureaucracy, it must be remembered, is more than the 'rigid' structure with which it has been associated. Some degree of bureaucracy is still essential to safeguard human institutions from chaos. It serves as a setting for the performance of work in accordance with rational standards and not as a vehicle for the exercise of personal caprice and favouritism. One of the basic features of bureaucracy which needs to be emphasised in organizational design in these countries is that legitimate authority belongs to the office and not the incumbent. Another basic and useful principle is that the selection, placement and promotion of employees are done on the basis of objective tests of abilities and past record rather than on the basis of personal, social or political criteria. A clear

definition of rights and procedures serves to protect people from arbitrary bureaucracy and employees from arbitrary management.

Finally, organization designers must keep in mind that organizations employ people to do work and to produce results. The people of these countries possess a tremendous untapped potential. It is, therefore, the responsibility of these designers to ensure that their designs will maximise the exploitation of this potential for the benefit of all.

The conditions for designing organizations suggested above are that it should be realistic, contingent and multi-disciplinary and that it should incorporate some of the features of rational impersonal bureaucracy and aim at maximising the exploitation of the human potential. This is not all; a contingent design is not only a design tailored for the present because organizations participate in making the future and must respond to its challenges. Organizations, however, do not decide on the nature of the future. This is essentially a value decision and the democratic process is the ideal vehicle for making it regardless of what the ideologues and self-proclaimed intellectuals claim to be the best solution. Organizations, on the other hand, can serve as the sources of information which will make clear to the people the range of choices open to them and the consequences of each choice. The organizations' role in making the future suggest to me another condition which must be incorporated in the designs of organizations for these countries. People in these countries who are generally traditional experience the future through

their contacts with modern organizations, their specialised employees and the modern technology they use. Their faith in the future and the promises it holds for them will be strengthened if they can see that organizations are successful. Even if organizations are facing difficulties in coming up with results, the people's faith in the future can still be maintained if they are given regular and detailed information on these difficulties. These open-ended exchanges will also help to bridge the gap between organizations and the people and ensure the organizations of the enthusiastic support and participation of the people.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ACKOFF, R.L. (1974) Systems, organizations and interdisciplinary research. In: Emery, F.E. ed. Systems thinking, pp 330-347. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd.
- AHOOJA, K. (1966) Development legislation in Africa. The Journal of Development Studies, 2 (3), 297-322
- AIKEN, M. and HAGE, G. (1972). Organizational interdependence and intra-organizational structure. In: Hall, R. ed. The formal organization, pp.236-267 New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- AJIFERUKE, M. and BODDEWYN, J. (1970). Culture and other explanatory variables in comparative management studies. Academy of Management Journal, 13, 153-163
- ALMOND, G. and POWELL, G. Jr (1966). Comparative politics: a developmental approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Company
- AL-ATIYYAH, M. (1975) (Administrative leadership in Iraq) M.A. thesis, University of Baghdad, Iraq (in Arabic)
- AL-DAHIRI, A.M. (1969) The introduction of technology into traditional societies and economies using Iraq as a case study. Baghdad: Al-Ani Press.

- AL-JAZRAWI, T. (1973) (Industrial administration and the economic development requirements).
Beirut: Dar Al-Talia, (in Arabic)
- AL-KHAIRI, M. and HAMZA, K. (1975) (Social research and development)
Baghdad: Muassasat Al-Buhut Al-Ilmia,
(in Arabic)
- AL-KUBAYCI, A. (1974) (Evaluation of workers' performance in Iraq between theory and application). Majalat Al-Buhut Al-Iktisadia wal Idaria, 2 (December) 75-113, (in Arabic)
- AL-RAWI, M., IBRAHIM, N., and BAQGER, S. (1969). (Social values and the Iraqi society problems as seen by the social science teachers in the secondary school stage in Iraq) Baghdad: Matbaat Al-Hukuma (in Arabic).
- (AL-THAWRA newspaper series of articles on the administrative system: condemned phenomena that will not pass without reckoning) (1976). Compiled by the Information and Publication Office, Oil Ministry, Iraq (in Arabic).
- AL-WATRE, M. (1976) (On administrative law). Baghdad: Ma'arif Press, (in Arabic).

- AL-WINDAWE, H. (1975) (Administration and politics) Baghdad:
Markaz Al-Buhut Al-Iktisadia wal Idaria,
(in Arabic)
- (Annual report of the Education and Psychology Research Centre) (1976)
University of Baghdad, Ministry for Higher
Education and Scientific Research, Iraq.
(in Arabic)
- (Annual report of the Scientific Research Foundation) (1975). Planning
Council, Iraq (in Arabic)
- (A suggestion to organize the research centres and institutes of the
Scientific Research Foundation)(1977). Prepared
by the Scientific Research Foundation, Iraq.
mimeographed, (in Arabic)
- BAAKLINI, A. (1974). Comparative public administration: the
persistence of an ideology. Journal of
Comparative Administration, 5, 109-124
- BACHRACH, P. (1969) The theory of democratic elitism. London.
University of London Press Limited.
- BARAKAT, H. (1971) (The political system between modern and
traditional values). In: (The political
system suitable for development in the Third
World (Lebanon and the Arab Countries),
pp. 80 - 94. Beirut: Awaiddat Publication,
(in Arabic)

- BARNARD, C. (1938) The functions of the executives, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
- BIRMINGHAM, W. (1966) The economic development of Ghana. In: Birmingham, W. and Ford A. eds. Planning and growth in rich and poor countries, pp 171-195. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
- BURNS, T. and STALKER, G. (1961). The management of innovation. London: Tavistock Publications.
- CATTELL, R. and SCHEIER, I (1961). Measurement of neurtosicm and anxiety. New York: Roland Press.
- CLARK, B. (1956) Organization adaption and precarious values. American Sociological Review, 21, 327-336.
- Conference on low productivity in the government agencies (1976). Live coverage by the Iraqi television station. (in Arabic)
- Conference on the Working Paper for the Scientific Research Foundation on work obstacles (1976).
- COSTELLO, T. and ZALKIND, S (1963). Psychology in administration: a research orientation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall.

Crabb's English Synonyms. (1816) Prepared by G. Crabb. London.
Routledge and Kegan Paul.

CRUTCHFIELD, R. (1955). Conformity and character. American Psychologist, 10. 191-198

CUMMINGS, L., HARNETT, D., and STEVENS, O. (1971). Risk, fate, conciliation, and trust: an international study of attitudinal differences among executives. Academy of Management Journal, 14, 285-304.

DAHL, R. (1959) The politics of planning. International Social Science Journal, 11 (3), 341-350.

DAVIS, K. (1964) Managing productivity in developing countries. Management International, 4 (2), 71-72

DERWISH, G. (1969) Scientific research in Iraq. In: Nader, C., and Zahlan, A. eds. Science and technology in developing countries, pp. 175-186. Cambridge: The University Press.

DEUTSCHE, K. (1952) On communication models in the social sciences, Public Opinion Quarterly, 16, 356-380

DILL, W. (1958) Environment as an influence on managerial autonomy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2, 409-443

- DROR, Y. (1969) The planning process. A facet design.
In: Lyden, F and Miller E. eds. Planning programming, budgeting: a system approach to management, pp. 43-116. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.
- DUNCAN, R. (1972) Characteristics of organizational environment and perceived environmental uncertainty.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, (3), 313-327.
- EMERY, F., and TRIST, E. (1961) Socio-technical systems. In: Emery, F. ed. Systems Thinking, pp 281-296. Middlesex: Penguin Books Limited.
- FAINSOD, M. (1963) The structure of development administration. In: Swerdlow, I. ed. Development administration: concepts and problems, pp. 1-24. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- FRIEDMAN, J. (1959) Introduction. International Social Science Journal, 11 (3), 327-340
- FRIEDMAN, J. (1967) A conceptual model for the analysis of planning behaviour. Administrative Science Quarterly, 12, 225-252.
- FROMM, E. (1961) The fear of freedom. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.

- GARDNER, G. (1959) The Arab Middle East: some background interpretations. The Journal of Social Issues, 15, (3), 20-27.
- GOLDTHORPE, J.E. (1975) The sociology of the Third World: disparity and involvement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GONZALEZ, R. and McMILLAN, C. Jr. (1961) The universality of American management philosophy. Journal of the Academy of Management, 4 (1), 33-41
- GOULDNER, A. (1959) Organizational analysis. In: Merton K., Broom L., and Cottrel S. Jr. eds. Sociology today: problems and prospects, pp. 400-428. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- GROSS, B. (1965) National planning findings and fallacies. Public Administration Review, 25, 263-273.
- GROSS, B. (1966) The administration of economic development planning: principles and fallacies. Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, 17 (1), 1-27
- GUBSER, P. (1973) Politics and change in Al-Karak, Jordan. London: Oxford University Press.

- GUETZKOW, H. (1965) The creative person in organizations. In: Steiner, G.A. ed. The creative organization, pp. 35-49. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- HABIB, K. (1974) (Studies on economic planning) Baghdad: Al-Nahda Press, (in Arabic)
- HALL, E. (1959) The silent language, New York: Doubleday.
- HAIRE, M., GHISELLI, E. and PORTER, L. (1963). Cultural patterns in the role of the manager. Institute of Industrial Relations, 2 (2), 95-117
- HARVEY, E. (1968) Technology and the structure of organization. American Sociological Review, 33 (2), 247-259.
- HASSAN, J. (1974) (Developing planning systems in Iraq) Mimeographed, (in Arabic)
- HAYEK, F. (1944) The road to serfdom. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Limited.
- HEILBRONER, R. (1963) The great ascent. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers.

- HELLER, F.A. (1966) Comparing American and British managerial attitudes to skills and leadership. In: Weinshall, T.D. ed. Culture and management, pp. 341-353. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd.
- HELLRIEGEL, D. and SLOCUM, J. Jr. (1974). Management: a contingency approach. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- HICKS, H. and GULLET, C (1975) Organizations: theory and behaviour. Tokyo: McGraw-Hill Kogakusha Ltd.
- HITT, W.D. (1969) Two models of man. American Psychologist, 24, 651-658.
- HOMANS, G. (1950) The human group. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- HOURLANI, A. (1956) Arabic culture. In: Hourani, A. ed. Perspective of the Arab world. New York: Intercultural Publications.
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (?) (Economic development in Kuwait) Translated from the English. Kuwait: Al-Maktab Al-Arabi, (in Arabic)
- International Herald Tribune (1977) A special report: Jordan, 25th November.

- JACOBS, N. (1966) The sociology of development: Iran as an Asian case study. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers.
- JEWKES, J. (1968) The new ordeal of planning. London: MacMillan.
- JOHNSON, H.G. (1967) The ideology of economic policy in the new states. In: Johnson, H.G. ed. Economic nationalism in old and new states, pp. 124-141. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jordan Five Year Plan (1976) Prepared by the National Planning Council, Jordan.
- JURJIS, M. (1975) Some cultural and behavioural obstacles which oppose economic and social development in Arabian Gulf countries and the role of the Republic of Iraq). In: (A collection of studies delivered at the First Scientific Conference of the Center for Arabian Gulf Studies at Basrah University.
- KATZ, D and KAHN, R. (1966). The social psychology of organizations: New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- KERR, C., DUNLOP, J., HARBISON, F., and MEYERS, C. (1964). Industrialisation and industrial man. 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

- KHADDURI, M. (1970) Political trends in the Arab world, the role of ideas and ideals in politics. Baltimore: The John Hopkins.
- KUHN, D., SLOCUM, J., and CHASE, R. (1971) Does job performance affect employee satisfaction. Personnel Journal, 50, 455-459, 485.
- LASSWELL, H. (1947) The analysis of political behaviour: an empirical approach. London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company Ltd.
- LAWRENCE, P. and LORSCH, W. (1967). Differentiation and integration in complex organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 12, 1 - 47.
- LAWRENCE, P. and LORSCH, W. (1969) Developing organizations: diagnosis and action. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Letter from the Economic and Administration Research Center to the Presidency of the University of Baghdad (1976)
24th February.

- LEWIS, J. (1969) The social limits of politically induced change. In: Morse, C., Ashford, D., Bent, F., Friedland, W., Lewis, J., and Macklin, D. eds. Modernization by design; social change in the twentieth century, pp. 1 - 43. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- LEWIS, W. (1966) Development planning: the essential of economic policy. London: George Allen & Unwin Limited.
- LINDBLOM, C. (1959) The science of 'muddling through'. Public Administration Review 29 (2), 79-88.
- MACKINNON, D. (1962). What makes a person creative. Saturday Review, 10 February, 15 - 69.
- MAHDI, S. (1968) (Modern scientific administration for public and private projects and organizations) Baghdad: Al-Ani Press, (in Arabic)
- MANHEIM, K. (1940) Man and society in the age of reconstruction. London.
- MANSOUR, A. (1977). (The doctors' frankness is a mass (sic) mistake). Oktober, January, 1-2.

- MARTIN, C. (1970) The case for a central projects bureau. Finance and Development, 7 (4), 9 - 14.
- MASLOW, A. (1943) A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50, 370 - 396.
- MATOSSIAN, M. (1958) Ideologies of delayed industrialisation; some tensions and ambiguities. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 6, 217 - 228.
- MCCALL, G. (1966). Identities and interactions. New York: The Free Press.
- MEIER, G. (1966) Progress and problems of the development decade. Social and Economic Studies, 15, (4), 285 - 304.
- MEJLOUMIAN, C (1969) Annual planning in Iran. Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, 20 (1), 52 - 60.
- MELIKIAN, L. and DIAB, L. (1974). Stability and change in group affiliations of university students in the Arab Middle East. The Journal of Social Psychology, 93, 13 - 21.

- MEYERSON, M. and BANFIELD, E (1965). Politics, planning, and the public interest. London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd.
- MILLER, G (1972) Professionals in bureaucracy: alienation among industrial scientists and engineers. In: Hall, R, ed. The formal organization, pp. 213 - 235. New York: Basic Books.
- NACHMIAS, D and NACHMIAS, C. (1976). Research methods in the social sciences. London: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd.
- NEGANDHI, A and REIMAN, B (1972). A contingency theory of organization re-examined in the context of a developing country Academy of Management Journal, 15, 137 - 146.
- (Negative aspects affecting the centres and institutes of the Foundation) (1977). Prepared by the Scientific Research Foundation. Mimeographed, (in Arabic)
- NOWOTNY, O. (1964) American vs. European management philosophy. Harvard Business Review, 42 (2)
- OBERG, W. (1963) Cross-cultural perspective on management principles. Journal of the Academy of Management, 6 (2) 129 - 143.

- PARSONS, T. (1956) Suggestions for a sociological approach to the theory of organizations - I and II. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1, 63-85; 225-239.
- PERROW, C. (1961) The analysis of goals in complex organizations. American Sociological Review, 26, (6), 854 - 865
- PERROW, C. (1967) A framework for comparative organizational analysis. American Sociological Review, 32, (2), 194 - 208.
- PERROW, C. (1970) Organizational analysis: a sociological view. London: Tavistock Publications.
- PUGH, D., HICKSON, D., and PHEYSEY, D (1969). Operative technology and organization structure: an empirical appraisal. Administrative Science Quarterly, 14 (3), 378 - 397.
- QUBAIN, F (1958) The reconstruction of Iraq: 1950 - 57. New York: F.R. Prager.
- RICE, A (1963) The enterprise and its environment. London: Tavistock Publications.

- ROKEACH, M. (1960) The open and closed mind. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- SAAB, H. (1972) (Modernizing the Arab mind). Beirut: Dar Al-Ilm lil Malayin (in Arabic)
- SALEEM, S (1956) Al-Jibayish. Baghdad: Rabita Press.
- SCHOLLHAMMER, H. (1969) The comparative management theory jungle. Academy of Management Journal, 12 (1), 81 - 97.
- SEASHORE, S and YUCHTMAN, E. (1967). Factorial analysis of organizational performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 12, 377 - 395.
- SELZNICK, P (1948) Foundations of the theory of organizations. American Sociological Review, 13, 25 - 35.
- SELZNICK, P (1949) TVA and the grass roots. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- SHILS, E (1964) Political development in the new states. New York: Humanities Press.
- SIGMUND, P. Jr. (1963) The ideologies of the developing nations. London: Frederick A. Praeger.

- SILVERMAN, D (1970) The theory of organizations. London: Heinemann.
- SIMON, H (1952) Comments on the theory of organizations. In: Rubenstein, A and Haberstrach, C. eds. (1964). Some theories of organization, pp. 157 - 167. Homewood, Ill. Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
- SIMON, H (1957) Administrative behaviour. New York: MacMillan.
- SMESLER, N. and SMESLER, W. (1963). Introduction. In: Smesler, N and Smesler, W. eds. Personality and social systems. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- SMITH, M (1969) Social psychology and human values. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.
- TERREBERRY, S. (1968) The evolution of organizational environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 12, 590 - 613
- THOMAS, T. (1974) People strategies for international development, Journal of Comparative Administration, 5 , 87 - 107.

- THOMPSON, J.D. and McEWEN, W. (1958) Organizational goals and environment; goal-setting as an interaction process. American Sociological Review, 23, (1), 23 - 31.
- THOMPSON, J.D. (1967) Organizations in action. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- THOMPSON, V. (1964) Administrative objectives for development administration. Administrative Science Quarterly, 9 (1), 91 - 108
- The McGraw Hill Dictionary of modern economics (1965). Prepared by Greenwald, D and others. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company.
- TINBERGEN, J. (1959) Problems of planning economic policy. International Social Science Journal, 11, (3), 351 - 360.
- TINBERGEN, J. (1963). Lessons from the past. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Company.
- TOMEH, A, (1974) Alienation: a cross-cultural analysis. Journal of Social Psychology, 94, 187 - 200.

United Nations Economic and Social Council (1976).

National science and technology policies
in the Arab states: present situation and
future outlook. UNESCO science policy
studies and documents, No. 38.

URWICK, L. (1961) Management and human relations. In:
Tannenbaum R., Weschler, R., and Massarik, F.
eds. Leadership and organization: a
behavioural science approach. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company.

VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE, C.A.O. (1965). Social stratification and the
Middle East. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

von BERTALANFFY, L. (1974) The theory of open systems in Physics
and Biology. In Emery, F.E. ed. Systems
thinking pp. 70 - 85. Middlesex. Penguin
Books Limited.

WALINSKY, L. (1963) Burma. In: HAGEN, E. ed. Planning
economic development, Chapter 2. Homewood, Ill:
Richard D. Irwin.

WOODWARD, J. (1965) Industrial organization: theory and
practice. London: Oxford University
Press.

(Working paper for the Scientific Research Foundation Conference on work obstacles). (1976). Prepared by the Scientific Research Foundation, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Iraq, (in Arabic)

Yearbook of the Royal Scientific Society (1975). Prepared by the Royal Scientific Society, Jordan.

APPENDIX I

THE MANAGER QUESTIONNAIRE

The texts of questionnaires shown here are, except in the case of the company planning manager, the translations from the Arabic versions which were actually used in the research. The company planning managers answered the original English version. It may be useful to indicate here that the different versions of the manager questionnaire were prepared and applied in the following chronological order: the company planning, the central planning, the ministerial planning and the research.

Each of these manager questionnaires is made up of the following parts:

- A. Covering letter
- B. Biography sheet
- C. The environment scale
- D. The manager conformity scale
- E. Items on the manager distribution of his
time among a number of his activities

A. Covering Letter

1. The covering letter included in the questionnaire submitted to the central planning manager:

Dear Sir,

Greetings,

You find enclosed a questionnaire on the nature of your work in the planning set-up and you are kindly asked to answer it. The subject of this research centres round the administrative aspects of social and economic planning in some of the developing countries. As you know the management of planning is an important factor which directly influences the quality of planning. The researcher has conducted a literature-based study of the planning organizations in a number of developing countries and has arrived at a number of conclusions which are now put to you in this questionnaire. Please accept my thanks and gratitude for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Hamid Atiyyah.

2. Covering letter included in the questionnaire submitted to the ministerial planning manager.

Dear Sir,

Greetings,

I am an Iraqi student preparing at the University of Bath (England) a Doctorate thesis in Management. The subject of the thesis is a comparative study of the organization and management of planning set-ups in a number of developing countries. To acquire scientific results I have prepared the questionnaire (enclosed) and you are kindly requested to answer it. Please accept my thanks and gratitude for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Hamid Atiyyah.

3. Covering letter included in the questionnaire submitted to the company planning manager.

Dear Sir,

I am a post-graduate student at Bath University, England, reading for the degree of Ph.D. in management. My research for this degree involves a study of planning in different organizations. I am interested in particular in the effects that work relationships or the work environment may have on the planning function and those concerned with planning. The enclosed questionnaire is intended to provide me with the necessary information for completing my study. Your cooperation will be immensely appreciated. Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

Hamid S. Atiyyah.

4. Covering letter included in the questionnaire submitted to the research manager:

Dear Sir,

Greetings,

I am an Iraqi student preparing at the University of Bath, England, a Doctorate thesis in Management. The subject of the thesis is a comparative study of the systems and methods of modern organizations in a number of developing countries. To obtain scientific results I have prepared the questionnaire (enclosed) and you are kindly asked to answer it. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Hamid Suwadi Atiyyah.

B. Biography Sheet

This includes the following items:

1. Name (only central and company planning managers)
2. Age (only central and company planning managers)
3. Position and grade
4. Diplomas and experiences and the places where these were obtained.
5. Positions you have previously occupied
6. The duration of time for which you have been in this organization

C.I The Environment Scale: Central and Ministerial Planning and Research Organizations

Every item of the items included in this group is made up of two opposite statements and the method of answering them is first: by choosing one of the opposite statements and which corresponds with your view and personal knowledge and second: by marking one of the

numbers (1 or 2 or 3) adjacent to the statement you have chosen. Indicating the number of your choice is done by putting a circle around it and in accordance with the following:

Number one (1): expresses your complete agreement with the statement adjacent to the number

Number two (2): expresses your agreement in general

Number three (3): expresses your slight agreement

In other words, number (1) represents the highest degree of agreement and number (3) the lowest degree of agreement. In some of the items, the term 'people' appears and the term 'people' is intended here to refer in particular to administrators (other than the employees of planning (research) set-ups whom you come in contact with through your work and in general to persons whose opinions you regard as having value or weight.

1. The following items are included in the questionnaire submitted to the central planning manager:

1. It is very difficult 1 2 3 3 2 1
to convince responsible
officials in the executive
departments (plan execution)
to do their part in making
a success of the plan and
to follow our instructions

We do not encounter any
considerable difficulty
in the task of convincing
these officials to do
their part

2. In general, the 1 2 3 3 2 1
government departments
(which propose the projects)
try to impose their projects
on us

In general, the government
departments propose the
projects and never try to
impose them on us

3. The priority scale for 1 2 3 3 2 1
choosing the plans' projects
is very clear and does not
need reconsideration

The priority scale for
choosing the plans' projects
is not clear and this situation
is a source of trouble for us

4. We (the plan officials) 1 2 3 3 2 1
always find ourselves blamed
if obstacles emerge to hinder
the realization of the plan
goals

We do not get blamed if it
is difficult to forecast
such obstacles

5. Most people intention- 1 2 3 3 2 1
ally belittle the importance
of our work, continuous efforts
and achievements

Most people are fair in
their appraisal of us and
judge our work justly

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>6. In the final analysis, 1 2 3 3 2 1
people will remember only
our mistakes and the
failure of planning to
reach the goals prescribed
for us</p> | <p>In the final analysis, people
will remember the good aspects
of our work and especially
our numerous achievements</p> |
| <p>7. People expect us to 1 2 3 3 2 1
perform miracles</p> | <p>People expect from us
reasonable achievements</p> |
| <p>8. Everyone connected 1 2 3 3 2 1
with planning must realise
that planning can only
succeed by the trial and
error method</p> | <p>Most of those connected with
planning realise the importance
of this method (i.e. the trial
and error method) in bringing
the economic plans to the
required precision and the
desired success</p> |
| <p>9. It is very difficult 1 2 3 3 2 1
to get participation and
cooperation from other
departments and their
employees</p> | <p>We do not face any considerable
difficulty in getting the
participation and cooperation
from other departments and
their employees.</p> |
| <p>10. People expect from 1 2 3 3 2 1
us too much in a short
time</p> | <p>We have ample time to prepare
the projects and plans
required from us</p> |

- | | | |
|--|--------------------|--|
| <p>11. It is very easy to get the approval of the concerned authority for our projects and plans</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>Getting the approval of the authority on our projects and plans is not an easy task at all</p> |
| <p>12. The goals of the plan are sometimes changed and as a result we have to reconsider our plan which leads to complication and delay</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>The goals of the plan and the priority scale are not changed in the manner or speed which could create such difficulties</p> |
| <p>13. Getting the necessary information from the government executive departments is an easy thing for us</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>We are faced with difficulties whenever we try to acquire the vital information from the government executive departments</p> |
| <p>14. Many people interpret the flexibility of planning as (a sign) of weakness and incapability to do what is required of us</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>Most people realise the importance of flexibility for the success of the planning process</p> |
| <p>15. Much of the information necessary for planning which we get from the government departments is incorrect or the element of error in its preparation is so high that we discard or revise it</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>The information we receive from the government departments is generally correct and can be relied upon without the need for a reexamination or revision</p> |

16. In general, we do not get useful reports on the results of plan execution from the executive departments	1 2 3 3 2 1	In general, the reports on results which reach us from the executive departments are very useful
--	-------------	--

II. Items in the environment scale included in the questionnaire submitted to the ministerial planning manager: A number of the items included here are the same as some of the items submitted to the central planning manager. These are the items numbered 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15. There are also other items included here which are similar in content but not in wording to the following items appearing in the environment scale submitted to the central planning manager: 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 13, 16. The changes in the wordings of these items were made to specify that the plan is the ministry plan; the executive departments are those within the ministry and so on. There are also new items included in this scale and these are as follows:

17. The number of projects presented to us is very large and consequently we cannot study them all and in detail before the date of plan submission	1 2 3 3 2 1	We are able to study and review all the proposed projects which reach us from the ministry departments
---	-------------	--

18. The number of projects proposed by the departments of the ministry is very small and does not satisfy the plan's need for projects	1 2 3 3 2 1	We receive an adequate number of proposed projects
--	-------------	--

- | | | |
|--|-------------|---|
| 19. Coordination with planning departments in other ministries (concerned with our plan) is not complete because of the routine etc. | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Coordination with planning departments in other ministries takes place in a systematic and smooth manner |
| 20. Our plans and reports are not given adequate attention from the central planning agencies | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | In my estimation, the central planning agencies give our plans and reports adequate and encouraging attention |

III. Items in the environment scale included in the questionnaire submitted to the research managers:

- | | | |
|---|-------------|--|
| 1. Most people do not realise that scientific research is not a routine function which can be performed within a given period of time | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Most people are aware of the nature of scientific research and its extensive dissimilarity from routine work |
| 2. Most people intentionally belittle the importance of our work, continuous effort and achievements | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Most people are fair in their appraisal and judge our work justly |

- | | | |
|---|-------------|--|
| 3. People expect from us a flood of inventions and dazzling results | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | People expect from us reasonable achievements |
| 4. We, the responsible officials in the research departments find ourselves blamed if obstacles emerge to hinder the realisation of research results expected from us | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | We do not get blamed if it is difficult to foresee such obstacles |
| 5. In the final analysis people will only remember our mistakes and the failure of our department to reach the goals prescribed for us | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | In the final analysis, people will remember mainly the good aspects of our work and especially our numerous achievements |
| 6. We have the necessary jurisdiction to do various researches without getting the approval of higher authorities | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Before beginning any research we have to refer it to higher authorities for their approval |
| 7. To get the approval on our research projects we have to submit lengthy justification and to wait for long periods of time | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | The process of getting the approval for our research projects is neither complicated nor cumbersome and does not result in a delay |

- | | | |
|---|--------------------|--|
| <p>8. Getting the necessary information from the other government departments is an easy task for us</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>We are faced with difficulties whenever we try to acquire the vital information from the other government departments</p> |
| <p>9. There is in this department an atmosphere of understanding and mutual appreciation between the scientists and the administrators</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>Unfortunately, an atmosphere of understanding does not exist between the scientists and the administrators in this department</p> |
| <p>10. We do not get financial appropriations sufficient to cover the cost of our operations and supplies</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>We get financial appropriations sufficient to finance all our operations and supplies</p> |
| <p>11. The government routine constitutes a major obstacle hindering our operations and frustrating our ambitions</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>Our operations and activities are not linked with the government routine and hence it does not constitute an obstacle to us</p> |
| <p>12. When one of our researchers goes to a government department to carry out tasks concerning research it is most likely that he will encounter difficulties</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>From our experience, when our researchers go to a government department to carry out tasks concerning research it is most likely that they will get the attention and satisfactory help from the employees of this department</p> |

- | | | |
|---|--------------------|--|
| <p>13. Often, we are asked to do research which exceeds the limits of our human and financial capability</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>Often, the requests submitted to us are reasonable and correspond with our capability and our department's circumstances</p> |
| <p>14. We do not have adequate measures to evaluate the research projects with and to determine priorities</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>We have the adequate measures to evaluate the research projects with and to sort them according to a clear priority scale</p> |
| <p>15. In choosing the research themes, priority is always given to the themes presented by the government departments</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>In choosing the research themes, priority is given to themes which interest the department's researchers and which have, at the same time, economic and social benefits</p> |
| <p>16. This department does not have the means to provide encouraging incentives to its researchers</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>This department has abundant means to provide encouraging incentives to its researchers</p> |
| <p>17. In my estimation the actual value of the research results (outputs) which are produced by this department considerably exceeds the actual value of the facilities (inputs) granted to us</p> | <p>1 2 3 3 2 1</p> | <p>In my estimation, the actual value of research results produced by us is considerably less than the actual value of the facilities granted to us</p> |

18. Our research is not 1 2 3 3 2 1
 met with interest from
 or followed up by the
 departments and agencies
 which could benefit from
 it

Our research is met
 with interest from and followed up by
 these departments

19. When people appraise 1 2 3 3 2 1
 our research and achieve-
 ments they stress the results
 and neglect to consider the
 circumstances surrounding
 us

People appraise our research and
 achievements objectively and do
 not neglect the circumstances
 surrounding us

20. My job here as a 1 2 3 3 2 1
 manager of the research
 department demands from
 me a tremendous effort

My job here does not demand from
 me more than a moderate effort

21. Our participation in 1 2 3 3 2 1
 solving the developmental
 problems is limited
 because the other departments
 do not inform us of these
 problems which fall within
 our field of specialisation

We receive adequate and regular
 information which makes it easy for us
 to identify the problems encountered
 in the developmental process

22. In general, the results 1 2 3 3 2 1
 we arrive at are put into
 practice and made use of

In general, the results we come
 up with are neglected and no
 benefit is derived from them.

C.2. The Environment Scale: Company Planning Manager

Every item in this part of the questionnaire is made up of two statements placed opposite each other. Please indicate in each case which of the two statements reflects your experience in your work, and to what extent it does so, by encircling the appropriate number. For example, choosing number one (1) in any of the items would indicate that you find the statement on your left to represent very closely the work situation.

- | | | |
|--|---------------|--|
| 1. It is very difficult to convince other departments to implement and follow the directives of our plan | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Other departments are easily convinced to implement and follow the directives of our plans |
| 2. Other departments try to impose their projects for the future on us | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Other departments propose their projects and never try to impose them on us |
| 3. We do not have a clear scale of priorities on which we can base our plans for the future | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | We do have a clear scale of priorities |
| 4. We are usually blamed if circumstances hinder the achievement of our plans' targets | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | We are never blamed if shortcomings cannot be helped |

- | | | |
|--|----------------------|---|
| <p>5. Other departments tend to belittle our efforts hard work and achievements.</p> | <p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</p> | <p>Other departments are fair-minded and tend to judge our efforts justly</p> |
| <p>6. In the final analysis, other departments will only remember the failures of our planning</p> | <p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</p> | <p>In the final analysis, other departments will remember mostly our successes and achievements</p> |
| <p>7. Other departments must become aware that sometimes planning works by a trial-and-error process</p> | <p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</p> | <p>Other departments are aware of this</p> |
| <p>8. It is very difficult to enlist the needed cooperation of other departments</p> | <p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</p> | <p>Other departments and their employees contribute their cooperation generously</p> |
| <p>9. Too much is expected of us in too little time</p> | <p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</p> | <p>We have ample time in which to prepare our forecasts and plans for the future</p> |
| <p>10. Getting our plans and projects approved is very difficult</p> | <p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</p> | <p>Getting our plans and projects approved and authorised is very easy</p> |

11. It is very easy
to acquire the necessary
information from other
departments .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

It is very difficult to
acquire the necessary information
from other departments.

D. The Manager Conformity Scale

The following caption precedes the questions included in this scale:

The following questions apply to the employees who are subordinated to you and you are made responsible for directing and supervising their activities. Answering these is done by encircling the appropriate number from the series of numbers which follows the question:

The following questions are included in the questionnaires submitted to the central company and ministerial planning and research managers. In the case of the research manager questionnaire, it is made clear that the subordinates referred to are the researchers, the research assistants and the technicians.

1. How much in your estimation, is the degree of your subordinates' participation in making the decisions you arrive at in your department?

low degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high degree

2. How much in your estimation, is the degree of closeness, cohesiveness and understanding between you and your subordinates?

low degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high degree

3. How much in your estimation is the freedom you allow your subordinates to disagree with you?

low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high

In addition to these, the following questions are also included in the scales presented to the central planning manager, the ministerial planning manager and the company planning manager:

4. How much in your estimation is the number and scope of responsibilities borne by your subordinates?

low number		high number
and	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	and
limited scope		limited scope

5. How much in your estimation is the degree of your subordinates' participation in setting the general goals of the plans and fixing the short term targets?

low degree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high degree

6. How much in your estimation is the opportunities allowed your subordinates to suggest and study economic project proposals?

low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high

In addition to questions numbered 1, 2, and 3, the following two questions are also included in the scale submitted to the research manager:

4. What degree of participation do you allow the researchers subordinated to you in preparing the research programme of your department?

low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high

5. How much freedom do you allow the department's researchers in choosing the themes of their research and their research associates and assistants?

limited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extensive

- E. Items on the Manager Distribution of his time on a number of his activities

The following caption precedes the items included in all the questionnaires except in the case of the company planning manager:

One of the objectives of this research is to find out how the administrative leader distributes his work time among his various responsibilities. The researcher has indicated and classified these responsibilities and you are kindly asked to indicate:

- a) the relative time you spend now on each task group
- b) the relative time you would like to spend on each task group and which you think is sufficient to perform it in a complete and ideal way.

Answering these questions is done by encircling the appropriate number from the series of numbers which follows each question: Numbers are from one (1) to seven (7) and number (1), hence, represents the relatively low time and number (7) the relatively high time.

Each of the items or task group is followed by these two questions:

- a) how much time you spend now?

low

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

high

b) how much time you would like to spend?

low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high

Items included in the questionnaire submitted to the central planning manager:

1. First Task Group: includes the responsibility of participation in setting the goals of the economic plan..... and the responsibility of specifying and clarifying the short term goals of your department's plan

2. Second Task Group: includes the task of making available to your department the various elements (inputs) which are vital to the department work such as relevant information, technical studies and proposals.

3. Third Task Group: includes the concern of the administrative leader for solving the problems which may arise between his subordinates and the employees of other organizations.

4. Fourth Task Group: includes the administrative leader's task of obtaining the approval of the higher authorities for decisions made in his department and includes also his interest in convincing the executive departments of the soundness of these decisions and of the need to implement them.

5, Fifth Task Group: includes the meetings arranged and undertaken by the administrative leader with persons (not planning officials or employees) who are important and whose cooperation and understanding are needed to fulfil the departmental mandate.

6. Sixth Task Group: includes the administrative leader responsibilities concerning the communication and the clarification of the goals and targets to his subordinates and includes also his duty to prepare a work plan for his department and to specify the role of each of his subordinates in this plan and to adjust or change this plan when circumstances demand it.

7. Seventh Task Group: includes the leader's function of coordinating the departmental operations with the operations of the other technical departments in the planning agency and his interest in maintaining a spirit of cooperation between his subordinates and the employees of the other departments.

8. Eighth Task Group: includes the leader's interest in finding the qualified elements to fill vacancies in his department and also his participation in interviewing the candidates, appointing them in the positions suitable to their specialisations and determining their grades and salaries.

9. Ninth Task Group: this includes the daily responsibilities of the administrative leader such as attending to the current affairs and issuing directives and instructions to his subordinates.

Items included in the questionnaire submitted to the ministerial planning manager:

1. First Task Group: includes the responsibilities of participation in drawing up the goals of the ministry's plan... and fixing and clarifying the short term and annual goals.

2. Second Task Group: includes the task of making available the various elements (inputs) which are vital to the functioning of the department such as relevant information, technical studies and proposals.

3. Third Task Group: includes the administrative leader's task of obtaining the approval of the concerned authority in the ministry on the decisions made in his department

4. Fourth Task Group: includes the task of linking and co-ordinating the work of the department with that of the central planning agencies and the planning departments in other ministries.

5. Fifth Task Group: includes the administrative leader's responsibility to communicate and clarify the goals and targets to his subordinates and includes also his duty to prepare a work plan for the department, to define the role of each of his employees in this work plan and to adjust or change it when circumstances demand.
6. Sixth Task Group: includes the administrative leader's function of co-ordinating the departmental operations with the operations of other departments in the ministry and his interest in maintaining a spirit of cooperation between his employees and the employees of other departments and in solving the administrative problems that may arise between them.
7. Seventh Task Group: includes the administrative leader's interest in finding the qualified elements to fill vacancies in his department and also his participation in interviewing the candidates, appointing them in the positions suitable to their specialisations and determining their grades and salaries.
8. Eighth Task Group: this includes the daily responsibilities of the administrative leader such as attending to current affairs and issuing directives and instructions to his subordinates.

Items included in the questionnaire submitted to the research manager:

1. First Task Group: includes the responsibility of the administrative leader of the research organization to obtain the official clarifications (laws and regulations) concerning the role and goals of his department and includes also his interest in making available to his department favourable opportunities for growth.
2. Second Task Group: includes the leader's task of obtaining the various elements (inputs) which are vital to the departmental functioning such as relevant information, proposals, equipment, publications etc.
3. Third Task Group: includes the administrative leader's task of acquiring the approval of the higher authorities on the decisions made in his department.
4. Fourth Task Group: includes the leader's function of co-ordinating the departmental operations with those of other concerned agencies, his concern for promoting a spirit of co-operation between the department's researchers and the employees of other agencies concerned with research performed by the department's researchers and includes also his participation in solving the problems which may arise between the researchers and employees of this department and the employees of other agencies.

5. Fifth Task Group: includes the administrative leader's responsibility to communicate and clarify the mandate and goals of the department to his subordinates, researchers and employees, and includes also his duty to prepare a work plan for his department and to define the role of each of the department's researchers and employees in this work plan and to adjust or change this plan when circumstances demand it.

6. Sixth Task Group: includes the administrative leader's interest in finding the qualified elements to fill vacancies in his department and includes also his participation in interviewing the candidates, appointing them in the positions suitable to their specialisations, and determining their grades and salaries.

7. Seventh Task Group: includes the daily responsibilities and functions of the administrative leader of the research organization such as attending to administrative business and supervising the progress of work in the organization.

8. Eighth Task Group: includes the activities performed by the administrative leader to satisfy his scientific (professional) interests such as working on research of his own and taking part in scientific conferences and study groups.

Items included in the questionnaire submitted to the company planning manager:

The following caption precedes these items:

One of the objectives of this research is to find out how the senior planner distributes his time and energy among his various functions and duties. These functions and duties have been divided into nine groups of activities and you are kindly asked to indicate:

- a) the relative time you spend now on each group of activities?
- b) the relative time you think must be spent ideally on each group of activities?

A time scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high) is inserted after each question. Please answer each question by encircling the appropriate number.

Each of the following items is followed by these two questions:

a) How much time do you spend now?

low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high

b) How much time would you like to spend?

low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 high

1. On having the goals of your department, the long-term perspective as well as the short term targets, defined and clarified.
2. On making sure that other inputs such as relevant information, technical studies, and proposed projects are made available to your department.
3. On solving conflicts which may arise between your subordinates and the employees of other departments.
4. On getting the plans and decisions made in your department approved by higher authorities in your organization and accepted by the other concerned departments.
5. On meeting persons (not members of your organization) whose cooperation and positive attitudes toward the organization are essential for the fulfilment of the department's mandate.

6. On communicating and clarifying the goals and targets of the organization to your subordinates, on preparing work plans for your department, and on adjusting and changing these plans when the need arises.
7. On coordinating the work of the various sections in your department and on resolving conflicts which may arise within the department.
8. On controlling and monitoring the daily work of your subordinates.
9. On finding qualified persons to fill job vacancies in your department, also on interviewing potential candidates, on placing them in the department, and on specifying their grades and salaries.

APPENDIX II

THE EMPLOYEE QUESTIONNAIRE

The texts shown here are the translations from the Arabic versions which were actually used in the research. Two versions of the employee questionnaire were administered to the employees of planning and research organizations. Each questionnaire is made up of the following parts:

- A. Covering letter (the same as the ones used in the corresponding manager questionnaires).
- B. Biography sheet (the same as the ones used in the corresponding manager questionnaires)
- C. The insecurity feeling scale
- D. The employee conformity scale
- E. The adjustment satisfaction scale
- F. The satisfaction and productivity graphs

C. The Insecurity Feeling Scale:

The first insecurity feeling scale is reproduced in Chapter VI.

The second insecurity feeling scale is as follows:

Every item of the question items included in this group is made up of two opposite statements, and the method of answering them is first by choosing one of the opposite statements and the one which corresponds to your opinion and personal knowledge and second by marking one of the three numbers (1 or 2 or 3) adjacent to the statement you have chosen. Indicate the number of your choice by encircling it and in accordance with the following:

Number one (1): expresses your complete agreement with the
 statement adjacent to the number

Number two (2): expresses your agreement in general with the
 statement

Number three (3): expresses your slight agreement with the
 statement

In other words, number (1) represents the highest degree of agreement and the number (3) the lowest degree of agreement.

1. A person should not 1 2 3 3 2 1
have unrestricted trust
in his abilities and skills
because this could bring
trouble upon the person

A person must have pride in
his abilities and skills and
trust in them always even if
this sometimes leads him to error.

2. One must accept the 1 2 3 3 2 1
opinion of the majority
even if he does not agree
with this opinion because
the majority opinion is
often nearer to the
correct opinion

Although the majority opinion
must be respected, one, however,
must keep his personal opinion
and defend it when necessary

3. One with high 1 2 3 3 2 1
qualifications performs
the job better than two
or three with average
qualifications

Two or three with average
qualifications perform the
job better than one highly
qualified

4. People favour and 1 2 3 3 2 1
respect the person who
works quietly and never
publicises himself and
his deeds

People favour and respect
the person who surpasses
his peers and manifests his
qualifications and deeds

- | | | |
|--|-------------|---|
| 5. One can be frank
with only close friends
and family members | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | One can be frank with all
alike |
| 6. Important social
changes are made by few
individuals (leaders)
within a relatively
short period of time
and without causing dislocations
in society | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Important social changes can
only be made gradually and
by making slight and gradual
changes in customs and ideas
and over a long period of
time |
| 7. Social relationships
(with family members and
friends), in general,
limit the individual's
activities and his
ambitions | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Social relationships do not
limit the individual's activities
or his ambitions |
| 8. In general when I
perform a job on my own
the result is in my
estimation better than
when I perform the
job with others | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | In general, the result is better
when I participate with others
in performing the job |
| 9. The individual
cannot accomplish anything
important in this life
without the support and
help of his family and
friends | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | The individual accomplishes
the important things on his
own and without help or
support from his family or
friends |

- | | | |
|---|-------------|--|
| 10. When one encounters a problem which is difficult to solve it is better that he follows it up until he reaches a solution or fails | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | When one encounters a problem which is difficult to solve it is better to leave it to other issues |
| 11. When one is faced with strong opposition it is advisable not to stand against the current | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Even if the opposition is strong one must stand fast |
| 12. It is appropriate that one avoids behaviour which could expose him to the others' criticism | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | One should not be wary of the others' criticism whenever he wants to do something |
| 13. It is not wise that one takes sole responsibility for an important decision involving a risk | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | No harm in taking responsibility for a decision no matter how important it is or what degree of risk is involved |
| 14. It is one's duty to admit his failure so that everyone can benefit from this experience | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | One does not admit his failure because others will not listen to his justification or appreciate his circumstances |

- | | | |
|--|-------------|--|
| 15. It is better that
one keeps a large number
of friends and acquaintances | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Keeping a large number of
friends and acquaintances
means a waste of much time
in niceties and civilities |
| 16. When one gets some
information the best and
fastest way of knowing
its correctness and
making sure of its
importance is done by
knowing its source | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Knowing just the source of
information is never enough
to judge the correctness and
importance of information |
| 17. I do not like to
work on a problem if
there is not a good
chance of reaching a
clear result | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | When I decide to work on a
problem I do not consider
whether I will reach a clear
result or not |
| 18. When I reach a
decision I seldom
change it. | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | I find no difficulty in
changing the decision I have
taken even if the others know
about it |

D. The Employee Conformity Scale:

The following caption precedes the items included in this scale:

The following questions deal with some of the
features and conditions of your job and
answering them is done by encircling the
appropriate number from the series of numbers
following each question.

The following items or questions are included in both versions of the employee conformity scale:

1. How much in your estimation is the number and scope of responsibilities you have in your present job?

low number		high number
and	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	and
limited scope		wide scope

2. How much in your estimation is the degree of your participation in making the decisions you arrive at in your organization?

low degree	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	high degree
------------	---------------	-------------

3. How much in your estimation is the degree of closeness, cohesiveness and understanding between you and your immediate superior?

low degree	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	high degree
------------	---------------	-------------

4. How much in your estimation is the scope of freedom you are allowed in disagreeing with your superior?

limited scope	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	wide scope
---------------	---------------	------------

The following question is included also in the employee questionnaire administered to the planning employees:

5. How much in your estimation is the degree of your participation in deciding the goals and the targets of the plan?

low degree	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	high degree
------------	---------------	-------------

In addition to the questions 1 - 4, the following question is included in the employee questionnaire administered to the research employees:

5. How much in your estimation is the scope of freedom you are allowed in choosing your research themes, research associates and assistants?

limited scope 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 wide scope

The following two additional items are included in the first and second conformity scale?

6. How many times does your immediate superior, the one who supervises your activities (and acting upon his own initiative) directly supervise and review your work:

- annually
- monthly
- several times in a month
- weekly (in the second questionnaire: several times in a week)
- daily

7. Which of the following statements expresses in general the nature of the work relationship between you and your immediate superior?

- We do not discuss the issues in detail and he alone (i.e. your immediate superior) makes the decision.
- We discuss the issues in detail but he alone makes the final decision

- We discuss the issues in detail and we, him and I, reach a common decision
- We discuss the issues in detail and my decision is usually confirmed
- We do not discuss the issues in detail and I make most of the decisions

E. The Adjustment-Satisfaction Scale (forms A and B)

The instructions provided for answering the items included in both forms, except the items involving the job offers, are the same as those used for the insecurity feeling scale. The following items are common to form A and B:

- | | | |
|--|---------------|--|
| 1. My duties and responsibilities are clearly defined and detailed to a satisfactory degree | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | My duties and responsibilities are not clearly defined and there is wide scope for interpretation which causes trouble |
| 2. I am not satisfied with what I have achieved until now in this job (or organization) and I have doubts about the future | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | I am satisfied with what I have achieved in this job (or organization) and I expect more in the future |
| 3. I am usually consulted regarding every issue which falls within my field of specialisation | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | I am seldom consulted in matters which fall within my field of specialisation |

- | | | |
|--|-------------|--|
| 4. I get support,
help and encouragement
from my immediate
superior to a
satisfactory degree | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | I am seldom the object of
my superior concern,
encouragement, or help. |
| 5. Most of my fellow
employees in this
organization do not
tolerate opposition | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Most of my fellow employees
in this organization are
broadminded and accept
opposition |
| 6. The person who
proves his scientific
and technical competence
gets the recognition and
encouragement in this
organization | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | The person who proves his
scientific and technical
competence does not necessarily
get the recognition and
encouragement |
| 7. I am sure that my
experience and knowledge
will increase as a result
of the work I am doing here
and (the work) I will perform
in the future | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | I do not believe that my
experience or knowledge will
increase if I continue to perform
this kind of work |
| 8. I have had only few
opportunities to present
proposals or to work on
research which I personally
find important | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | I have had many opportunities
to present proposals and do
research which I personally
find important |

9. If you were offered a job in another department and the salary scale is more than what you are getting now, which of the following statements would represent your reaction to this offer?

- I will seize the opportunity and accept the offer without hesitation
- I think I will accept the offer
- I do not know what my reaction would be
- I do not think I will accept the offer
- I am certain I will not accept the offer

In addition to these items, the following two items also appear in form A:

<p>10. Orders and procedures 1 2 3 3 2 1 are specified and detailed to a degree which prohibits initiatives from the employees and there is emphatic insistence from above on the necessity of adhering to the orders and procedures</p>	<p>Orders and procedures are not specified or detailed to such a degree and there is wide scope for initiative from the employees</p>
--	---

11. If you were offered a position in another government department and if you were told that the position is not different from your present job except that it affords you the opportunity to do the research which you like within a small group of researchers, which of the following statements would represent your reaction?

- The offer would not interest me and I will reject it
- I think I will reject the offer
- I do not know what my reaction would be
- I think I will accept the offer
- For sure I will accept the offer

In addition to the first nine items, the following items are included also in form B:


- | | | |
|--|---------------|---|
| 10. My personal opinion is that the work I am performing now is very important and beneficial | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | My personal feeling is that I am performing work which has no obvious importance or benefit known to me. |
| 11. When the research topics are chosen, the responsible officials in the organization consider <u>first</u> the scientific interests of the researchers | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | When the research topics are chosen, the responsible officials consider <u>lastly</u> the scientific interests of the researchers |

- | | | |
|---|-------------|--|
| 12. The atmosphere of understanding and co-operation in this organization helps in doing the research and reaching the sought results | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | Unfortunately, the organization atmosphere is not characterized by understanding and co-operation which impedes research work and reaching the sought results |
| 13. The organization offers us abundant incentives which encourage doing the research and achieving good results | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | The organization does not offer us adequate and encouraging incentives |
| 14. The organization supplies all my requirements of scientific equipment and promptly and facilitates my contacts with other organizations | 1 2 3 3 2 1 | The organization does not supply me with all my requirements and is usually late in providing me with the equipment and information necessary for doing the research |

F. The Satisfaction and Productivity Graphs

To economise on time and effort the following two questions are put in the form shown (graph) and you are kindly asked to draw a graph in response to each question representing the changes on the factor on the vertical axis over the years indicated on the horizontal axis:

1. Satisfaction
with
work



2. Rate of your
productivity
and degree of
job activeness

